Friday, February 28, 2014
Twenty Six Haitian-American Elected Officials Call on the State Department, the UN, OAS, CARICOM, IADB, IMF and World Bank to Act Immediately on the Dominican Republic
Friday, December 27, 2013
La Démocratie en Danger pour tous les Dominicains Par Roger Noriega
Democracia en riesgo para todos los dominicanos Por Roger F. Noriega
Democracy at Risk for all Dominicans By Roger F. Noriega
Thursday, February 3, 2011
Putting Aid to Work for the Haitian People: Creating a Haitian Housing Authority by Stanley Lucas









Friday, October 15, 2010
$1.15 billion US Aid Package for Haiti Goes to the Clinton Global Initiative by Stanley Lucas

For the third time this week, Fox News Anchor Bill O’Reilly highlighted the “Haiti Aid Scandal”. First, I think it would be helpful to outline the various pots of money that the US Government has allocated to Haiti so that we can all be clear about what is being discussed:
1. In the immediate aftermath of the earthquake, the US Government allocated approximately $1 billion in aid. Of that, only a couple hundred million actually got to the Haitian people for emergency assistance (medical, food, water, etc). The rest was to fund the cost of sending the 82nd Airborne and military down to Haiti to stabilize the country – as the UN mission was very badly hit by the earthquake.

The stunning news tonight is that the Clinton Global Initiative will receive all $1.15 billion of the $1.5 billion to deploy in Haiti as they see fit. For the Haitian Diaspora in the US and Haitians in-country it is somewhat surprising that the Secretary of State would put the money exclusively in her husband’s hands. This is disappointing because it is not what President Barack Obama promised Haitians. He committed to developing a partnership with Haiti – meaning that US aid would go to directly to Haitian institutions to strengthen their capacity not third party.
There are several potential implications for this money going exclusively to the Clinton Global Initiative (CGI). First, there are potentially other organizations that would be deserving of some of these funds but now everyone will have to prove themselves worthy to Mr. Clinton. Second, this means big dollars for Clinton’s NGO. The standard overhead or administrative fee used by NGOs is 22%, which means Bill Clinton’s NGO potentially just secured $253 million in overhead expenses, and has potentially fully funded his Initiative for years to come. CGI will then presumably make grants to other organizations, which will also require an overhead operating budget. This multiplier effect on overhead could result in more money than necessary going to operational budgets for international NGOs. This is potentially a lot of money going into the US system and not actually reaching the victims. Third, Clinton does not have a stellar track record of helping Haiti. On March 31, 1995, President Bill Clinton promised the people of Haiti 1,000 km in new roads, 1 million trees and job creation (see: http://ftp.resource.org/gpo.gov/papers/1995/1995_vol1_437.pdf ). The people of Haiti are still waiting for him to fulfill that 15-year-old promise. This has led to much skepticism about President Clinton’s high profile position in Haiti, which was brought to light after his appointment as UN Special Envoy last year (see: http://solutionshaiti.blogspot.com/2009/07/former-president-clinton-takes-his.html ).

A skeptical young Haitian listening to President Clinton last week
But most importantly, the question remains: Why doesn’t the US use the money to directly fund Haitian institutions (government, civil society, and Diaspora) and place technical advisors within those organizations to monitor the funds and program implementation? Haitians have serious doubts that the Clinton Global Initiative will use the money to strengthen Haitians and Haitian civil society. And, they believe that part of the reason that aid has been so ineffective after all these years is because money has not been used to strengthen capacity. See: http://metropolehaiti.com/metropole/full_une_fr.php?id=18364
One of the themes that emerged after the earthquake was the complete inability of the Haitian Government to respond to the earthquake and the disarray that the country is in despite $11 billion in aid money that has been poured into the country over the past 25 years. What happened was that most donors channeled their aid through international NGOs and bypassed the Haitian Government, civil society, Haitian Diaspora and other Haitian institutions. To be sure, the Haitian Government is rife with corruption, but there are ways to build capacity and fight corruption. What happened was that many international NGOs built capacity in-house instead of building Haitian capacity. Furthermore, there was a lack of coordination among aid agencies resulting in redundancy or one-off programs that did little to benefit Haiti in the long term. If the United States wants to help Haitians and have a real impact with this money, they should change the framework and prioritize investing in bringing skills and capacity to the Haitian people rather merely financing NGOs.
Tuesday, July 27, 2010
Lugar Calls for Business Reform; Proposes Haitian-American Enterprise Fund By Stanley Lucas

Summary
On July 22, Senator Lugar released a report, authored by senior staff members, entitled, “Without Reform, No Return on Investment in Haiti” (see http://lugar.senate.gov/issues/foreign/lac/haiti/pdf/investment.pdf ). The report summarizes the limited impact of US and foreign investment in Haiti over the past two decades and the serious hurdles to setting up a business. In order to jumpstart the private sector, Lugar has proposed the establishment of a Haitian American Enterprise Fund. The bill was introduced on April 14 and is pending review in the Committee on Foreign Affairs (see http://www.thomas.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c111:S.3202: ). The Fund would be modeled on the successful models of the enterprise funds created in the 1990s for Poland, Hungary, and other European countries after the fall of the Berlin Wall.
Analysis
Lugar’s team hit the nail on the head by pinpointing the reform of the business sector as the key to sustainable economic growth. In the immediate aftermath of the earthquake, former President Bush economist Glen Hubbard wrote a similar piece (see http://solutionshaiti.blogspot.com/2010/02/true-marshall-plan-for-haiti-by-glenn.html ) arguing that the success of the Marshall Plan in post-WWII Europe was based on the vibrant private sector, which was lacking in Haiti. To be sure, Haiti needs business reform and to formalize the private sector. The Haitian American Enterprise Fund is an interesting approach, but must be structured in a way that allows all Haitians access to the Fund. As the Fund is currently outlined, it will do nothing more than further strengthen Haiti’s elite business cartel and the current discredited leadership.
The report misses a critical element of why the business sector is in such disarray, and why there is almost no political will to make the necessary reforms. Haiti’s economy is controlled by a business cartel known as the “Groupe de Bourdon”, named after an affluent neighborhood. This cartel controls about 95% of the economy – and contributes a mere 4% of the income taxes collected. In the private sector they control food importation, the agriculture sector, banks, transportation, etc. They essentially monopolize all sectors, including the informal sector. For example, many people in the informal sector will buy bags of rice or other consumer products and then sell these items in the market for a slight mark up. They buy these products from the Groupe at an extremely high interest rate. It is feudalism at its best.
They do this with the support and participation of the Preval Administration. They financed Preval’s campaign, and in return, they gained control of the public and private sector. In the public sector, they leveraged their access to the President, they put in place the ministers of finance, commerce, public works, the directors generals of the tax offices and office to acquire state lands, the port and customs, the governor of the central bank, and economic advisors to the president. They also secured a monopoly of oil (via Petro Caraibe) and grains through PL480, a USAID program for Haiti. It is also the Groupe that is responsible for the incredible interest rates of 48-60% on small business loans and the limited access to credit. With this access they were able to acquire profitable state institutions for pennies on the dollar under the guise of privatization.
This Groupe also has the means to access the US Government, Congress and international aid. Several members of the cartel briefed the senate staffers. Unfortunately, the Lugar staff did not take the opportunity to meet with the local chambers of commerce and entrepreneurs that have been dedicated to bringing opportunity to all Haitians. This powerful group has effectively lobbied US codels, international delegations, Clinton, UN, IADB, and the World Bank. With the support of the Haitian government they have secured international aid funds to finance pet projects that do not at all benefit the Haitian people as a whole. For example, they are trying to secure an $80 million grant to build their own private university rather than modernizing and rebuilding the affordable state university. These loans and grant are taken on behalf of the Haitian people but finance their own end.
The report also misses the reason why there is a “dearth” of political will to make business reforms. The report states that President Preval is “resistant to overtures by the World Bank and other international partners to make difficult decisions, ostensibly because he fears being labeled a dictator by political adversaries if he makes certain reforms by decree.” First, it is unclear why these reforms would need to be made by decree. There is a legislature that is motivated to show some progress on important issues in advance of elections. But more fundamentally questionable is the assessment of Preval’s motives. He was unafraid of illegally extending his term in office and unafraid of passing the Emergency and Reform Act nullifying Haitian civil liberties. It is doubtful that he would be afraid to pass business reform measures that would make access to credit more possible and streamline regulatory procedures. President Preval is “resistant to international overtures” because the current system benefits him personally and his associates in the business cartel.
Finally, it is also somewhat confusing as to why the Dominican Republic factors so prominently into the report. Staff members met with as many representatives of the DR private sector as the Haitian private sector. As noted, the relationship between the two countries has been strained due to poor treatment of Haitian workers and a host of other issues. It is unclear why the DR private sector is bemoaning the fact that Haitian leaders are not looking at “island wide” recovery. The DR did not sustain the damage that Haiti did, and has likely only benefitted from the disaster with the increased numbers of aid workers and aid importation through their airports and ports.
Recommendations
The Haitian-American Enterprise Fund is an excellent idea, but there are additional efforts that could be undertaken to ensure that the private sector is bolstered:
· The Fund should be structured in a way that takes into account an entrenched business cartel and allows all Haitians access to the opportunities the Fund presents.
· While the Fund idea is strong and proven, it would be better as part of a more robust and comprehensive plan that includes technical assistance for legislative and regulatory reform to Haiti’s cumbersome business codes, training the judiciary and professionalization of government staff.
· Considering their past two decades performance, US AID Haiti’s capability to implement such a Fund should be reviewed. The US AID Haiti mission among the highest funded missions worldwide, but has not demonstrated a proven track record of results for the level of funding they have received.
· The report neglects to discuss the role of the Haitian Diaspora’s role as a key resource in supporting the building of the business sector. Unfortunately, the Lugar staff did not meet with prominent Haitian Diaspora business leaders in the US. This has been an issue for the Diaspora with the Administration and Congress throughout the rebuilding process and has left the Diaspora community wondering why they have been so seriously marginalized from the process.
· The regional and departmental Chambers of Commerce have also been neglected these organizations which have proven more representative of Haitian interests. They could use capacity building and professionalization programs. In addition, they are an excellent and more balanced source of information.
· In light of Preval’s resistance to implement private sector reforms, the Congress could consider working directly with Haiti’s legislature, which is highly motivated to undertake meaningful reform, especially with upcoming elections. Congress could consider establishing an interparliamentary exchange program with the Haitian legislature.
· Finally, the report mentions that critical lack of infrastructure is a primary obstacle to doing business in Haiti. This is an excellent area for US aid as it provides immediate job opportunities for Haitians, opportunities for US companies and tangible results. Most importantly, investing in infrastructure skirts the complicated political issues, such as FDI and the DR.



