Aristide’s Lawyers File Corruption Charges Against the Clintons in Haiti by Stanley Lucas

After decades of stealing from the Haitian people, Aristide has orchestrated an investigation into the Clinton’s deployment of earthquake aid and reconstruction funds.  On April 12, 2014, one of Jean Bertrand Aristide’s proxies, Newton St. Juste, a Haitian lawyer, filed corruption charges with Haiti’s General Accounting Office (Cour Superieure des Comptes) against former President Bill Clinton and former Secretary Hillary Clinton.  Based on press reports, the corruption filing alleges that Secretary Clinton and former President Clinton diverted Haitian relief funds. St. Juste stated that they intend to also investigate Cheryl Mills, Secretary Clinton’s former Chief of Staff, who served as the principal manager of Haiti projects. Aristide’s lawyers wrote to Secretary John Kerry to inform him of the process. This action has generated a firestorm of interest on social media outlets among Haitians around the world.

Given St. Juste’s links to Aristide it is widely believed that Aristide is behind this action.  There is informed speculation that Aristide is positioning his American wife, Mildred Aristide, to run for the presidency in 2015 – a position for which she is not eligible due to her dual citizenship.  This filing then serves three strategic goals: 1. Blackmail the Clintons and others in the U.S. who received the bulk of the aid and relief funds (i.e. threaten the suit and offer to withdraw it for their support for his wife); 2. Garner favor with the Haitian public whose frustration with the lack of demonstrable progress in the wake of the 2010 earthquake is palpable; and, 3. Appear “tough on the US” in order to whitewash his 1994 and 2004 requests for military support in Haiti to bolster his ailing regime.  These requests were tremendously unpopular and have not been forgiven or forgotten by Haitian voters.  Further, Aristide needs support from Washington to alleviate the pressure that he is getting from the Jean Dominique Judicial proceedings, where he is being called in to answer questions about the 2000 murder of the popular reporter. 

Aristide has a proven track record manipulating U.S. policy toward Haiti in his favor. When he wanted to return to power after the 1991-94 coup, he used a member of the Congressional Black Caucus and couple of well paid lobbyists, including Randall Robinson and his wife, to drive President Clinton’s Haiti policy. He first obtained sanctions that destroyed Haiti’s economy and the environment and later, organized a wave of boat people that forced the White House into a US military intervention in 1994 to reinstate his presidency.  As part of that deal, he made a series of commitments to Washington to institutionalize democracy and modernize the economy.  He reneged on all of those promises.

A few months after his return in 1994, Aristide began a violent spree of retribution having his political opponents in parliament, political parties, human rights activists, the press and civil society murdered.  He rigged elections and presided over the country being named one of the three most corrupt countries on earth – for the first time in its 200-year history.  

Meanwhile in Washington he used Haitian taxpayer funds to lavishly compensate lobbyists and well-positioned political allies. He used corrupt business deals in Haiti’s telecommunications sector, namely with the FUSION and IDT companies, to enrich US politicians. Facing legislative and municipal elections in 1995, Aristide tried to blackmail the Clinton administration by saying in a well-publicized speech, “for things to go well in Washington things have to go well in Haiti” meaning if Washington did not support his actions to preserve his party during those elections, he was in a position to create trouble for the Clinton Administration in a US election year. Aristide has created in Haiti the popular belief that he has enough evidence in hand to blackmail some politicians in the US who did business with him.  No one knows if this is truth or fiction.

After his electoral coup in November 2000, an agreement of eight points for the return of constitutional order signed between Aristide and President Clinton’s National Security Advisor Anthony Lake created an air of legitimacy despite the fact that the country was opposed to the coup.  Amidst protests around the country, after his February 2001 swearing in, Aristide went after his political opponents again, burning headquarters of political parties, private residences of political party leaders, killing and repressing journalists and various sectors of civil society including youth, peasants, women organizations and the private sector.  All this while his Administration plunged the country into deeper corruption and poverty.

As a result, another popular uprising started in 2003-04 demanding his resignation.  Members of his own Fanmi Lavalas party saw him as a threat to their political future.  To prop up his undemocratic and unpopular regime, Aristide responded by requesting US military intervention from a reticent Bush Administration.  To force their hands, he returned to the familiar tactic of attempting to orchestrate another massive wave of boat people to Florida by destroying Haiti’s newly formed coast guard.  He failed.  Without external military support he had to face the Haitian people -- and even his own supporters.  

Contrary to Aristide’s propaganda machine, national figures from Fanmi Lavalas, including Moise Jean Charles, reached out to Guy Philippe, a former police commissioner, living in the Dominican Republic.  Moise Jean Charles brought Guy Philippe to Haiti to lead the effort to oust Aristide. That fact was confirmed years later during a contentious interview between Jean Charles and Lavalas Senators Gerald Gilles on Radio Galaxie in Haiti. This revelation contradicted all previous statements made by Aristide allies and lobbyist in the US.

Facing a popular uprising, Aristide was saved by the US and France -- just like Duvalier before him.  Aristide resigned in 2004 and went into exile in South Africa. Upon his arrival, he fabricated a story that the US kidnapped him.  His allies, namely Kim Ives dutifully broadcast this storyline. That storyline, however, was only for international consumption.  In Haiti everyone knew that he suffered the same fate as Duvalier because of the way he ruled the country.

After his 2010 return to Haiti, his US political allies and lobbyists have revived his anti-Americanism strategy to return him to power through his wife.  This strategy will again include creating chaos in country and weakening democratic institutions, blackmailing US politicians and removing Martelly’s constitutional government by blocking the electoral process. Already, Aristide has effectively worked with Senate President Simon Dieuseul Desras to prevent the vote on the electoral law necessary to organize the October 2014 elections – the law has already passed the lower house. 

Aristide again is banking on the fact the US foreign affairs bureaucracy favors stability and peace above all else, and therefore, always responds to threats of violence.  He has secured the support of one member of the Congressional Black Caucus and is banking on support from one or two sympathizers in the US bureaucracy who serve on the Haiti Desk at the US State Department in 1994.  He is further banking on extra political sensitivity given the 2016 US presidential campaign and the speculation that Mrs. Clinton will be a frontrunner. 

What Aristide forgets – as usual – is that in Haiti all politics are local. Haitians have already rejected him for his undemocratic practices and corruption.  They will see right through this deception as business as usual and flatly reject him again.  The silver lining in this “business as usual” story, is that there will be a much needed – and long overdue -- investigation into where the aid funds actually went.  There are still 150,000 people living under tents and only modest improvement in the country  as the allocation of aid funds has not been strategic  or effective despite the Haitian government’s efforts to help shape the overall aid deployment. The Haitian Government – mainly using Canadian aid – relocated 1.35 million people but lack the aid to finish the job.  It should be noted that the Haitian Government itself only receive 1 percent of the aid funds with the remainder going mainly to international NGOs and politically connected contractors.

HAITI 12 JANVYE 2014: APRE 4 LANE KÈK CHIF KE NOU TA DWE KONNEN pa Stanley Lucas

Apre 4 lane depi ke goudougoudou pase sou Ayiti tout moun ap mande kote mas lajan key o bay pou peyi nou pase?  Mwen di tout moun pa bliye ke manman lajan rekonstriksyon an pa pase nan men Ayisien. Akoz lwa ijans lan ke iresponsab ki te nan tèt leta a te pibliye an 2010 se etranje yo a travè CIRH ki te ranmasse, kontwole ak depanse manman lajan rekonstriksyon lan. Mezanmi pa di ke map di lan tanko Moise non.

Mezanmi sepa ti kob non ke mesye ak medam etranje yo fè gagot ladanl. Mwen men’m mwen pa anti etranje. Mwen se yon neg ki kwè nnan kooperasyon men lè gen dezod fok nou lonje dwèt sou dezod la. Fok nou pa bliye ke alepok ekonomi mondyal la tap mache, pa gen lajan ditou ki tap sikile. Kidonk lè reken etranje wè lajan kap vide sou Ayiti ki te reprezante yon bon sos, you tout plonje al fè bè yo. E se pousa ke etranje yo mete men sou lajan rekonstriksyon lan e se yo tou ki depanse 99% kob sa yo. Sot ki bay embesil ki pa pran. Eske Preval te embesil? Mwen pa kwè sa, lit e konnen sal tap fè, seli ki dwe vin eksplike poukisa li te fèsa. Ti video ak dokimantè ki fèt pou proteje misye pa sifi.  Malgre lobèy sa yo, tampri souple, pinga yo vin di ke ayisien kowompi paske lajan yo pa jamen ateri nan men nou. Si gen eksplikasyon ki pou bay sou ki kote lajan yo pase, se etranje yo ki pou bay li paske se nan men yo ke lajan ke yo te bay pou viktim Ayiti yo ye. 12 Janvye 2014 dwe reprezante yon jou tèt ansamb pou nou mande kote lajan yo voye pou pep Ayisien lan pase? Men kèk chif ke nou dwe konnen:

Kombyen Ayisien ki mouri le 12 Janvye 2010: 320.000

Kombyen Ayisien ki te deplase apre 12 Janvye 2010: 3 Millions

Kombyen fanmi ki te pedi kay: 420.000

Kombyen Ayisien ki tap viv amba tant apre 12 Janvye 2010:  1.6 Million

Kombyen kob ke Ayiti pedi 12 Janvye 2010: $12 Milliards

kombyen Ayisien ke kolera MINUSTAH touye depi Octobre 2010: 8500+

Kombyen Ayisien ke kolera MINUSTAH kontamine: 780.000

Kombyen jou ki pase san ke MINUSTAH pa prezante Ekskiz bay Pep Ayisien pou kolera de li lage nan peyi Dayiti: 1169

Kombyen kob, lajan ke Ayiti bezwen pou netwaye kolera MINUSTAH: $2.6 Milliards

Kombyen kob ke yo bay Ayiti onivo miltilateral: $7.5 Milliards

Kombyen kob ke gouvenman Meriken remet ONG ak kompayi prive meriken pou Ayiti: $2 Milliards rete $1 milliard ki poko depanse

Kombyen kob milite Meriken depanse pou distribye medikaman, manje dlo, bato lopital elatrye apre 12 Janvye 2010: $1.2 Milliard

Kombyen kob ke gouvenman Meriken depanse pou ede konstwui Pak endistryel Nodès: $124 Millions

Kombyen kob chak ONG ak Kontraktè Meriken recevwa pou Ayiti de gouvenman Meriken: Gen yon fonksyonè Depatman Deta ki move chak fwa ke mwen poze kesyon sa

Kombyen kob sitwayen Meriken remèt 80 ONG meriken pou Ayiti: $1.9 Milliards

Kombyen Ayisien ki recevwa TPS nan men gouvènman Meriken apre 12 Janvye: 60.000

Kobyen nan 110.000 Ayisien ke fanmi yo Ozetazini aplike pou rezidans e ki apwouve par Homeland Security ke gouvènman Meriken kite rantre: 0

Kombyen Kob gouvènman Kanada remèt ONG Kanada pou Ayiti: $1 Milliard

Kombyen Lajan Lakwa Wouj Washington ranmasse pou Ayiti: $486 Millions

Kombyen kob ke gouvènman Ayisien recevwa kom sipo bidjetè an 2011: $68 Millions

Kombyen kob ke gouvènman Ayiti jwen sou chak $100 dola ke etranje yo depanse an Ayiti: 10 centimes

Kombyen kob sa koute pou konstwui kay pou 100 employes ambasad Meriken Ayiti: $100 Millions

Kombyen kob sa koute gouvènman Matelly a pou retire 1.1 Million Ayisien Amba tant: $98 Millions

Kombyen kob sa koute pou konstwui kay pou 750 travayè nan Karakol: $20 Millions

Kombyen Ayisien kap viv amba tant toujou: 160.000

Ki pousantaj nan lajan ke etranje ap depanse pou Ayiti pandan 2013 kal jwen oganizasyon natif natal peyi a: 3%

Haiti: Les hommes de l'occupant par Stanley Lucas

Photo de Jean Bertrand Aristide a la Maison Blanche quand il demandait officiellement l'occupation d'Haïti en 1994.

Ce 15 Octobre 2013 ramène le dix-neuvième anniversaire de l’occupation militaire des Etats Unis en Haïti sollicite par le Président Jean Bertrand Aristide en 1994. Le peuple Haïtien attend toujours des excuses de Jean Bertrand Aristide. C’est le moment de rappeler pour les générations futures que cette demande officielle d’occupation militaire d’Aristide était un acte de trahison parce qu’elle viole la constitution d’Haïti.  Aristide par cette décision mettait aussi en veilleuse de la souveraineté nationale d’Haïti si chèrement acquise par les pères de l’indépendance. Nous ne devons pas non plus oublier qu’après la demande d’intervention militaire de Jean Bertrand Aristide alors que les bateaux, avions, engins militaires et la machine de guerre des Etats Unis étaient déjà en route pour bombarder Haïti, n’était-ce l’action diplomatique de dernière minute de l’ancien Président Jimmy Carter, du General Colin Powell et du Sénateur Sam Nunn des milliers de citoyens haïtiens auraient pu perdre la vie et vivre les moments inoubliables de la guerre avec les bombardements, la mitraille et autres psychoses que cela laisse sur tout un peuple. Grace a leur intervention, l’invasion brutale sollicitée par Aristide l’homme des occupants qui n’avait pas hésite a donner le feu vert a pu être évitée. Bay kou bliye pote mak sonje! Se pa yon ti dezod tankou Aristide te dil, se te yon gwo trayizon!

    Dessalines pat nan achte figi

De la demande officielle d'embargo contre Haïti en 1992, en passant par la demande officielle d'intervention militaire en Haïti en 1994 ou encore l'invitation officielle des troupes militaires de l'Afrique du Sud le 1 Janvier 2004 aux Gonaïves pendant que nous étions en train de célébrer nos 200 ans d’indépendance, voir: http://metropolehaiti.com/metropole/archive.php?action=full&keyword=mbeki+aux+gonaives&sid=0&critere=0&id=7742&p=1 et sa dernière demande officielle pour l'envoi de 3000 soldats américains en Haïti en Février 2004, l'ancien Jean Bertrand Aristide a viole la constitution de 1987, trahi sa patrie et vendu la souveraineté nationale d’Haïti. Les demandes d'interventions militaires sollicitées officiellement par un Président de la république d'Haïti sont condamnées par la constitution de notre pays qui considèrent ces actions comme un acte de haute trahison. Dix neuf ans après Jean Bertrand Aristide et Fanmi Lavalas n’ont toujours pas présente des excuses au peuple Haïtien pour ses demandes répétées d’occupations qui ont hypothèque la souveraineté nationale de notre pays.

    Aristide devant le Pentagon recevant les honneurs militaires apres avoir sollicite l'occupation d'Haiti

L’histoire de l’occupation récente de la république d’Haïti par des troupes étrangères a commence en 1992. Le Président constitutionnel Jean Bertrand Aristide victime d’un coup d’état illégal le 30 Septembre 1991 partira en exil. Une fois a l’étranger, dans le cadre de son plan pour la reconquête du pouvoir politique, Jean Bertrand Aristide, prendra unilatéralement, sans consultation avec le parlement haïtien et les forces démocratiques d’Haïti un ensemble de décisions qui ruineront l’économie d’Haïti avec des impacts sociaux  déplorables appauvrissant tout une population tout en vendant la souveraineté nationale.

Pour commencer, Jean Bertrand Aristide pour retourner au pouvoir décida d’imposer en 1992 un embargo économique sur Haïti en lieu et place de sanctions ciblées contre les responsables du coup d’état. Les résultats de ces sanctions imposées par Aristide avec le support de ces allies de la communauté internationale seront catastrophiques pour Haïti et son peuple. Les plus démunis et les classes moyennes ont été les plus grandes victimes de l’horreur dénommé embargo impose par Aristide. Comment un Président d’Haïti a-t-il pu commettre une telle ignominie ? L’embargo Aristide tuera des milliers d’enfants selon une étude de l’UNICEF et de l’université américaine Harvard. Il a eu un impact terrible sur les femmes, la sécurité alimentaire et le système de santé causant la malnutrition, le manque de médicaments dans les centres de sante et l’accès aux soins de base.

    Les vendeurs de notre patrie au Pentagon en 1994

L’embargo d’Aristide a fait perdre 300.000 emplois a Haïti et détruira l’environnement a cause de l’accélération du déboisement du au blocage maritime militaires bloquant la plupart des importations inclut les produits pétroliers. L’horreur économique de l’embargo avec ses conséquences comme par exemple la famine causant la malnutrition générale,  poussa les citoyens à quitter le pays a la recherche d’opportunités pour faire vivre leur famille. Malgré les horreurs économiques et sociaux de l’embargo qui frappaient les enfants, les jeunes, les femmes, les hommes et les vieillards, Aristide déshumanise continuait a scander a la radio qu’il fallait augmenter les sanctions. Les copies audio de ces déclarations sont encore disponibles dans toutes les stations de radios d’Haïti et de la diaspora malgré les efforts et les gros moyens déployés par Aristide pour faire disparaitre la documentation audio, vidéo et écrite de ses crimes contre son peuple.

Devant l’échec de l’embargo Jean Bertrand Aristide décida seul, sans consultations avec les forces politiques, le parlement, la société civile et la diaspora de solliciter officiellement une intervention militaire des Etats Unis en Haïti pour le restaurer au pouvoir. Pour ceux qui ont oublier consultez ce lien pour un rappel, klike la: http://www.nytimes.com/1994/06/03/world/doubting-sanctions-aristide-urges-us-action-on-haiti.html

    Gade yo kap siyen...

Jean Bertrand Aristide demanda officiellement aux Etats Unis de le restaurer au pouvoir avec 20.000 soldats et l’Agence Américaine d’Intelligence (CIA). La stratégie d’Aristide pour reprendre le pouvoir comprendra deux axes. L’axe interne et l’autre externe. Au niveau interne:

1.     Fabriquer et projeter devant l’opinion publique et la communauté internationale des violations massives de droits humains. C’est vrai que les militaires et l’organisation paramilitaire FRAPH étaient responsables de nombreux violations de droits humains pendant la période du coup d’état mais c’est aussi vrai qu’avec son réseau Jean Bertrand Aristide faisait voler a travers les morgues des hôpitaux du pays des cadavres de citoyens morts naturellement pour les cribler de balles  pour ensuite les déposer dans les rues d’Haïti pour gonfler le dossier des droits humains.

2.     Utilisation de ses réseaux politiques pour distribuer de l’argent pour construire des bateaux et provoquer un flot massif de boat people vers Miami.  Dans le cadre de la préparation de ce scenario boat people le teledjol Haïtien avait identifie a l’époque le Maire Lavalas de la commune de Delmas comme celui qui avait distribue l’argent pour construire les bateaux qui allaient transporter des milliers de citoyens haïtiens des milieux ruraux d’Haïti vers Miami. Il n’attendait que le signal donne de Jean Bertrand Aristide qui était à Washington travaillant activement en ce sens. Le milliers de gens en mer qu’on verra plus tard sur CNN plus tard était le coup boat people organise et prépare par Aristide pour forcer Clinton a intervenir en Haïti sur sa requête.

Au niveau externe:

1.     Employer des lobbyistes pour préparer et gonfler l’opinion publique pour une intervention militaire. Tout un réseau de lobbyistes avait été employé par Aristide avec les 80 millions de dollars de la teleco qui étaient dans les banques américaines.  Michael Barnes le chef de la campagne de Bill Clinton dans le Maryland était parmi les employés ainsi que de nombreux proches du Concrétionna Black Caucus incluent Randal Robinson et sa femme Hazel étaient sur le payroll. Ils deviendront tous millionnaires sur le dos du peuple haïtien. Les 80 millions de la teleco d’Haïti se sont envoles dans les poches de ces messieurs et ceux d’Aristide. Leur rôle était de pousser l’administration américaine vers l’intervention militaire a travers des articles de journaux, la grève de faim de Randal Robinson devant la Maison Blanche tout en plaçant des éléments clefs et favorables dans des positions stratégiques a l’intérieur de l’administration Clinton. Ces influences leur permit de faire revoquer l’Ambassadeur Lawrence Pezzulo et le remplacer par un proche de Congressional Black Caucus (CBC) et Aristide, William H. Gray.  Le livre non publie de Pezzullo “The Leap into Haïti: Or How Not to Conduct U.S. Foreign Policy in the Post Cold War” offre des détails intéressants sur comment Aristide a planifie, sollicite et obtenu l’intervention militaire des Etats Unis pour le restaurer au pouvoir en Haïti.

2.     Utilisation les missions diplomatiques d’Haïti a Washington, Nations Unies, OEA et la CARICOM pour faire avancer le dossier de l’intervention militaire. En plus de la demande formelle d’occupation militaire de Jean Bertrand Aristide, il utilisera les missions diplomatiques pour les requêtes formelles dans les institutions multilatérales et rapports bilatéraux. Quatre missions diplomatiques d’Haïti ont joue un rôle clef dans l’agenda de la demande d’occupation voulu par Aristide: Washington, l’OEA, les Nations Unies et la CARICOM. En plus la mission de Washington jouait un rôle additionnelle pour faciliter l’occupation: payer des journalistes américains charges de publier des histoires préparées par Aristide et les lobbyistes qui travaillaient le Congres et l’Administration pour faire avancer le dossier de l’intervention.

3.     Demander officiellement l’intervention militaire aux autorités américaines pour le restaurer au pouvoir demanda officiellement au pouvoir en Haïti. Prière de consulter la vidéo d'Aristide remerciant au Pentagone le Ministre américain de la Défense William Perry et le General Shalikasvili, cliquez ici: http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/60373-1  

Aujourd’hui il y a dix neuf ans Aristide sollicitait officiellement de la Maison Blanche et du Pentagone une intervention militaire en Haïti pour le restaurer au pouvoir en Haïti. Aristide, en prenant la décision de faire envahir Haïti en Septembre 1994, par des militaires étrangers n'avait consulte que ces conseillers proches Casimir, Longchamp, Woerleigh qui etaient avec lui aux Etats Unis. Dans sa campagne de sollicitation officielle de l'occupation de la république d'Haïti, Aristide mit catégoriquement de cote les sénateurs et députes la 45e législature et les forces politiques du pays. Il mit aussi de cote ses allies politiques en Haïti opposes a sa demande d'occupation. A l'époque Gérard Pierre Charles de l'Organisation du Peuple en Lutte (OPL), Jean Marie Vincent et d'autres membres du mouvement lavalas qui constituaient le front interne contre le coup d'état militaire étaient contre l'intervention militaire étrangère en Haïti.  Les membres du front interne lavalas de résistance combattant le coup d'état pensaient pouvoir réinstaller l'ordre démocratique en Haïti sans occupation militaire étrangère. Aristide voulant l'intervention militaire des étrangers pour revenir au pouvoir était en conflit avec ce groupe de lavalassiens de l'intérieur oppose a l'occupation. Cette différence causa l'assassinat de Jean Marie Vincent selon les analystes qui attribuèrent le meurtre à Aristide. 

Jean Bertrand Aristide le demandeur officiel de l'occupation militaire du 15 Octobre 1994 sera-t-il encore silencieux ce 15 Octobre 2013 ou finalement demandera-t-il pardon à la nation?

C'est aussi Jean Bertrand Aristide qui introduira les soldats de l'ONU en Haïti, il remplacera les militaires américains par les militaires des Nations Unies en 1995.  A cause de la politique interne, les autorités américaines décidèrent de rapatrier leur troupe en Haïti. Pour les remplacer Jean Bertrand Aristide fit une demande de soldats étrangers à l’ONU qui accepta. Cette première mission militaire dut déployée en Haïti, à l'époque elle portait le nom de MINUHA.  

De 1994 a 2004 Aristide a sollicite officiellement douze demandes d'occupations. En 2006 René Préval, Jacques Edouard Alexis continueront cette politique de renouvellement de l'occupation. De 2006 a 2011 ces responsables de l'état n'ont jamais présente à la nation le plan de reconquête de la souveraineté nationale d'Haïti a travers le renforcement et la reconstruction de nos institutions de sécurité. La mise en place d'une stratégie de sécurité nationale ne fait pas partie de leurs priorités. Apres Lavalas ce sont le CPP, l'INITE et Louvri Barye qui choisirent l'occupation. 

Aristide débarqua a Port-au-Prince le 15 Octobre 1994 dans un avion américain, puis fut déverse au palais national par un hélicoptère de la marine américaine. Aristide était fier de sa performance, il racontait à ses conseillers proches comment il a roule Bill Clinton.

Sachant qu'il avait viole la constitution en sollicitant et provoquant cette intervention militaire, Aristide déclara plus tard dans un discours a la population que "li fe yon ti dezod".

Randall Robinson fut récompense par Aristide a travers les millions que recevra plus tard sa femme Hazel Robinson de l'état Haïtien a travers des contrats de lobbyistes. Pour les détails cliquez ici: http://www.haitipolicy.org/Lobbying7.htm   Le livre de Robinson devait servir pour la réalisation d'un film pro Aristide sur l'histoire d'Haïti.

Depuis honteux et maltraites par des historiens Haïtiens pour ses choix d'occupations Aristide utilise des faux noms et quelques proches a son service sur l'internet, l'un deux, Joël Léon, pour promouvoir une propagande qui vise a changer l'histoire des demandes officielles d'occupations d'Haïti faites par lui.  

Aristide sera-t-il silencieux ce 15 Octobre 2013? Je suis certain qu'il le restera encore cette année.

Concernant la demande d'occupation de 1994 les journalistes Haïtiens devront demander a Titid , l'homme des occupants, pourquoi ne pouvait-il pas avoir le comportement noble du président  Manuel Zelaya du Honduras qui est rentre chez lui sans solliciter un soldat étranger après le coup d'état militaire contre lui? Il faudra aussi demander au Lavalas et a LESPWA-INITE qui etaient au pouvoir depuis vingt ans pourquoi Haïti comme l'Irak n'a-t-elle pas son plan de reconquete de la souverainete nationale pour le retrait progressif des troupes etrangeres?  Est-ce que c’est parce qu’ils eaient les hommes de l’occupant qu’ils n’ont pas pu parler de la reconquete de la souverainete nationale?

Quand a Michel Martelly il a propose le 18 Novembre 2011 un plan de reconquete de la souverainete nationale qui passe par la professionalisation de la police, la construction d’une armee professionnelle et le retrait organise de la MINUSTAH. Mais ce sont les memes arnacho populistes lavalassien Moise Jean Charles, Simon Desras qui ont fait du lobbyong a Washington pour dire qu’Haïti n’avait pas besoin d’une armee. Martelly a donc renouvele le mandat de la MINUSTAH.

Pour les etudiants qui choississent ce theme pour leur these, un petit rappel des demandes recentes et officielles d'occupations en Haïti. 

Il y a eu beaucoup de debats autour de l'idee de "l'occupation etrangere" en Haïti. les Haitiens, bien sur, sont opposes a cette idee.  Quelques leaders Haitiens au pouvoir pour leur capital politique ont essaye de manipuler les faits pour ne pas assumer la responsabilite d'avoir demande officiellement l'intervention militaire des etrangers en Haïti. Les faits sont que de 1990 a nos jours quatrorze missions etrangeres de formes variees ont ete deployer en Haïti, a chaque fois, a partir d'une requete officielle du Gouvernement Haitien en fonction. Les documents officiels sont disponibles pour prouver que ces requetes ont effectivement ete faites. Voici la liste: 

Assistance technique des Nations Unies sollicitee par le president Ertha Pascale Trouillot en 1989  pour supporter  l'organisation des elections elections de 1990

Demande de l'imposition d'un embargo economique des Nations Unies sur Haïti sollicitee par le president Jean Bertrand Aristide en 1991 

Demande de l'envoi d'une mission des Nations Unies,MICIVIH, en Haïti sollicitee par le president Jean Bertrand Aristide Fevrier 1993 a Mai 1998 

Demande d'intervention militaire des Etats Unis en Haïti sollicitee par le president Jean Bertrand Aristide en Septembre 1994 

Requete d'une mission militaire des Nations Unies,UNMIH, en Haïti sollicitee par le president Jean Bertrand Aristide Septembre 1993 qui a termine sa mission en Juin 1996 

Requete d'une mission militaire des Nations Unies en Haïti, UNSMIH, sollicitee par le president Rene PrevalJuillet 1996 a Juillet  1997 

Requete d'une mission militaire des nations Unies en Haiti,UNSMIH, sollicitee par le president Rene PrevalUNTMIH Aout 1997 a Novembre 1997 

Requete d'une mission militaire des Nations Unies en Haiti,UNSMIH, sollicitee par le president Rene PrevalMIPONUH Decembre 1997 a Mars 2000 

Requete d'une mission militaire des Nations Unies en Haiti,UNSMIH, sollicitee par le president Rene PrevalMICAH, Mars 2000 a Fevrier. 2001 

Requete d'intervention d'Aristide a l'administration Clinton, les huit points, sollicitee par Jean Bertrand Novembre 2000 

Requete d'une mission militaire des Etats Unis en Haïti sollicitee par le president Jean-Bertrand Aristide  Janvier 2004 

Requete d'une mission militaire des Nations Unies en Haïti sollicitee par le president Jean Bertrand Aristide Janvier 2004 MINUSTAH April 2004 a nos jours ; 

Aristide a aussi sollicite l'intervention de l'OEA 2000 a 2007 , toujours en Haïti 

Aristide a sollicite l'intervention de la CARICOM 2001 a 2004

Michel Martelly renouvelle le mandat de la MINUSTAH 2012-14

Pour le txte de 2012 sur l’occupation d’haiti, klike la : http://solutionshaiti.blogspot.com/2012/10/haiti-15-octobre-2012-dix-huitieme.html

HAITI 12 JANVYE 2013: APRE 3 LANE KEK CHIF KE NOU TA DWE KONNEN

Pa bliye ke manman lajan rekonstriksyon an pa pase nan men Ayisien. Akoz lwa ijans lan ak CIRH ke des iresponsab leta te pibliye se etranje yo ki te ranmasse, kontwole ak depanse manman lajan rekonstriksyon lan. E se yo tou ki depanse kob sa yo. Pinga yo vin di ke ayisien kowompi. Si gen eksplikasyon ki pou bay sou ki kote lajan yo pase, se yo ki pou bay li paske se nan men yo ke lajan nou ye. 12 Janvye 2013 dwe reprezante yon jou tet ansamb pou nou mande kote lajan yo voye pou pep Ayisien lan pase? Men kek chif ke nou dwe konnen:

Kombyen Ayisien ki mouri le 12 Janvye 2010: 320.000

Kombyen Ayisien ki te deplase apre 12 Janvye 2010: $3 Millions

Kombyen fanmi ki te pedi kay: 420.000

Kombyen Ayisien ki tap viv amba tant apre 12 Janvye 2010: $1.4 Million

Kombyen kob ke Ayiti pedi 12 Janvye 2010: $12 Milliards

kombyen Ayisien ke kolera MINUSTAH touye depi Octobre 2010: 8500

Kombyen Ayisien ke kolera MINUSTAH kontamine: 700.000

Kombyen jou ki pase san ke MINUSTAH pa prezante Ekskiz bay Pep Ayisien pou kolera de li lage nan peyi a: 816

Kombyen kob, lajan ke Ayiti bezwen pou netwaye kolera MINUSTAH: $2.2 Milliards

Kombyen kob ke yo bay Ayiti onivo miltilateral: $7.5 Milliards

Kombyen kob ke gouvenman Meriken remet ONG ak kompayi prive meriken pou Ayiti: $1.7 Milliard

Kombyen kob milite Meriken depanse pou distribye medikaman, manje dlo, bato lopital elatrye apre 12 Janvye 2010: $1.2 Milliard

Kombyen kob ke gouvenman Meriken depanse pou ede konstwui Pak endistryel Nodes: $124 Millions

Kombyen kob chak ONG ak Kontrakteu Meriken recevwa pou Ayiti de gouvenman Meriken: Depatman Deta pa vle bay enfomasyon sa yo

Kombyen kob sitwayen Meriken remet 80 ONG meriken pou Ayiti: $1.6 Milliards

Kombyen Ayisien ki recevwa TPS nan men gouvenman Meriken apre 12 Janvye: 60.000

Kobyen nan 110.000 Ayisien ke fanmi yo Ozetazini aplike pou rezidans e ki apwouve par Homeland Security ke gouvenman Meriken kite rantre: 0

Kombyen Kob gouvenman Kanada remet ONG Kanada pou Ayiti: $1 Milliard

Kombyen Lajan Lakwa Wouj Washington ranmasse pou Ayiti: $486 Millions

Kombyen kob ke gouvenman Ayisien recevwa kom sipo bidjete an 2011: $68 Millions

Kombyen kob ke gouvenman Ayiti jwen sou chak $100 dola ke etranje yo depanse: 10 centimes

Kombyen kob sa koute pou konstwui kay pou 100 employes ambasad Meriken Ayiti: $100 Millions

Kombyen kob sa koute gouvenman Matelly a pou retire 1.1 Million Ayisien Amba tant: $98 Millions

Kombyen kob sa koute pou konstwui kay pou 750 travaye nan Karacol: $20 Millions

Kombyen Ayisien kap viv amba tant toujou: 360.000

Haiti Needs a Bailout and Effective Foreign Aid By Stanley Lucas

Background
On January 12, 2010 a 7.2 earthquake hit Haiti.  The country lost 320,000 people.  Not only was this a devastating blow to the population, it took a serious blow on the country’s workforce.  About 25% of those losses were from the civil service, 18% teachers and 9% doctors and nurses.  That day more than $12 billion of infrastructure was lost along with all the government buildings, 7,000 schools, and the only state university, 420,000 homes destroyed, bridges, roads, ports, communications, and electricity lines were also destroyed.  To compound the human and infrastructure losses, eight months later UN Nepalese soldiers introduced the cholera bacteria to Haiti’s water system by contaminating the Mirebalais River.  It is estimated that it will cost the country $1.5 billion to eradicate the bacteria.  The UN is not covering that cost.

Fast-forward to 2012 and Haiti is again hit by two destructive hurricanes, Isaac, which destroyed $300 million in agricultural goods, and Sandy, which destroyed all agricultural production in five key geographic departments of the country Grande Anse, South, Nippes, South East and West.  Four other departments were also partially hit.  These hurricanes resulted in 120 casualties and destroyed or damaged about 30 bridges, roads, schools and hospitals. 

This compounding devastation has lead to the possibility of political unrest.  Haiti imports 85% of the food that it consumes.  Since August 2012, the country has been on the list of 20 countries that will face food insecurity in the next year as global food prices will increase between 10 to 35%.  The big global food producers have lost 60% of their production to drought.  Facing these realities, Haiti needs a real bailout and more effective foreign aid.  Haiti does not have to be this fragile and vulnerable.  If the tremendous foreign aid resources that poured into the country post-earthquake were to be effectively deployed, Haiti would be better positioned to meet and weather these challenges.

National Response
The Haitian Government has put in place a national strategy that is comprised of assisting the vulnerable (women, senior and children) and creating jobs.  The Martelly Administration has launched a credit program for rural women entrepreneurs and food for work programs in the countryside.  In the agricultural sector, they have provided direct assistance to farmers who have lost their crops.  But their resources – both human and financial – are meager.

International Response
Since 2010 Haiti has been the beneficiary of unprecedented international solidarity.  More than $1.4 billion of private donations rolled in after the earthquake.  These donations were mainly doled out to 80 international NGOs.  From the U.S., Haiti received approximately $2.9 billion of bilateral assistance, and about the same amount from Venezuela and other bilateral donors.  The United Nations conference on how to assist Haiti led to a $10 billion combined commitment to the country.

Yet with all this money, we have yet to see results.  The well intentioned NGOs and experts have come with ideas and strategies that have not proven effective despite best efforts.  There simply is no cure for global poverty.  Often, however, these strategies fail to take into account (and have event bypassed completely) local input and at times have a partisan or ideological bent to them. For more see:  http://www.scribd.com/doc/112995727/HAITI-HUMAN-SECCURITY-IN-DANGER

Unfortunately, another group has attempted to exploit opportunities in Haiti for personal gain and to build their political dynasties back home.  Foreign profiteers and some “non-profiteers” have benefited from the aid money without delivering any results for the people.  It is this group that is now in control.  In practice, they have been enriching themselves on three fronts:  the first by taking advantage of foreign aid through their contractors, NGOs or foundations; second by leveraging bilateral aid destined for investment in Haiti to capture control of the country’s business sectors, including telecommunications, remittances, banking and so on; and third, by creating an alliance with the Dominicans to take control of the country by weakening its institutions, taking control of the strategic investments and the new natural resources that are being discovered.  Just in the last two years,  $40 billion dollars of gold, and prospective for oil  and diamonds has been discovered.

The reality is that for every $1 in foreign aid the Haitian Government receives $.01 and the Haitian people receive $.07.  The rest of that dollar goes to overhead, salaries, and travel budgets.  Clearly this is an ineffective model for aid.

Often when one calls for accountability by asking questions – like where did the money go; what are the organizations/institutions that received funds for Haiti; how much per organization; what did they deliver, and where and who got what – you become a pariah, see: http://www.disasteraccountability.org/ .  No one wants the Haiti aid scam exposed.  What seems to be the case is that foreign aid has become an industry for profit among cronies.  This may seem to be a cynical point of view, but one only has to look at the situation on the ground in Haiti to see that there have been no real results despite huge spending. 

Here is what happens in practice: 

    •    Country X from the Middle East donates $30 million for the reconstruction and recovery efforts

    •    International NGOs compete for that money arguing that the Haitian government is corrupt, incapable or lacks the skills to effectively deploy the money.  Typically, those with the best connections to the leadership of that country get the money. 

    •    That NGO receives the money for a set of programs.  Industry standard is to take 22% overhead and then a portion of the money is allocated to salaries, per diem and travel.  NGO jobs are not the low paying jobs they used to be.  Senior staff can make anywhere from $150,000 to $400,000 annually.  NGO staff makes a number of trips to Haiti.  Arguably they stay in the hotels and use the local drivers, which is a small boost to the economy.

    •    They are supposed to deliver a set of “deliverables” for the money.  When action finally starts – let’s say to build houses for the victims of the earthquake – a contractor, which is part of the well-connected network is hired.  They get paid $45,000 to build a house.  The house is valued at $7,500 and is constructed with substandard materials that will not withstand a hurricane and in some cases can use materials hazardous to health and not suitable to the climate.

At the bilateral level, the process is the same.  For example, Congress has allocated funds to Haitian victims in its foreign aid bill.  These funds, which are managed by USAID, have been awarded through no bid contracts.  One politically well-connected institution received $104 million to create more than 30,000 jobs in Haiti. The institution was investigated by the Inspector General, which found that less than 4,000 jobs have been created.  That is $26,000 per job.  These jobs typically pay about $500/year.  Nobody knows who is getting the State Department and USAID Funds for Haiti – let alone the Haitian Government which has requested that information in an effort to understand resources – or what deliverables have been promised.  Meanwhile narrative reports of achievements read like propaganda.  The discrepancies between what they said they have achieved and the reality of misery in the ground is shocking.

Bailout and Effective Aid
Haiti desperately needs an immediate bailout in the range of $3 billion.  To bypass the “usual suspects” who receive aid and fail to deliver, about 60% of these funds should be allocated directly to the Haitian private sector associated with foreign private investments.  These investments should go to agriculture and agro industry, infrastructure and communications, garment manufacturing, tourism, education and services.  Meanwhile bilateral foreign aid should go straight to the Haitian public sector, mainly the Ministry of Planning and Cooperation.  International technical experts with veto power over the funds could be placed within ministries to ensure that the funds are being used for their intended purposes.  With these refinements to the foreign aid process, we would expect to see concrete results.  In any event, what would be the downside in attempting a new way of doing business?  It is clear that the current system is not working and needs to be revamped.  Let’s give the Haitian people a chance to take control of their destiny.

AMIDST RISING FOOD PRICES AND MORE STARVATION IN HAITI USAID REMAINS OFF TRACK

70 percent of the funds given to the two largest U.S. contractors for a cash for work project in Haiti was spent on equipment and materials. As a result, just 8,000 Haitians a day were being hired by June, instead of the planned 25,000 a day, according to the IG.

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

AUDIT OF USAID’S HAITI RECOVERY INITIATIVE ACTIVITIES MANAGED BY OFFICE OF TRANSITION INITIATIVES

AUDIT REPORT NO. 1-521-12-009-P  SEPTEMBER 26, 2012 

SUMMARY OF RESULTS 

In January 2010 Haiti was struck by a devastating earthquake that leveled extensive portions of Port-au-Prince, killing or displacing hundreds of thousands of people.  According to USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI), the Haitian Government was largely incapacitated because significant numbers of government officials were killed and many buildings and records were destroyed. 

In the immediate aftermath of the earthquake,  OTI began implementing the Haiti Recovery Initiative (HRI). The initial focus was on supporting short- and medium-term activities aimed at stabilizing the Caribbean nation through assistance  with community revitalization, improved governance, and economic strengthening. 

In March 2011 OTI awarded Chemonics International Inc. a $53-million, 18-month contract to continue its work under the second phase of HRI (called HRI-II).  HRI-II was designed to support the January 2011 Post-Earthquake U.S. Government Haiti Strategy; according to that, the United States would help Haiti strengthen its economy and public institutions in the three strategic development corridors of Port-au-Prince, Saint-Marc, and Cap-Haitien.  As of May 3, 2012, OTI obligated $46.5 million and disbursed $23 million. 

The Regional Inspector General/San Salvador (RIG/San Salvador) conducted this audit to determine whether HRI-II activities are achieving their main goals of stabilizing Haiti through community revitalization, increased citizen engagement, and improved governance. 

The audit found that many OTI activities are providing benefits, such as: 

  OTI worked with the International Organization for Migration to relocate about 1,250 internally displaced families that were living in two camps in Petionville.  The camps were cleared in December 2011. 

  OTI provided the Haitian Parliament with temporary offices and meeting space. Parliament’s headquarters partially collapsed during the earthquake.  However, while individual activities had positive impacts locally, OTI was not using a structured system for measuring and reporting whether HRI-II as a whole was meeting its broader national objectives, and the lack of such a system made it difficult to measure the program’s impact.   

Furthermore, HRI-II was not on track to complete all activities before the scheduled end date of September 2012.  Budget line items in the contract provided for grants under contract ($37.3 million) and “non-grant under contract” activities, such as direct procurement of goods and services ($3.3 million) for a total of $40.6 million.  As of February 2012, 141 activities worth about $22.9 million had been developed and approved, leaving $17.7 million available for new activities to be approved, implemented, completed, and closed in the 7 months left.   

The audit also found some additional areas in which program management could be improved 
as discussed in the following findings. 
  The monitoring and evaluation system was weak (page 3). 
        Community involvement in activities was not sufficient (page 7). 

  A short-term technical assistance activity did not meet expectations (page 7). 
        An environmental review for an activity was not performed and approved before 
implementation (page 7). 

This report recommends that OTI: 
1.  Implement a plan to measure and report progress toward meeting HRI-II’s goals for the remainder of the program (page 5). 
2. Update its  implementation plan for the remainder of the program to include estimated timelines for each phase of an activity for development, implementation, and closeout 
(page 5). 
3.  Work with USAID/Haiti to conduct and document data quality assessments for the indicators OTI reports on for the mission’s operational plan and performance report (page 5). 
4.  Incorporate plans to engage communities when developing activities so the communities will sustain the efforts (page 6). 
5.  Implement communications plans into ongoing and new activities to make the local population aware of the activity and its benefits for the community (page 6). 
6.  Implement processes to assess short-term technical assistance with grantees throughout the grant cycle (page 7). 
7.  Review the existing environmental documentation of current and planned activities for compliance with environmental review requirements (page 9). 

8.  Require Chemonics to confirm that environmental reviews are completed before any activities begin (page 9). 

Detailed findings appear in the following section.  The audit scope and methodology are 
described in Appendix I. Management comments are included in their entirety in Appendix II, and our evaluation of management comments is included on page 10 of the report. 


AUDIT FINDINGS 
Monitoring and Evaluation System Was Weak 
USAID’s Automated Directives System (ADS) 200.6 defines performance management as the systematic process of monitoring the achievements of program operations; collecting and analyzing performance information to track progress toward goals; and using that information to influence how decisions are made and how resources are allocated.  According to ADS 203.3.3.1, the performance management process has four principal steps: (1) establishing a performance management framework, (2) collecting and analyzing performance information, (3) using that information to influence decision-making and resource allocation throughout a program, and (4) communicating results. Missions use performance management plans as tools to plan and manage the process of monitoring, evaluating, and reporting progress toward achieving objectives.  ADS does not provide a format for performance management plans; USAID offices and missions are allowed to use the format that best fits their needs. 

OTI’s contract with Chemonics states, “Timely evaluation of activities and the program more broadly is a critical component of ongoing, updated analysis, which is accomplished through periodic strategic review sessions for regular evaluation of recent activities and the program.” Because OTI communicates frequently with its partners, it can adjust activities as needed throughout the course of a program.  However, in the case of HRI-II, the lack of management tools to measure progress toward program goals made it difficult to measure the program’s impact. Specific monitoring and evaluation concerns are discussed below. 


Program Management Was Not Comprehensive.   HRI-II’s monitoring and evaluation focused primarily on the activity level and to a lesser extent on the program as a whole.  Each activity had three levels of objectives and indicators to measure outputs, outcomes, and impact.  HRI-II developed two guides, Activity Cycle and Guidebook and Activity Management Guide, to help employees manage the program. However, while the guides provided templates and addressed procedures for awarding and administering grants for the program, they did not contribute to monitoring the entire program. 

According to the HRI-II contract, program monitoring efforts should include regular evaluations of the program, as well as the activities.  These evaluations should allow the HRI-II staff to refine the program’s focus. The contract further states that the participants, nature, structure, and frequency of the evaluations depend on the country context, program needs, and the staff. In general, they should be conducted between two and four times a year.  

OTI has conducted only one evaluation for HRI-II so far, and it took place in June 2011 to discuss and draft OTI’s strategy for Haiti, to build the new HRI-II team, and to propose ideas of where to conduct activities.  OTI officials said they conduct quarterly “rolling assessments” to assess programmatic issues, program development, and implementation.  In addition, OTI and Chemonics met weekly to cover program development and implementation, and to discuss problems, delays, and challenges.


While these meetings contribute to program development and implementation, they do not measure progress toward ultimate program goals. HRI-II Did Not Have Program-Wide Monitoring and Evaluation Plan.  When the program started in March 2011, the staff developed a monitoring and evaluation guide that consisted of guidelines and procedures for developing monitoring and evaluation plans.  However, it did not constitute a formal plan that HRI-II’s staff could use to track progress, nor did it explain how results would be measured and documented throughout the program.   

Chemonics officials said they decided not to prepare a formal plan because the activities were so different from each other that monitoring and evaluation plans needed to be tailored to the activity level. At the time of the audit, HRI-II had 141 activities in progress.  Because each activity had its own individual monitoring and evaluation plan, Chemonics was tracking 141 different plans, but had no single plan for the entire program.  After an activity was completed, the Chemonics staff performed a final evaluation.  OTI and Chemonics officials said they would use final evaluations, comparisons of “clusters” of similar activities, and “thematic reviews to provide lessons learned and a feedback loop” to guide future activities. However, given HRI-II’s short time frame and the different nature of the activities, this approach might not provide useful or timely information as a monitoring and evaluation tool. 

Poorly Defined Indicators.   USAID guidance states that performance indicators should be unambiguous about what is being measured and closely track the results they are intended to measure. 

Some of the performance indicators Chemonics developed were not well-defined.  One activity provided computer equipment, chalkboards, benches, chairs, desks, and school kits consisting of backpacks and school supplies to two public schools in target communities.  Yet a performance indicator for that activity measured the number of students who returned to school. OTI developed the activity to help offset some of the costs borne by the parents in sending their children to school, but the performance measure did not correlate to the activity.  


Other activities reviewed had only one or two indicators, and they were poorly defined; for example, one purportedly measured  Number of government institutions supporting a conflict and/or fragility. An activity that provided a local  municipality with an engineering study for improving one of the town’s main roads was measured by  Number of reconstructed national governing institutions and systems that receive USG  [U.S. Government] assistance to incorporate principles that support democracy and government legitimacy. None of these activities had indicators that clearly measured objectives.  

Implementation Plans Lacked Timelines.  OTI requires Chemonics to track activity data through OTI’s activity database, which includes a field for a detailed implementation plan.   In addition, an activity or grant notes field provides chronological updates of the activity’s progress or anything discussed in implementation meetings.  The combined information in the two fields helps OTI track an activity’s progress.  

However, the detailed implementation plans for some of the activities reviewed did not have enough information for OTI to see whether the activity was on track to end on time and to meet its objectives.  For example, the plan for providing Haiti’s Parliament with temporary offices and meeting space consisted of “The subcontractor will be responsible for the following: 


1) Assembling and installation of steel-framed structures; 2) Connection of utilities.”  No dates or estimated timelines were included. 

Data Quality Assessments Not Performed. ADS 203.3.7.3 states that performance data reported to USAID/Washington in the performance plan and report must have had a data quality assessment (DQA) completed within the past 3 years. The goal of a DQA is to inform managers of data strengths and weaknesses and the extent to which data can be relied upon to influence management decisions.  

Although results of OTI’s HRI-II activities were reported in USAID/Haiti’s fiscal year 2011 performance plan and report, the staff did not conduct DQAs of the data for the five indicators that it reported on in 2011.   

All of the problems discussed in this finding stemmed from the fact that OTI did not make monitoring and evaluation a priority early in the HRI-II’s implementation.  OTI officials said it started becoming a priority when Chemonics hired a full-time monitoring and evaluation officer in August 2011.   

According to an OTI management review completed in January 2011, the HRI I program did not place enough emphasis on monitoring and evaluation.  The team conducting the review recommended that OTI hire a permanent staff member to oversee monitoring and evaluation. OTI advertised for a foreign service national monitoring and evaluation specialist in April 2011, but officials said they did not receive any qualified applicants. 

Under the program’s monitoring and evaluation framework, it was hard to consistently and effectively evaluate how results and targets were measured.  This handicap could result in activity objectives not being met.  To strengthen the program’s monitoring and evaluation system, we make the following recommendations


Recommendation 1. We recommend that USAID/Office of Transition Initiatives implement a plan to measure and report progress made toward achieving program goals for the remainder of the program. 

Recommendation 2.  We recommend that USAID/Office of Transition Initiatives require Chemonics International to update its  implementation plans for the remainder of the program to include estimated timelines for each phase of an activity for development, implementation, and closeout. 

Recommendation 3.  We recommend that USAID/Office of Transition Initiatives 
coordinate with USAID/Haiti to conduct and document results of data quality assessments for the indicators that USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives reports on for the mission’s operational plan and performance report. 

Communities Were Not Involved 
Enough in Activities 
As described in USAID’s sustainable development strategy, “Sustainable development mandates participation. It must involve, respond to, and be accountable to the people who will live with the results of the development effort.”  According to the HRI-II contract, the goal of USAID/OTI’s efforts in Haiti is to help stabilize the country while laying the foundation for development and good governance.  The contract further states that OTI would pursue all programming with an eye to community participation, government engagement, and alignment with the unified U.S. Government approach in Haiti. 









HRI-II’s offices in Port-au-Prince, Cap-Haitien, and Saint-Marc have worked with local communities to develop activities tailored to meet their needs.  Nonetheless, not all of the activities implemented in the corridor around Cap-Haitien were developed by the regional office that understood the social and economic context of the area, and not all activities implemented have involved community participation in a way that guarantees sustainability.  OTI’s 2012 Management Review pointed out that the leadership of the Chemonics office in Port-auPrince often failed to communicate to the Cap-Haitien team the information necessary to conduct activities there that were developed or managed by the Port-au-Prince office.  Program  officials expressed concerns regarding activities planned by the Port-au-Prince office that did not utilize local knowledge.  In addition, they said Chemonics used contractors from Port-auPrince to implement a number of activities in Cap-Haitien and Saint-Marc; these contractors brought their own people to do the jobs instead of hiring locals.  As a result, residents saw jobs in their neighborhoods being done by outsiders, and without an understanding of the activities, they did not see how anyone local benefitted. 

Program officials said that for some activities, particularly in the Cap-Haitien corridor, community members did not feel engaged and did not take ownership of the completed projects.  Urban beautification projects in the towns of Limonade and Caracol failed for these reasons.  The purpose of these projects was to improve public areas by installing plants and benches, as well as doing minor masonry work, and to project “a positive image of what role the nearby Caracol industrial park and other upcoming economic investments will play in citizens’ lives.” The landscaping work in Limonade was not completed as planned because of a lack of coordination between two HRI-II activities.  Chemonics purchased and planted some seedlings for the town center, but they died from lack of care.  According to the project’s final evaluation report, residents did not understand how the activity led to the beautification of the area nor did they associate it with the industrial park.  Limonade’s mayor said the municipality could have been involved more in planning the activity to ensure its success.   


Although many of OTI’s activities included  community collaboration in development and implementation, some did not, and they were not very successful because OTI did not always incorporate plans into activity designs to  promote community ownership and sustainability. Furthermore, OTI did not require Chemonics to implement a communication plan for each activity to increase the local population’s awareness of it and its benefits to the community. While OTI must strike a balance between coordinating closely with local communities and meeting its mandate of being fast and flexible, activities implemented with limited participation from local communities can hurt the prospects for sustainability.  Therefore, we make the following recommendations. 

Recommendation 4.  We recommend that USAID/Office of Transition Initiatives incorporate plans to engage communities when developing activities so that they will take ownership and sustain the efforts. 

Recommendation 5. We recommend that USAID/Office of Transition Initiatives require 
Chemonics International to implement communications plans for ongoing and new activities to increase the local population’s awareness of the activities and how they will benefit the community. 

Short-term Technical Assistance 
Activity Did Not Meet Expectations 
The audit team reviewed one of nine ongoing short-term technical assistance activities.  These 
provide an organization with an expert who trains or mentors employees for a short period of time. The HRI-II activity provided Haiti’s national mapping agency, Centre National de l’Information Geo Spatiale (CNIGS) with a geographic information system (GIS) specialist for 6 months because the agency lost most of its management staff, facilities, and equipment during the earthquake. The consultant was responsible for helping transfer mapping information from international humanitarian agencies to CNIGS and for working with other donor agencies in developing an information system for coordinating housing and neighborhood reconstruction. According to CNIGS and the consultant, the information system was not finished when her contract ended in February 2012.  CNIGS’s acting director said she did not provide the help the agency needed and her input did not meet its needs. The acting director added that the consultant’s efforts to document user requirements for the information system were insufficient and would have to be redone by the system developer. The consultant said she had difficulties getting CNIGS staff members to discuss data sharing agreements, which delayed establishing the data-sharing protocols. In addition, the tasks of implementing the conceptual model of the information system and configuring the GIS server were only halfway completed by the end of her contract.  

The activity did not meet its objectives because Chemonics did not communicate effectively with CNIGs or provide adequate support to the consultant.  In October 2011, shortly after the consultant began working at the agency, she told Chemonics officials she was having difficulties discussing with CNIGS what they expected her to do in developing the system.  Chemonics officials told her to continue to try to work with the agency. 


Chemonics officials said they had separate meetings with the consultant and CNIGS monthly, but they focused on program development.  The  Chemonics officials said they never asked agency staff members whether the consultant was meeting their needs and learned only at the activity’s end that CNIGS was not satisfied with her. Short-term technical assistance might not help grantees if they do not get the type of assistance they need or if they do not use the expertise provided appropriately.  To assist OTI in managing current and future short-term technical assistance grants, we make the following recommendation. 

Recommendation 6.  We recommend that USAID/Office of Transition Initiatives implement processes to assess short-term technical assistance with grantees periodically throughout the grant cycle. 


Environmental Review Not Performed and Approved Before Implementation 
ADS Chapter 204, “Environmental Procedures,” states that USAID must fully comply with environmental procedures established in the Code of Federal Regulations (22 CFR 216). USAID is required to “integrate environmental issues into its programs, both to meet U.S. Government legal environmental obligations and to optimize economic and social development results.” 

Supplementary guidance to ADS 204 provides descriptions of environmental procedures to include in requests for proposals and award documents.  The purpose is to give USAID time to conduct environmental reviews and incorporate environmental factors and mitigating measures in the design and approval of each program and activity before making an irreversible commitment of resources.  ADS further states that the review should be done as early as possible in the design process to allow enough time for more detailed subsequent environmental review and concurrence, and for integrating environmental mitigations into the process. 

Chemonics has established procedures for environmental reviews to screen each activity for potential adverse impacts, recommend determinations to categorize environmental risk, and identify mitigation and monitoring measures.  The procedures for mitigation and monitoring include templates for environmental mitigation plans and reports; these were developed for USAID/Haiti to use when implementing infrastructure and related activities.  Several of the activities the team reviewed were designated as “negative with conditions,” which applies to activities that could have moderate adverse environmental impacts, but could be managed effectively with appropriate mitigation and monitoring measures.  For these activities, Chemonics used plans that included mitigation measures and reporting on monitoring of those measures.


In one of the activities, OTI did not complete the required environmental review and mitigation and monitoring plan before implementing the activity, which was designed in June 2011 to generate temporary employment opportunities through planting 700,000 jatropha seedlings in the Saint-Marc corridor.  In Chemonics’s environmental review of the activity, it recommended a determination of “negative with conditions,” requiring an environmental mitigation and monitoring plan. 

However, although the seedlings were planted in August 2011, OTI had not approved the environmental determination, and the mitigation and monitoring plan was not in effect.  The environmental officer visited the jatropha plantation in August 2011 and said that no negative effects had occurred; the officer said Chemonics had done scientific research to be sure that the type of jatropha was proper for the area, but had not yet documented the environmental work performed. Subsequently, Chemonics developed a mitigation and monitoring plan and submitted it to USAID/Haiti and OTI for approval. The mission environmental officer and contracting officer’s representative approved the environmental mitigation plan and report in October and November 2011, respectively—after the jatropha had already been planted. 


The lack of planning for environmental mitigations before implementation happened because OTI and Chemonics neglected to be sure that they complied with the requirements to complete the environmental documentation and to obtain the necessary USAID approvals before planting the trees. Potentially adverse environmental impacts can occur if proper mitigation and monitoring procedures are not put into place before implementing an activity and monitoring it. Therefore, we make the following recommendations. 

Recommendation 7. We recommend that USAID/Office of Transition Initiatives review the existing environmental documentation of current and planned activities for compliance with environmental review requirements, and document the results of the review. 


Recommendation 8. We recommend that USAID/Office of Transition Initiatives require Chemonics to complete environmental reviews before implementing activities. 


EVALUATION OF MANAGEMENT 
COMMENTS 
Based on our evaluation of management comments on our draft report, we have determined that management decisions have been reached on all recommendations.  In addition, final action has been taken on Recommendations 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8.  Our detailed evaluation of management comments follows. 

Recommendation 1.  OTI agreed to implement a plan to measure and report progress toward meeting program goals for the remainder of HRI-II.  Officials said they would hire a local contractor to conduct third-party monitoring and evaluation. In addition, OTI plans to require the monitoring and evaluation contractor to develop indicators to be used for measuring and reporting on goals for the remainder of the program.  OTI expects to have this in place by December 31, 2012. Based on OTI’s planned actions and estimated time frames, a management decision has been reached on this recommendation. 

Recommendation 2.  OTI agreed to update its implementation plan for the remainder of the program to include estimated timelines for each phase of an activity for development, implementation, and closeout.  In May 2012 OTI updated its procedures and required Chemonics to submit detailed implementation plans that include timelines for estimated completion of each phase of an activity.  Based on OTI’s response and supporting documents provided, final action has been taken on this recommendation.   

Recommendation 3.  OTI agreed to conduct and document DQAs of the indicators OTI reports on for the mission’s operational plan and performance report.  In management comments, OTI officials said they would work with USAID/Haiti’s Program Office on the DQAs, and they expect to complete them by December 1, 2012.  Based on OTI’s response and estimated time frames to complete the DQAs, a management decision has been reached on this recommendation. 

Recommendations 4 and 5.  To address the recommendations, OTI issued updated guidance to Chemonics in August 2012 that required it to incorporate community engagement and communication into each activity’s implementation plan.  The plans should include information about how and when Chemonics plans to engage the communities in an activity and what communication tools it plans to use to increase activity impact by highlighting participation of local authorities and explaining the benefits to the community.  OTI provided a copy of the updated guidance explicitly stating that community engagement is to be conducted in the activity development stage to promote community ownership and sustainability for all community stabilization activities. As a result of OTI’s response and completed actions, final action has been taken on these recommendations. 

Recommendation 6.  OTI agreed to implement processes to assess short-term technical assistance with grantees throughout the grant cycle.  In response, OTI has implemented a procedure to include meetings with grantees as a monitoring and evaluation requirement for its short-term technical assistance activities.  OTI provided copies of the updated monitoring and evaluation guidance issued to Chemonics that includes the new requirement.  Based on OTI’s response and documented actions, final action has been taken on this recommendation. 





Recommendations 7 and 8.  OTI agreed to review the existing environmental documentation of current and planned activities for compliance with environmental review requirements, and to require Chemonics to confirm that environmental reviews are completed before any activities begin. OTI conducted a review of current and planned activities for environmental compliance. It also worked with USAID environmental officials to develop umbrella mitigation and monitoring plans for infrastructure, water and sanitation, and watershed activities.  In addition, OTI added a step in its approval process to document environmental compliance requirements that must be completed before an activity can be approved.  OTI provided documentation of the new requirement and a checklist documenting its environmental compliance review of the ongoing and planned activities.  OTI also provided copies of the umbrella environmental mitigation and monitoring plans. Based on the actions taken by OTI and supporting documents, final action has been taken on these recommendations. 


SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 
Scope 
RIG/San Salvador conducted this performance audit in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions in accordance with our audit objective.  We believe that the evidence obtained provides that reasonable basis.  The purpose of the audit was to determine whether OTI is achieving its main goals of stabilizing Haiti through support for community revitalization, increased citizen engagement, and improved governance. 

OTI awarded a cost-plus-fixed-fee completion form task order to Chemonics on March 14, 2011, to provide short-term technical assistance to reinforce stability and lay the groundwork for longer-term development in Haiti.  As of May 3, 2012, OTI had obligated $46.5 million and disbursed $23 million. As of February 10, 2012, OTI had approved activities worth $22.9 million. 

The audit was performed at USAID/Haiti and at the Chemonics project offices in Port-au-Prince, Cap-Haitien, and Saint-Marc from January 11 through April 11, 2012.  The audit reviewed a judgmental sample of 22 ongoing and completed activities valued at $6.8 million from a universe of 141 activities approved, in process, or completed as of February 2012, valued at $22.9 million.  The audit covered the period March 14, 2011, through February 10, 2012.  We visited 19 sites in Port-au-Prince, Cap-Haitien, and Saint-Marc. 


In planning and performing the audit, we assessed relevant internal controls that OTI used to manage its Haiti program. These controls included established policies and procedures for grant administration and program management,  monitoring and evaluation processes, and reporting processes. 

Methodology 
To answer the audit objective, we interviewed OTI and USAID/Haiti officials, Chemonics employees, grantees, and beneficiaries. We reviewed and analyzed relevant documents including activity plans, grant agreements, grant and procurement documentation, activity progress and final evaluation reports, and environmental reviews.  We judgmentally selected 22 ongoing and completed activities to obtain a sample of activities across regions, sectors, goals supported, and grantee type.  We compared expected results with actual results by reviewing supporting documentation, observing activity implementation on site visits, and interviewing grantees and beneficiaries.  Since the testing was based on a judgmental sample instead of a statistical one, the results and conclusions are limited to the items tested and could not be projected to the entire audit universe. To determine the reliability of computer-processed data in OTI’s activity database, for activities reviewed we compared grant data to source documents, and compared reported progress with conditions we observed during site visits. 

MANAGEMENT COMMENTS

August 22, 2012 
MEMORANDUM 
TO:  Regional Inspector General/San Salvador, Jon Chasson 
FROM:  USAID/DCHA/OTI Director, Robert Jenkins /s/ 
USAID/Haiti Acting Mission Director, Steve Olive /s/ 
SUBJECT:  USAID Response to Audit of USAID’s Haiti Recovery Initiative Managed by the Office of Transition Initiatives (Report No. 1-521-12-XXX-P) 

This memorandum transmits USAID’s response to the Regional Inspector General’s draft audit report “Audit of USAID’s Haiti Recovery Initiative Managed by the Office of Transition Initiatives,” dated July 26, 2012 for your consideration.   USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives (USAID/OTI) programs are, by nature, challenging to evaluate because of the iterative process applied to project development that is designed to work in rapidly changing program environments such as Haiti.  We appreciate the efforts of the RIG staff to understand our unique programming approach and processes.   

Regarding Recommendation 1: We agree with this recommendation. USAID/OTI is 
currently in the process of engaging a local contractor to conduct third party monitoring and evaluation.  One of the first deliverables of the contract will be the development of indicators that will be used for measuring and reporting against achievement of program goals for the remainder of the program.  We will have these in place by December 31, 2012.  It should be noted that it is challenging to attribute direct results in complex and fluid stabilization environments, and it is often the absence of destabilizing events that demonstrates stability in these historically volatile areas. Barring sudden major destabilization in our target communities, we anticipate that the indicators will offer qualitative and quantitative impact data and will be based on plausible correlation which may not be directly attributable to individual activities.   



Regarding Recommendation 2: We agree with this recommendation. USAID/OTI 
revised the “Activity Cycle and Guidebook” on May 2, 2012 to include guidance for the contractor on improving the implementation plans for each grant.  The contractor will now submit basic implementation plans with the grant approval documentation and will submit detailed implementation plans with timelines for estimated completion of each portion of the activity no more than one week after the kick off meeting where the grantee signs the grant. 

Regarding Recommendation 3: We agree with this recommendation. USAID/OTI will 
work with the USAID/Haiti Program Office to complete the data quality assessments for the five indicators to which USAID/OTI contributes in the Mission’s Operation Plan and Performance Report. We will complete the data quality assessments no later than by December 1, 2012. 

Regarding Recommendation 4 and 5: We agree with this recommendation. 
Community engagement and ownership is a cornerstone of USAID/OTI programs worldwide and an integral part the USAID/OTI program, especially for our community stabilization activities.  This has been an important aspect of our approach since the inception of the program; however, USAID/OTI recognizes that it has not been adequately documented and has faced particular challenges in activities that are not developed at the community level but which were requested by the Haitian national government or other USG actors.  USAID/OTI revised the “Activity Cycle and Guidebook” on August 16, 2012, to specify that the contractor will include community engagement and communication as part of the implementation plans for community stabilization grants.  The development section of the “Activity Cycle and Guidebook” also now explicitly states that community engagement will be conducted at the development stage of the activity design process to promote community ownership and sustainability for all community stabilization activities. The implementation section of the “Activity Cycle and Guidebook” also now explicitly states that community engagement will be conducted at the development stage of the activity design process to promote community ownership and sustainability for all community stabilization activities. The implementation section of the “Activity Cycle and Guidebook” also now states that the contractor submit an activity note for community stabilization activities describing the communication plan to increase the local population’s awareness of the activity and how it will benefit the community.     

Regarding Recommendation 6: We agree with this recommendation. 
Following the site visit by the audit team where the unmet expectations were raised by the grantee, USAID/OTI discussed the situation with our contractor and immediately began including check-in meetings with the grantee on the M&E plan for Short-Term Technical Assistance (STTA) activities that were in development.  This included two with the same grantee of the audited activity, CNIGS.  It should be noted that although there were communication issues with this STTA, for the majority of our other STTA activities to GOH entities, they have asked to extend the consultants because of how much they value the consultants’ contributions to the organization.  USAID/OTI included grantee check-ins as an M&E requirement for STTA activities in the August 16, 2012 M&E guidebook. 

Regarding Recommendation 7: We agree with this recommendation.
The activities reviewed under this audit were developed prior to Chemonics’ conducting an environmental compliance training in September 2011 in which USAID’s Regional Environmental Officer (REO) and the Mission Environmental Officer (MEO) participated. USAID/OTI has already completed its review of environmental documentation for current and planned activities, and worked with the MEO and REO to create three Umbrella Environmental Mitigation Plans and Reports (UEMPRs) for infrastructure, water and sanitation, and watershed management and irrigation.  USAID/OTI creates individual EMPRs for all HRI activities that do not fall under one of the UEMPRs and now regularly reviews a spreadsheet that tracks the environmental compliance plans and regular reporting for all activities.   

Regarding Recommendation 8: We agree with this recommendation. 
On October 20, 2011, HRI added a section in the activity approval documents to document environmental compliance needs for each activity which must be completed before the activity is approved. In this section, the activity is classified based on its potential for environmental impact and what environmental documentation or mitigation works will be needed during implementation.  Corresponding guidance was added to the “Activity Cycle and Guidebook” on May 2, 2012.  Many of the common types of activities implemented by HRI that have potential for environmental impacts are implemented using an UEMPR. HRI’s efforts to improve environmental compliance 
monitoring were so well-received that HRI was highlighted as an example and an HRI staff member spoke during the Environmental Compliance (Reg. 216) Workshop hosted by USAID/Haiti from April 23 - 27.