Stanley Lucas on USIP and the Haitian Defense Force

    Robert Maguire (USIP)

USIP posted a seemingly factual analysis or “Current Situation” update on Haiti.  It’s actually quite a clever post because at first reading, it appears to be straightforward and non-partisan.  But if you look a little more closely at what is not said, the slant becomes much more visible.  The post overall reads as skeptical of the Martelly Administration – but manages to get in a plug for former president Aristide by noting how he disbanded the military in Haiti.  But most troubling, this post seems to suggest that Haiti is incapable of building a modern, professional army.  It seems to suggest that the international community – and the NGOs that control many sectors of Haitian society – doubt Haiti’s ability to build up an army based on the past performance of armies under dictators.  Is this at all fair?  The Chileans did it.  The Iraqis are doing it.  The Afghanis are doing it.  The Argentineans did it.  The Filipinos did it.  The Dominicans did it.  Is Haiti less than any of these countries?

What we never see in any of the coverage on the new Haitian Defense Force are the underlying facts that led Haiti to prioritize building a modern defense force:

First, the idea of a Haitian National Defense Force comes directly from the people of Haiti.  On the campaign trail, candidate Martelly heard again and again about the need to reclaim national sovereignty and reinstate an army.  To his surprise, this was the top issue for Haitian voters.  In fact, 96% of the Haitian people want the army back.  Why was this fact omitted from this objective analysis?

Second, the UN Mission in Haiti, MINUSTAH, has been ineffectual and has lost the confidence of the Haitian people.  MINUSTAH has received more than $4 billion in funding over the past seven years.  Their track record is marked by scandal after scandal – from cholera to the brutal rape of a 19 year old man.  This demonstrates a pattern of mismanagement.  Unfortunately, the MINUSTAH has become a destabilizing force in the country.  The Haitian people are fed up and would prefer to have MINUSTAH phased out. 

Further, MINUSTAH’s mission to build a police force is insufficient to ever provide Haiti with enough resources to patrol and defend borders, fight the war on drugs and manage disasters.  Former MINUSTAH commander, General Elito, said as much in 2007.  He said that even if they trained 30,000 police officers, it would not be a sufficient force.  Why did this post only focus then on the UN’s statements about renegotiating the current agreement rather than noting – even in passing – these larger dynamics with MINUSTAH?

Third, the Haitian state was paralyzed after the earthquake.  It was unable to pick up the pieces or participate at all in rescue and recovery.  The US military had to come in to provide stability, manage ports and airports and get food to the people.  Haiti sits on three fault lines and in a hurricane path – it must build the capability to manage and cope with disasters.  This typically is a military function.  Why didn’t this post note at all the important role of a military in disaster response?

And finally – and most importantly perhaps – Haiti is a sovereign and free country.  Why wouldn’t it have its own protection forces?  Why wouldn’t Haiti have the right to defend itself?  Other nations with similar past circumstances have rebuilt their militaries.  After the fall of Augusto Pinochet in Chile, the Chileans reinstated their army.  They built a modern, professional military force after a brutal dictatorial regime and a “negative history” with their army.  The Chilean military, in fact, helped pick up the pieces after they experienced a devastating earthquake in 2010.  The military is functioning professionally and as a military is intended to function.  Is Haiti somehow less than Chile? 

In fact, it is quite common to rebuild and modernize military forces after the fall of dictatorship or civil war.  This was the policy of the US Government in Iraq and Afghanistan.  It is typically part of a military exit strategy. 

This article also fails to mention that after Aristide disbanded the military, because he felt he could not control them, he built up a network of gangs and thugs, known as chimeres, who terrorized the citizens and were involved in drug trafficking, kidnapping and politically motivated murder and violence.  So if history is the standard, the absence of a military did not work out so well for Haiti either.

What you should know about USIP is that the Haiti program is led by an ideologue close to Aristide. 

Bob Maguire is widely considered to be the brain trust behind the Operation Bagdad campaigns in Haiti that led to the murder of 2000 people, and the rape of 800 people.  It was a brutal gang-led campaign to bring terror to the people.  Dr. Maguire believed he was building a force of revolutionaries to rise up against President Boniface Alexandre and Prime Minister Latortue and reinstate his patron, Aristide.  But the gangs did not want revolution, they saw opportunity to take control of resources and the drug trade in the absence of Haiti’s drug kingpin, Aristide. 

The subtly of the posting just goes to show how carefully one must read the news.  I hope that Haitians will stay informed and know their history rather than accept these types of posts at face value. 

Duvalier Returns to Haiti; Merely a Pawn in the Political Chaos by Stanley Lucas

Three former strongmen of Haiti have been living in exile since being forced to leave the country:  Jean Claude Duvalier, better remembered as “Baby Doc”, exiled in France; General Henri Namphy in the Dominican Republic; and Jean Bertrand Aristide in South Africa.  Duvalier’s return opens the door to the return of other former corrupt leaders the Haitian people ousted and sends a message to current leaders that there are no consequences to corruption.  It is important at this time to look back at these three leaders to better frame what Duvalier’s return actually means for the Haitian people.

After a popular uprising against his regime, Jean Claude Duvalier, self-appointed President for Life, left Haiti on February 7, 1986 after 14 years in power.  Henri Namphy, General President, who headed the transition after Duvalier’s departure left the country on June 20, 1988 after a military coup.  And, Jean Bertrand Aristide left on February 29, 2004 after a popular uprising and an armed rebellion led by his former allies.

Aristide and Duvalier’s Ouster

Aristide and Duvalier have extensive human rights violations and track records of corruption.  They brutalized the Haitian people and enriched themselves.  Duvalier persecuted and killed many political opponents, see: http://www.fordi9.com/Pages/Victlist/ListA.htm .  During his regime thousands of political opponents had to flee the country.  Freedom of expression and civil liberties were non-existent under his rule.  Journalists were persecuted as well and political parties were outlawed under Haiti’s one party system.  After his departure an administrative commission, led by former Minister of Finance Leslie Delatour, concluded Duvalier had stolen more than US$600 million from Haiti’s coffers.

Jean Bertrand Aristide was democratically elected in December 1990.  The people of Haiti were hopeful that this humble, poor priest meant a new era for Haiti.  But Aristide ruled as a strongman – not as a man of God. Aristide lost credibility among the Haitian democrats when he recruited some of the FRAPH killers, a paramilitary group responsible for the killing hundreds of Haitians after the 1991 coup d’etat.  Aristide used those killers to assassinate a popular catholic priest that stood up against his corruption and violence, Father Ti Jean.  When the Secretary General of Haiti Human Rights Platform, Chenet Jean Baptiste, denounced the killing, he had to flee the country to save his life.  Aristide recuperated several Duvalierists that were members of the military and the now defunct Tonton Macoutes, a paramilitary group under Duvalier, during his second term in office.  The most well known was Sainvoyis Pascal, who Aristide made Speaker of the House in 2001 as the head of the Lavalas caucus in the House of Deputies. Aristide persecuted and killed his political opponents.  Journalists, women and youth activists, political parties and human rights activists, peasants and others that opposed his views were beaten, illegally jailed or killed, see: http://www.forumhaiti.com/t678-liste-partielle-des-victimes-et-magouilles-du-lavalas  and http://www.prevalhaiti.com/messages.php/24180 . After Aristide resigned in 2004, Haiti’s General Accounting Office and an administrative commission led by the current Minister of Justice Paul Denis found that he had stolen more than US$350 million from Haiti’s coffers over nine years, see: http://www.haitipolicy.org/content/3284.htm 

Both Aristide and Duvaliers have maintained with the stolen funds a base of support in-country while residing in exile.  But Aristide went a step further and has maintained a network of contacts in the U.S. comprised of his former lobbyists see: http://www.haitipolicy.org/Lobbying7.htm and people who made money with him during his rule via telecommunications and other business dealings.  He also has a network of academics and ideologues like Robert Maguire at the US Institute of Peace, Dr. Paul Farmer, a prominent AIDS expert and Deputy UN Special Envoy to Haiti, who actively promoted Aristide’s return under the false premise that he was  “kidnapped” by the US Government in 2004 rather than having resigned in disgrace and requested evacuation.  Aristide’s own Prime Minister has denied the kidnapping claim and stated officially and publicly that the kidnapping charge was fabricated for political purposes.

Duvalier and Aristide’s Relationship with the Preval Government

Rene Preval and Jean Bertrand Aristide were political twins when they were seeking power in the 1990s.  When Aristide became President in 1991 he ditched the coalition (FNCD) that allowed him to win the presidency and a parliamentary majority.  He handpicked Rene Preval as his Prime Minister in February 1991, in violation of the Haitian constitution, which requires that the Prime Minister be selected from the party that has the majority in both chamber of parliament.

On August 13, 1991, the FNCD caucus in parliament sought to fire Preval as Prime Minister on the grounds of incompetency.  Both men, Aristide and Preval, sent a group of thugs to burn some of the members with a common tactic of  their regime “necklacing” burning tires around their necks.  Without police intervention many members of the House of Deputies could have died that day, among them the current Haiti’s ambassador at the OAS Dully Brutus, former Speaker of the House of Deputies.  This act led to a political crisis and later an illegal military coup in September 1991.  Both Aristide and Preval went into exile.  

After Aristide requested a US military intervention for his return in 1994 and attempt to illegally stay in power after his term was over, he was forced to relinquish power and Preval became his successor.  Aristide wanted Preval to be his puppet during Preval’s first term in office as president.  When Preval started to become more independent, Aristide -- as a warning -- sent some of his thugs to kill the dogs Preval’s sister, who was serving as his Executive Assistance.  Despite the warning Preval, continued to move away from Aristide.  As a second warning, Preval’s sister was shot and wounded by Aristide’s gunmen.  Preval backed down and ceded to Aristide’s pressure following his instruction to the letter.  

At the end of his first term under Aristide’s control, Preval rigged both the legislative and presidential elections in May and November 2000.  The President of the Provisional Electoral Council (CEP) Leon Manus resisted and in a public letter denounced the fraud threatened by Aristide and Preval and had to flee the country for political exile in the United States.  Despite a letter written to the OAS by Manus detailing the situation, the OAS did nothing.  Aristide forced his majority in parliament and stole the presidency.  The people of Haiti stood up and said “no”, and contested the legitimacy of both parliament and Aristide as president.  On February 7, 2001, two presidents were sworn in:  Aristide who stole the elections, and Gerard Gourgue a provisional president representing the opposition.  Preval went quietly back to his hometown Marmelade. The following three years Aristide in power tried to frame and eliminate Preval. One of the key players protecting Preval against Aristide a that time was Jude Celestin who got a stock of heavy weapons from Preval before the end of his first term. From 2001 to 2004, Aristide used violence and corruption to suppress dissent among the population -- students, women, political parties, peasants,  press, humans right activists, and civil society.  His brutality failed.  The Haitian people would not stand for it.  In February 2004, a popular uprising was highjacked at the last minute by a group of gunmen, who used to serve as Aristide henchmen and allies, provoked his resignation.  He fled into exile with the assistance of the US military at his request.  Aristide’s Prime Minister Yvon Neptune invoked Article 149 of the constitution and allowed a member of the Haitian Supreme Court to become provisional president.

The provisional government organized general elections in 2006 allowing every political party to run, but they prevented any members of the provisional government to run for office unless they resigned six months prior to the elections. Preval became president and Aristide’s Lavalas party won six of the 99 seats in the Chamber of Deputies and three of the 30 seats in the Senate.  It was clear that the Lavalas party had no political support among the people.  Preval distanced himself from Aristide and captured most of his supporters and gave them government positions in his office, the cabinet and the civil service.  Preval closed all the loopholes that allowed Aristide to siphon money from the State.  Since then, Aristide has been maneuvering with his former lobbyists and allies to use Haiti’s telecommunications company to weaken Preval and promote their fabricated line that he was kidnapped all in an effort to return him to Haiti.  Aristide promised to make everyone rich – or richer as several of them have already enriched themselves with Aristide

Preval’s relationship with Duvalier began in the 1980’s through Michele Pierre Louis, Haiti’s former Prime Minister.  At that time, Pierre Louis was Deputy Director General of the airport.  They negotiated Preval’s return to Haiti (he had fled into exile in the 1960s) and gave him a job as a civil servant.  Preval knew key players at the Minister level since he grew up with several of them, attended the same schools and lived in the same neighborhood.  When as a young man he had to flee Haiti into exile in Belgium, two of Preval’s friends under the Duvalier regime went to the Dominican Embassy where Preval was seeking asylum to give him a packet of cigarettes and US$100.  One of them, a Duvalierist, is living in Long Island today and is Preval’s top political advisor and most trusted political ally.

This the context in which Jean Claude Duvalier returned to Haiti.  His return is inextricably linked with Aristide and Preval’s agendas, and most observers believe he is merely a pawn in or distraction from a larger political dynamic underway.

Duvalier’s “Inexplicable” and “Surprise” Return

Duvalier landed in Haiti on January 17, 2011 after 24 years in political exile in France.  His return is being labeled a “surprise” in press reports, but it could not have happened without international diplomatic support and Preval’s approval.  He could not have boarded a plane in France to Haiti without the approval of the French and Haitian governments.  Further, his supporters did not seem to be surprised by his return as they turned out to great him at the airport. 

News coverage of Duvalier’s return has also called his return “inexplicable”, but many Haitians are speculating about three likely scenarios:

1.     Preval is using Duvalier’s return to create political confusion and a distraction for the international community.  Preval received the OAS’s report of recommendations on how to resolve the fraudulent elections last Thursday.  On Monday, the OAS Secretary General will visit Haiti to get Preval’s official response to the report findings. 

The report recommends a run off elections between the top two candidates:  Martelly and Manigat.  International officials have stated that the report “makes sense” and the methodology is “flawless” and the credentials of the report team are “impeccable”.  Haitians are questioning what methodology would actually account for the thousands of ballots littering the streets, uncounted after the elections.  Apparently the recount process was carried out by using a small percentage of the tally sheets from the voting precincts.  It was widely reported and observed that tally sheets were manipulated before they even arrived at the tabulation center. 

In this scenario, Duvalier’s return creates an enormous distraction, serious confusion and has the added benefit of rallying his base against Duvalier.  Essentially, Duvalier is a pawn in Preval’s transparent and desperate attempts to maintain power.

2.     People believe that Dr. Paul Farmer, head of Partners in Health and Mr. Clinton’s deputy UN special envoy to Haiti, is has orchestrated Duvalier’s return behind the scenes.  Farmer is an ardent Aristide supporter and Duvalier’s return opens a window for Aristide’s return.  If Duvalier can return, why not Aristide?  Aristide has an equally despotic track record in Haiti stealing elections, trafficking drugs and overseeing political persecution, violence and murder.  His return would be disastrous for Haitians.  Ever since the earthquake, however, there has been speculation about Aristide’s return.  He has tested the waters as have his political supporters, so people believe this is their political play to get him back in country. 

3.     Duvalier’s return creates a level of political chaos that will be impossible to resolve without foreign political occupation – and someone, somewhere benefits from that with billions of aid money on the line.  The Haitian people will resolutely reject foreign occupation, however. 

Whoever is pulling the strings (Preval or Farmer/Aristide backers), it is clear that they do not want to see a run-off between Martelly and Manigat and the annulment of the legislative elections.  Duvalier is a pawn and a distraction.  And, no matter who is using Duvalier as a pawn, knows there are the only two scenarios facing Duvalier:  jail or execution. 

One thing is certain:  whoever is behind this move wants to ensure and maintain the status quo of corruption in Haiti.  Ultimately whether or not the underlying motive is billions of dollars in reconstruction contracts that are in play or newly discovered resources (it is widely speculated that the earthquake revealed an oil deposit off the coast of Haiti) that some are trying to put their hands on, Haitian reformers in Haiti and the Diaspora need to come together via an emergency political summit to put an end to this madness. The Haitian democrats in country and in the Diaspora that are trying to change the culture of corruption are caught in a nexus of power that inhibits or completely thwarts their efforts.  On the one side is the corrupt politics of Duvalier, Aristide and Preval and the Groupe de Bourdon, Haiti’s business cartel controlling more than 90% of the economy and paying only 4% of the taxes, which is basically the status quo.  And on the other side is the network of supporters in Washington, DC and other big capitals of the world.  This group is comprised of lawyer searching for large retainers, ideological academics and foreign profiteers.  In their fight for democracy and the modernization of Haiti’s economic system, they never find a support base, and worse, those members of the wealthy sector use their resource to publicly assassinate their characters and isolate them. For all Haitians, a foreign occupation will never be an option and the political instability must end.  We need to focus on rebuilding the country.  Now.

RAND Haiti Policy Report Review by Stanley Lucas

Report Summary

The RAND Corporation, a non-profit institution that helps improve policy and decision making through research and analysis, released a report entitled, “Building a More Resilient Haitian State” earlier this year.  A book version of the report can be purchased online at http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG1039/ for about $20 or can be downloaded free.  The Carnegie Corporation and the Smith Richardson Foundation funded the report.

 

The report states that Haiti's future prosperity and peace require building a more effective, resilient state.  For the past several decades Haiti’s state institutions have been riddled with weaknesses in human resources, organization, procedures, and policies.  The researchers begin by summarizing Haiti’s overall challenges and then assess key sectors, including:  Governance and Administration; Justice; Security; Economic Policy; Housing and Infrastructure; Education; Health; and Donor Cooperation and Building the Haitian State. 

 

For each sector, RAND researchers identified Haiti's main challenges, assessed current strategic plans to tackle the key issues and recommended a set of state-building priorities that are necessary, feasible, and sustainable.  Priorities include civil service reform, justice-system reform, ongoing involvement of United Nations peacekeepers, streamlined regulations for business, and improved access and quality assurance for healthcare and schools.

 

RAND singles out the primacy of Haiti’s poor governance over the past several decades as the key factor for the devastation in Haiti after the earthquake and “society's almost complete dependence on help from abroad to deal with the consequences.”  They conclude that:

 

State-building is intimately connected with politics.  Without executive decisiveness and legislative action, state-building cannot proceed.  Donors and international organizations can assist — not only by providing financial resources but also by promoting political consensus and encouraging adherence to strategic plans.

 

Report Analysis

At the outset the report misses the mark in its analysis of the tent cities as being an effective stopgap solution to the housing challenges.  Haitians are not even living in tents.  Rather, most are living under tarps in unorganized, unofficial camps.  They are facing violence, disease, lack of regular access to food and water, and eviction from landowners.  This is by no means effective and many observers have said that the tent cities do not meet international standards for disaster relief efforts.

 

The governance challenges set forth in this report are well known to the Haitian people.  Haiti – having the most significant income disparity ratio in the world – is controlled largely by a small elite (Groupe de Bourdon) that is resistant to reform and an entrenched, corrupt leadership.  Given high levels of corruption, many donors are unwilling to fund all important capacity building, which has stymied progress even further and failed to tackle the root of the problem in Haiti.  The recommendations in the governance section are well-worn territory but present a good assessment of the current strategic plans.  One of their most interesting conclusions, which is also a theme of the report, is that current plans are often overly comprehensive and fail to set forth priorities and clear timelines for implementation.  They also neglect to establish benchmarks and monitoring and evaluation (M&E) mechanisms.  This is true across all sectors and is a failing of all the strategic plans put forward to date.  In many cases, plans are so broad it allows donors to justify any program that they develop.

 

The healthcare section offers some of the most interesting ideas for how to reorganize the sector.  They advocate having the Haitian Health Ministry (MSPP) set the priorities, with international technical support, but then introducing a competitive bidding system to operate the Haitian healthcare system.  Currently donors operate a patchwork of uncoordinated programs and often operate completely outside of the Haitian government.  Although well intentioned, this dynamic ends up undermining the Haitian Health Ministry and is often not in the best interest of the long-term development of the system.  This is a particularly compelling suggestion as they recommend dividing the country and contracts into regions and having NGOs operate Haitian Government branded facilities in order to build public confidence as well.  Clearly there would be resistance to such a radical shift and to the Haitian Government asserting its authority.  The researchers recognize that some donors could chose to walk away from their programs, but in the end, operating a few large scale programs would have more impact and be more manageable than operating many smaller scale projects.

 

Interestingly, the report also singles out donors for not being as effective as they could be.  The report states that Haiti has been a focus of international donors and aid organizations as the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere and the only country to see a decline in GDP in the past 30 years.  However, all this attention has not translated into any improvement in Haiti’s circumstances.  In fact, Haiti’s social, economic and political situations have worsened.  In order to get this situation under control, the report advocates for the Haitian government to take a greater role in streamlining aid and focusing projects on priorities rather than accepting anything the aid community offers, including the small one-off projects.

 

On the flip side, the report advocates for aid organizations to subtly guide the political process in Haiti and encourage adherence to plans.  This seems somewhat incongruent with the tone of the report overall.  In several places the researchers advocate that the Haitian government should be stronger in asserting its leadership and providing direction to the aid organizations.  It recognizes that the Government may need technical assistance in developing priorities, but that there should be more consideration to what is best for building the Haitian state rather than what is in the best interest of the NGOs.  In fact, they note that many NGOs compete with each other for funding and primacy on issues.  It is not the role of the NGO community to subtly guide the political process or promote political consensus.  To do so may contribute to the perception that aid organizations are trying to build winners and losers.  We agree that NGOs and donors should focus more on capacity building more in line with the Nine Principles of Development and Reconstruction issued by the USAID.

 

One other aspect of the rebuilding process that would have been useful to delve into was to help build up a national watchdog function to monitor the Haitian Government and donor community by tracking dollars and impact and publicizing the results.  A key lesson from the tsunami recovery in Aceh was that donor confidence was bolstered by financial accountability.  A small Haitian watchdog group has tried to monitor funds but was undermined by the UN, which said they would provide that function.  While it is of course fine for the UN to provide a watchdog function, they missed an important opportunity to build a more resilient state by providing technical and financial assistance to building capacity in-country.  Haiti has been plagued by corruption for decades and has landed at the top of Transparency International’s list for the past several years as being one of the most corrupt countries in the world.  Surely a civil society watchdog function would go a long way toward building resiliency in the Haitian state.

Overall the report is a very useful overview of the various plans out there to tackle Haiti’s problems and provides a very valuable contribution in noting the main shortfall with those plans (namely the lack of timelines and priorities). 

Haiti’s Drug Problems

By Robert Perito and Greg MalyJune 2007
on May 8, 2007, President Bush promised Haitian President René Préval that the United States would do more to help Haiti fight drugs and drug traffickers. Préval agreed that drugs threaten Haiti’s government, which lacks the capacity to fight international narcotics trafficking alone. The two presidents were right to emphasize this issue. The nearly unimpeded flow of narcotics through Haiti undermines the rule of law and the legitimacy of Haiti’s government. It fosters corruption in the police, courts, and customs; fuels weapons trafficking; finances armed gangs; breeds insecurity; and hampers economic development by discouraging investment and tourism. Haiti is an important transshipment point for cocaine reaching the United States and a major concern for American authorities.
The nature of the threat to Haiti from narcotics trafficking and the nature of U.S. counter-narcotics assistance were discussed by a panel of experts at a meeting of the Institute’s Haiti Working Group on June 8, 2007. Panelists included Alexander Toth, chief, Latin America and Caribbean Section, Office of Enforcement Operations, U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency; Kevin Brown, head of the Caribbean and Central American Section, International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Bureau, U.S. Department of State; Leon Charles, minister counselor, Embassy of Haiti and former director of the Haitian National Police; and, Dr. Marie-Claude Rigaud, a distinguished life fellow of the American Psychiatric Association. Robert Perito, director of the USIP Haiti Working Group, served as moderator. Following is a summary of the views expressed by the speakers and the audience during the meeting. It does not represent the views of the U.S. Institute of Peace, which does not take policy positions.

Haiti Is an Important Transshipment Point for Cocaine...
Shipments through Mexico and Central America account for 90 percent of the cocaine exported from South America to the United States. The remaining ten percent is shipped through central and eastern Caribbean. In recent years, successful enforcement efforts in Jamaica have reduced trafficking through that country. At the same time, President Chavez’s anti-American policies have reduced counter-narcotics cooperation and resulted in sharply increased cocaine shipments from Venezuela through Haiti and the Dominican Republic on the Island of Hispaniola. U.S. government agencies estimate that 83 metric tons or about eight percent of the cocaine entering the United States in 2006 transited either Haiti or the Dominican Republic.
Haiti has 1,200 miles of unprotected coastline and 225 miles of un-patrolled land border. Drug shipments by "fast boats" and small planes land at tiny ports and on clandestine airstrips scattered along Haiti’s southern coast. Haiti’s under-strength and dysfunctional police force is unable to respond to the challenge, as traffickers often take as little as five minutes to offload their cargo and refuel. Haiti’s tiny coast guard has only two patrol boats, 95 personnel, and no air assets. Corruption among Haiti’s law enforcement authorities is common. A near-record seizure of 925 pounds of cocaine on May 31, 2007 in the coastal town of Loegane highlights Haiti’s problems. The drugs were discovered at a road checkpoint in vehicles with government license plates. Five police officers were among the ten people arrested.
Faced with a nearly overwhelming challenge from international drug traffickers, Haiti’s government has been frank about the need for international assistance. In a speech to the Haitian Parliament on January 10, 2007, Préval alleged that the United States had failed to fulfill its obligations under the 1998 bilateral drug enforcement agreement, which permitted the United States to conduct counter-narcotics operations in and around Haiti. Préval said the United States needed to do more to interdict drug shipments and dismantle drug gangs. On March 16, 2007, Préval joined leaders from the Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Colombia, Grenada, and Trinidad and Tobago and representatives from Europe and the United States at a regional summit on Drugs, Security, and Cooperation in the Caribbean. Préval called for increased foreign assistance for the Caribbean as part of a global battle against narcotics traffickers: "If we are left alone, the drug-trafficking giants are going to devour us in one bite." On May 18, in a Haitian Flag Day speech, Préval declared a "war without end" against corruption, smuggling and drug trafficking.

U.S. Counter-Narcotics Programs Short of Funds and Resources
The United States has made a good faith effort to control the flow of narcotics through Haiti and the Dominican Republic within the limits of available resources. Following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the U.S. Coast Guard re-deployed assets from the eastern Caribbean to the U.S. mainland to improve port security. This reduced the U.S ability to interdict drugs transiting the Caribbean. At the same time, U.S. national priorities such as the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan reduced overall resources that might have been available for funding drug enforcement operations in Haiti. Additional limitations come from the inability of the Haitian government and security services to effectively utilize assistance and the reality of high levels of official corruption in Haiti. Yet, U.S. and Haitian counter-narcotics efforts have proven effective when vigorously applied.
In 2006, U.S. authorities tracked 159 drug flights from South America to Haiti and the Dominican Republic. From March to May 2007, the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) conducted Operation Rum Punch and Rum Chaser, which involved an intensive effort to reduce drug flights and seize drug shipments. During the operation, there was more than a 40 percent drop in the number of drug flights into Haiti compared to the previous four months. Of those flights that came through, four were interdicted yielding the seizure of over 1,135 kilograms of cocaine. Subsequently, there was a dramatic decrease in the number of suspected drug flights from Venezuela and Colombia into Haiti and a shift of airdrops and clandestine landings of aircraft carrying cocaine to the Dominican Republic.
For the long term, however, programs to reform the Haitian National Police (HNP) remain the cornerstone of U.S. efforts to control the transshipment of narcotics through Haiti. Without an effective Haitian police force there is little prospect of solving Haiti’s narcotics-related problems. The United States has contributed $40 million in training and equipment for the HNP, the country’s only security force. Assistance included upgrades for the police academy, a model police stations program, and provision of communications, vehicles, uniforms, and related gear. The HNP’s special counter narcotics unit has 45 vetted officers and has received U.S. training, equipment and support for operations. Within this unit, DEA has specially selected and trained a Sensitive Investigative Unit composed of officers who collect intelligence and conduct operations against major traffickers. The U.S. Coast Guard provides equipment and training to its Haitian counterpart, which conducts limited operations from bases at Killick and Cap Haitien. The United States also provides technical assistance to a financial investigative unit located at the Haitian Central Bank that deals with money laundering and official corruption. Overall U.S. drug-related assistance to Haiti has totalled about $1 million annually since 2004.
Critics of the U.S. counter-narcotics effort believe the United States could do more, particularly given the seriousness of the threat. They argue that the following steps could be undertaken without a major increase in financial resources:
A full complement of DEA officers could be assigned to the U.S. Embassy in Port au Prince. During 2006, several of the five DEA positions at the embassy were not filled.
The U.S. Coast Guard could join with regional partners under the Caribbean Regional Maritime Cooperation Agreement to deploy additional units and increase assistance to their Haitian counterparts. The U.S. Coast Guard concentrates its effort north of Haiti to interdict Haitian migrants rather than patrolling south of Haiti to interdict drugs.
The United States could reassign aircraft from the large Blackhawk helicopter force that operates in Colombia to Haiti to support UN and HNP counter drug operations.
MINUSTAH, the UN mission in Haiti, could become more involved in counter-narcotics efforts. The United States could assign experienced counter-narcotics specialists to the UN police force.
Greater international attention could be paid to controlling Haiti’s border with the Dominican Republic.
The Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM) could create a regional special court to deal with drug traffickers that would be funded by international donors.

Domestic Drug Abuse Is Not a Problem
Ironically, Haiti’s status as the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere and the fact that most Haitians still live in rural areas have prevented the development of an internal drug abuse problem. Some traditional use of marijuana continues, but cocaine and heroine are beyond the purchasing power of all but a tiny fraction of Haiti’s population. Moreover, social cohesion and traditional moral values still hold sway in rural areas preventing young people from experimenting with drugs. This may not always remain the case, however. Experience in other countries shows that drug flows through transit countries eventually leave a growing residue of local drug addiction.