HAITI 12 JANVYE 2013: APRE 3 LANE KEK CHIF KE NOU TA DWE KONNEN

Pa bliye ke manman lajan rekonstriksyon an pa pase nan men Ayisien. Akoz lwa ijans lan ak CIRH ke des iresponsab leta te pibliye se etranje yo ki te ranmasse, kontwole ak depanse manman lajan rekonstriksyon lan. E se yo tou ki depanse kob sa yo. Pinga yo vin di ke ayisien kowompi. Si gen eksplikasyon ki pou bay sou ki kote lajan yo pase, se yo ki pou bay li paske se nan men yo ke lajan nou ye. 12 Janvye 2013 dwe reprezante yon jou tet ansamb pou nou mande kote lajan yo voye pou pep Ayisien lan pase? Men kek chif ke nou dwe konnen:

Kombyen Ayisien ki mouri le 12 Janvye 2010: 320.000

Kombyen Ayisien ki te deplase apre 12 Janvye 2010: $3 Millions

Kombyen fanmi ki te pedi kay: 420.000

Kombyen Ayisien ki tap viv amba tant apre 12 Janvye 2010: $1.4 Million

Kombyen kob ke Ayiti pedi 12 Janvye 2010: $12 Milliards

kombyen Ayisien ke kolera MINUSTAH touye depi Octobre 2010: 8500

Kombyen Ayisien ke kolera MINUSTAH kontamine: 700.000

Kombyen jou ki pase san ke MINUSTAH pa prezante Ekskiz bay Pep Ayisien pou kolera de li lage nan peyi a: 816

Kombyen kob, lajan ke Ayiti bezwen pou netwaye kolera MINUSTAH: $2.2 Milliards

Kombyen kob ke yo bay Ayiti onivo miltilateral: $7.5 Milliards

Kombyen kob ke gouvenman Meriken remet ONG ak kompayi prive meriken pou Ayiti: $1.7 Milliard

Kombyen kob milite Meriken depanse pou distribye medikaman, manje dlo, bato lopital elatrye apre 12 Janvye 2010: $1.2 Milliard

Kombyen kob ke gouvenman Meriken depanse pou ede konstwui Pak endistryel Nodes: $124 Millions

Kombyen kob chak ONG ak Kontrakteu Meriken recevwa pou Ayiti de gouvenman Meriken: Depatman Deta pa vle bay enfomasyon sa yo

Kombyen kob sitwayen Meriken remet 80 ONG meriken pou Ayiti: $1.6 Milliards

Kombyen Ayisien ki recevwa TPS nan men gouvenman Meriken apre 12 Janvye: 60.000

Kobyen nan 110.000 Ayisien ke fanmi yo Ozetazini aplike pou rezidans e ki apwouve par Homeland Security ke gouvenman Meriken kite rantre: 0

Kombyen Kob gouvenman Kanada remet ONG Kanada pou Ayiti: $1 Milliard

Kombyen Lajan Lakwa Wouj Washington ranmasse pou Ayiti: $486 Millions

Kombyen kob ke gouvenman Ayisien recevwa kom sipo bidjete an 2011: $68 Millions

Kombyen kob ke gouvenman Ayiti jwen sou chak $100 dola ke etranje yo depanse: 10 centimes

Kombyen kob sa koute pou konstwui kay pou 100 employes ambasad Meriken Ayiti: $100 Millions

Kombyen kob sa koute gouvenman Matelly a pou retire 1.1 Million Ayisien Amba tant: $98 Millions

Kombyen kob sa koute pou konstwui kay pou 750 travaye nan Karacol: $20 Millions

Kombyen Ayisien kap viv amba tant toujou: 360.000

USAID and State Department: Serious Questions about a Haiti Reconstruction Puff Piece

http://wemeantwell.com/blog/2012/08/20/serious-questions-about-a-haiti-reconstruction-puff-piece/

The default media plan at State is to follow anything negative in the press with a planted puff piece. Rather than tackle the facts in a negative story (seeking to refute them with other information, or to make corrections), 

State’s modus is to seek ink that just says everything is actually wonderful, without mentioning the offending original articles Following a scathing Associated Press investigation 
http://wemeantwell.com/blog/2012/07/23/state-department-fumbles-haiti-reconstruction/   into the failure of State to reconstruct Haiti after the devastating 2010 earthquake (Less than 12 percent of the reconstruction money sent to Haiti after the earthquake has gone toward energy, shelter, ports or other infrastructure.

At least a third, $329 million, went to projects that were awarded before the 2010 catastrophe and had little to do with the recovery), State first tried an “Op-Ed” http://www.state.gov/p/wha/

rls/rm/2012/195338.htm by the ambassador http://wemeantwell.com/blog/
2012/07/25/too-much-self-love/ blithely mumbling that all was well. That was back in late July. It took almost a month more, but State did finally select its author for what appears to be a real puff piece, in this case some hack named David Brown at the hometown Washington Post (slogan: still dining out on that Watergate thing) http://www.washingtonpost.com/david-brown/2011/02/28/AB2Y0sM_viewAll.html  Brown’s work at the Post http://www.washingtonpost.com/david-brown/2011/02/28/AB2Y0sM_viewAll.html has been mostly on health issues, mainly HIV/AIDS, with the odd bit about Warren Buffet’s prostrate (not good) and Dick Cheney’s artificial heart (“doing exceedingly well”). As such, he was obviously the perfect guy to write authoritatively on reconstruction in Haiti. Without too much surprise, Brown tells us of the wonderful work State, via its USAID arm, has done in one micro-neighborhood in Port-au-Prince  http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/in-one-of-haitian-capitals-roughest-neighborhoods-a-pretty-good-second-chance/2012/08/18/0958982c-ae5c-11e1-936a-45aa2b40de38_story.html?hpid=z3 . The short version is that in this one neighborhood, 500 people have new houses, lots of locals were employed to do the work, and civic improvements accompanied the new homes. It is a real success story. Read it yourself. http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/in-one-of-haitian-capitals-roughest-neighborhoods-a-pretty-good-second-chance/2012/08/18/0958982c-ae5c-11e1-936a-45aa2b40de38_story.html?hpid=z3
Some Questions  
Here are the questions I sent to the Washington Post Ombudsman about the article. Should I receive a reply, I will feature it on this blog. 

Had the article addressed these points it might have floated above puff piece. Did David Brown locate this rebuilt neighborhood on his own, or did State direct him to it? 

Did Brown fly to Haiti specifically to do this story? 

What role did State/USAID play in his access to the neighborhood? 

Was he accompianied by anyone from State/USAID at any time? 

Brown does not seem to cover Haiti, State or reconstruction issues. How did he end up with this story?  

The story says $8.5 million US tax dollars were spent repairing or replacing 500 homes. That works out to a very rough figure of $17,000 per home. Haitian GDP is about $1300 a person a year https://www.cia.gov/library/




publications/the-world-



factbook/geos/ha.html , among the world’s impoverished. Is $17k per home expensive? Typical costs? What does the figure actually mean?

Why did reconstruction seem to succeed so well in this one micro-area while failing broadly? Are there lessons to be learned and applied elsewhere in Haiti or is this an anomaly?  

The Associated Press piece focused in part on how little reconstruction money actually makes it to Haiti instead of being siphoned off by US contractors. Brown’s article claims all but four workers used on this project were Haitian. At the same time, he notes that the project sent only $1.4 million of the $8.5 million total into the local economy. That seems to suggest over $7 million bucks went somewhere else. Where did it go?  

Brown’s article, which ran on the front page of the Post and continued inside, quoted only two people connected with the project by name, the project manager paid by USAID and one engineer paid by USAID. Why were there no quotes from any of the Haitian residents of the new dwellings? Why were there no quotes from any local Haitain officials? Did the WaPo editors cut out such quotes? Did they not ask Brown to obtain such quotes? How did Brown fact-check the details given to him by the USAID-paid people? DID Brown fact check those details? As I learned in Iraq, building things is relatively easy given massive amounts of money. 

The real magic is sustainability. Brown tells us “Groups of houses share 23 septic tanks and 100 bucket-flush toilets, which can be locked for privacy. Twenty solar-powered lights illuminate streets.” What plans and whose money are in place to repair and maintain that technology? Who/how will the septic tanks be drained or pumped out? What happens when the first solar light needs replacing? 

Will any of this be there working a year from now? If so, under what plan? The article calls the work in Haiti a “renaissance,” a pretty dramatic word that is empty, meaningless and damned temporary unless there is a sustainability plan in place. Almost all the details in the story are unsourced. Brown talks about the number of septic tanks, a kidnapping and decisions taken collectively by the neighborhood. He does not say where any of this information came from. Where did this information come from?  

Brown states: Another big problem was that wider paths and outdoor places to sit were neighborhood priorities but there was not any unoccupied land for them. As the project evolved, 201 households agreed to reduce the size of their plots, 171 agreed to reshape them, and 51 agreed to share their plots with another family by living in two-story houses.  

This is a huge thing to have accomplished. In reconstruction work, the easiest thing to do is simply to redo what was destroyed, urban problems and all. Destroyed too-narrow streets are replaced with new too-narrow streets because it proves inexpedient to resolve the many disputes. How did this process actually work out in Haiti? Did it really happen? If it did, the method used should be a critical element toward replicating this success throughout Haiti. Did State/USAID lead negotiations? Was there some sort of local micro-government? Since it is unlikely that such agreement spontaneously emerged, leaving out the process raises questions about whether Brown had any idea what he was writing about, or was simply a notetaker for USAID’s propaganda machine.

Haiti’s Fight for Transparency by Jake Johnston (Caribbean Journal)

In the aftermath of the earthquake in Haiti, donors pledged billions of dollars for reconstruction efforts. With those dollars was a commitment to “build back better”; this time was supposed to be different from previous big aid campaigns.

But so far, less than half of donor pledges have been disbursed, and it has become clear that “building back better” remains nothing more than a slogan. While there clearly have been successes in Haiti since the earthquake and the hard work of thousands of aid workers shouldn’t be discounted, nearly half-a-million remain homeless and hundreds of thousands more are living in desperate conditions.

With a visible lack of results and little hard data with which to assess progress, one question naturally arises: Where did the money go? At the Center for Economic and Policy Research and together with many other organizations, we’ve been trying to track where exactly the money that did get spent, went. It hasn’t been easy.

To be sure, aid projects shouldn’t be judged solely on what percent of an aid budget went to overhead, or how much went to American consultants or was spent on American products as opposed to Haitian consultants and products. Ideally, the effectiveness of projects should be based on their outcomes, not just on the breakdown of how funds are spent. But measuring outcomes often isn’t feasible. A nominally independent review of the U.S. government’s response in Haiti attempted to measure the quality and impact of aid, but “a disquieting lack of data on baselines against which to measure progress or even impact” prevented them from doing so.

As taxpayers, we have the right to know how our tax dollars are being used and if they are used effectively.  Specifically, this means looking at the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), which has spent well over a billion dollars in Haiti since 2010.  To their credit, it’s not difficult to obtain the first level of transparency: to which organizations USAID gave funds.  USAID factsheets reveal that close to 100 percent of humanitarian funds for Haiti were channeled through NGOs, U.N. agencies or right back to other U.S. government agencies. Included in this billion-plus dollars hundreds of millions of dollars in contracts which have gone overwhelmingly to “beltway bandits” — firms located in D.C., Maryland or Virginia. Only 0.02 percent by our latest tally has gone to Haitian firms.

But this isn’t the end of the line when it comes to transparency.  Once funds are given to an organization, what are they spent on? What were they meant to achieve? How much goes back to the US and how much goes to local firms?

In a meeting last October in Port-au-Prince a USAID official defended the awarding of contracts to so-called “beltway bandits,” telling me that, while certainly some money goes off the top for their profits, much gets spent in country or is given to local subcontractors. It was a back-of-the-envelope calculation, but he estimated that each international worker sent to Haiti could cost up to $250,000 a year.

The important part, he stressed, was that this money would be spent in Haiti on electricity, security, housing, etc. “He has to live here, eat here, dance here, whatever,” the official reasoned.

And as for how much money is actually going to local subcontractors, did USAID have any data on this they’d be willing to share? While I was assured that a systematic approach to capturing this data was in the works, in the meantime the same USAID official explained to me that, “you need hard data…and I need that hard data too.”

It’s a critical issue. To be able to judge how effectively US taxpayer money is being spent in Haiti, we need to know what actually gets spent in Haiti and what gets funneled back to the US.  Local procurement is a sustainable way to improve the Haitian economy; channeling aid through local businesses creates jobs, develops capacity and reduces the need for more aid down the line. While USAID has begun an ambitious reform agenda, which includes increasing local procurement, they readily admit that “the Agency does not have the systems in place to track sub-grants and sub-contracts.”

USAID may not have the systems in place, but they at least should collect the information. Following a Freedom of Information Act request, I received a USAID task order with Chemonics, a for-profit development firm that is the largest single recipient of USAID funds for Haiti since the earthquake. The task order requires the contractor to “track and report on the overall monthly commitments and disbursements for all activities and non-activity expenditures.”

Further, the contract states that Chemonics “is required to provide a detailed budget and vouchers for all subcontractors.” So USAID may not be able to systematically process this information, but if the contractor and USAID are doing their jobs, the data does exist.

In responding to my FOIA request, in which I asked for “all communications or records relating” to the two contracts USAID had with Chemonics since the earthquake, USAID only provided me with their two task orders. These are vague documents that list the general goals of the program, but no specific targets or works to be completed. Of all the various documents and financial reports that the contractor was required to submit to USAID, none of them were released, nor were they even withheld. It was as if they didn’t exist. Further, all of the cost information, including overhead and labor costs, was redacted on the grounds that this is considered the proprietary information of the contractor and could cause competitive harm.

There have been some successes. Just a few weeks ago, following up on a request, USAID published a list of Haitian organizations that had received direct USAID funding. The total was less than $10 million out of more than $1 billion spent to date. Although it was an extremely low percentage of spending – just about one percent – it was a step in the right direction for USAID. Of course, there is still no data available on where funds are going at the subcontracting level.

The USAID Inspector General (IG) has six audits of Haiti programs planned for 2012, which hopefully will provide valuable information that so far hasn’t been publically available. In November 2010 the IG had found numerous problems with the work of Chemonics and others involved in cash-for-work programs.

Despite noting that contractors “were operating in an environment with high risk for fraud,” USAID had not performed financial reviews.  Currently, an audit of Chemonics is being performed by the IG, and could be published later this summer. But while Chemonics may be the largest recipient of USAID funds in Haiti, they’re far from the only USAID partner whose activities and financials are shielded from public scrutiny.

In Busan, South Korea, at the Fourth High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced, to a round of applause, that the U.S. was joining the International Aid Transparency Initiative.

“Transparency helps reveal our weaknesses so we can improve our work,” Clinton said.

Indeed. USAID could start by making public their partners’ budgets, as well as project related targets and costs, in order to answer the question of “where did the money go” once and for all.

**Jake Johnston is an international researcher at the Center for Economic and Policy Research. He writes on Haiti-related issues for the blog Relief and Reconstruction Watch.

Haitian Recovery Progress Remains Limited, Oxford Analytica

Two years after the earthquake, Haiti remains in a state of humanitarian emergency. Recovery efforts -- marked by inefficiency and political infighting -- are still in their early stages, leaving Haitians in a high-risk environment for possible future disasters. Meanwhile, media coverage of the situation is limited, and commitment to the Haitian people from the international community has waned.

What next

Without heavy support from the international community, Haiti will continue to struggle with the humanitarian effects of the 2010 earthquake and subsequent cholera epidemic. Relief probably will continue to be marked by inefficiency, poor coordination and diminishing funds. Meanwhile, little progress is likely to be made when it comes to the country's recovery efforts.

Analysis

The scale of the disaster posed by the January 2010 earthquake (see HAITI/INTERNATIONAL: Emergency offers disaster lessons - January 20, 2010), combined with underlying high levels of vulnerability and lack of physical and social infrastructure, resulted in one of the largest, most complex, and costly relief operations ever executed. With the Haitian government largely incapable of handling the situation, it was up to the international community -- coordinated by the UN -- to ensure that humanitarian needs were met and recovery and reconstruction efforts took off. However, response efforts have been criticised as inefficient and poorly coordinated (see HAITI: Humanitarian crisis resists amelioration - November 8, 2010).

Humanitarian situation

Two years on, Haiti still remains in a state of humanitarian emergency:

Displacement. Over 500,000 people still live in temporary camps. Although this represents a decrease from the peak of 2.3 million internally displaced people, most of those who have left the camps -- many involuntarily -- have moved to transitional shelters or been rendered homeless.

Cholera. Compounding the effects of the earthquake, Haiti has been struggling with a cholera epidemic -- the outbreak of which has been blamed on UN peacekeepers due to dumping of unsanitary waste. The epidemic so far has affected over 500,000 people and resulted in almost 7,000 deaths.

Sanitation. Over 3.7 million people do not have access to safe drinking water and 8.2 million are without reliable access to latrines or toilets. The main cities lack functioning waste systems. People that remain in camps have been facing dire sanitary conditions, with lack of safe drinking water and open-air defecation.

Health. Haiti has the highest under-five mortality rate in the region. Under 40% of Haitians have access to healthcare and less than 60% of children are immunised for measles.

The humanitarian outlook for Haiti in the coming year is worrying, as challenges for relief operations remain significant. It will be imperative for humanitarian organisations to ensure the transition of humanitarian response activities to development programmes. However, there are very few signs of this occurring in the near term.

Recovery

Meanwhile, the longer-term recovery process remains in early stages and has faced significant obstacles:

Reconstruction. Progress of reconstruction has been slow and inefficient. Of almost 300,000 buildings destroyed or badly damaged, the international community has supported the repair of less than 20,000. Meanwhile, efforts to remove rubble have stalled, though it was an urgent reconstruction priority, leaving Port-au-Prince with at least 5 million cubic metres of rubble -- about half of what was generated by the quake. Moreover, legal impediments surrounding land titles have frozen building activity throughout the country.

Structural reform. The UN is calling for acceleration of structural reforms in the areas of education, water and sanitation, agriculture, healthcare, justice and housing. In this regard there is urgent need for strengthened institutional capacities at state and local levels.

IHRC. In October 2011 the mandate of the Interim Haiti Recovery Commission (IHRC) was not renewed -- largely due to the executive-legislature stand-off since the election of President Michel Martelly in May 2011 (see HAITI: Martelly faces legislative conflict - December 19, 2011). Although the IHCR was largely seen as inefficient and is likely to be replaced with a new Haitian-run agency, several large-scale reconstruction projects have stalled.

Donor fatigue. In light of political stalemate, inefficient reconstruction project management and implementation, and fading coverage of the Haitian situation in world media -- combined with the effects of the global financial crisis -- donor interest in funding Haitian recovery has started to wane. As of end July 2011, only 37.8% of 5.3 billion dollars pledged at the 2010 international donor's conference in New York had been disbursed. Meanwhile, many smaller aid agencies have been forced to withdraw from Haiti due to lack of financial support. However, there are signs of increasing international private investment interest, which would help create needed job opportunities.

Humanitarian risks

Even before the 2010 earthquake, Haiti had one of the most vulnerable populations in the world. Due to its geographic location it is highly exposed to natural hazards. The effects of the quake exacerbated the vulnerability of the population and decreased their disaster resilience, leaving a majority of Haitians in a high-risk environment for possible future disasters:

Hurricanes and floods. The 2012 Atlantic hurricane season has been predicted to be above average, with risk of wind damage, inland flooding and costal surge. This could complicate reconstruction efforts further, leading to worsened humanitarian conditions throughout the country.

Earthquakes. Haiti remains at risk of new earthquakes, though seismologists and geologists are unsure about the level of risk in the near future.

Cholera. While the number of new cholera cases is declining with the end of the rainy season, the epidemic has peaked twice in the last two years. There are significant risks of it peaking again, as safe water and sanitary conditions are insufficient to prevent the spread of the infection.

The high risk of future disasters underlines the urgency of Haiti getting to grips with its humanitarian crisis and rebuilding in a way that enhances disaster resilience. However, the prospect of this happening remains low in light of the country's political stalemate and unhealthy dependency on inefficient, poorly coordinated and increasingly uninterested international community efforts.

Impact

- There is significant risk of a prolonged humanitarian crisis, with dwindling resources to address root problems.

- Disaster risk reduction initiatives will continue to be emphasised to ensure sustainable recovery, but quality projects will remain scarce.

- Creation of a Haitian recovery coordination agency is likely, but could lead to greater levels of inefficiency and corruption.