Haiti: Les révélations douloureuses de Michel William

Souvent  dans la nuit, á force de penser  au drame économique qui se joue sur le terrain politique haïtien  je deviens rêveur en me laissant aller á  des analyses les plus osées pour expliquer les comportements tantôt étranges  tantôt  justifiés des acteurs. Des fois  je remonte le cours de l’actualité  pour essayer de comprendre le rôle dévolu á   un des acteurs, la presse, dans  cette tragi comédie politique .D’autres fois  je vais á  la poésie  et  je deviens   très triste  comme Paul Verlaine pour vivre dans mon cœur  le futur sombre du pays  comme les feuilles mourantes  de  l’automne. Puis n’en pouvant plus, je soumets á   l’appréciation des internautes ce poème de Paul Verlaine et  á  la méditation des acteurs politiques de l’intérieur ces vers tirés  d’Andromaque de Racine

Chanson d'automne

Les sanglots longs

Des violons

De l'automne

Blessent mon cœur

D'une langueur

Monotone.

Tout suffocant

Et blême, quand

Sonne l'heure,

Je me souviens

Des jours anciens

Et je pleure,

Et je m'en vais

Au vent mauvais

Qui m'emporte

Deçà, delà

Pareil à la

Feuille morte.

En metteur en scène improvisé et analyste politique averti, je fais jouer par Gary Conille  le rôle d’Oreste dans Andromaque de Racine lorsqu’il dit « Pour qui sont ces serpents qui sifflent sur vos têtes » et plus tard « Je me livre en aveugle au destin qui m’entraine »

Dans une réflexion non moins  sereine  je verrais un Michel Martelly dans le  rôle  de Pyrrhus qui ne peut pas payer le cout de sa victoire aux urnes. Je vous demande  á  tous haïtiens, haïtiennes  mes frères et sœurs, d’y réfléchir

Je ne doute pas d’un seul instant de la volonté du Président Michel Martelly de sortir le pays du marasme politique et économique créé par vingt années de pouvoir anarcho-populiste qui a pesé de tout son poids sur l’héritage du pouvoir dictatorial des Duvalier . Je ne doute pas non plus de la volonté des hommes qui ont soutenu la campagne  électorale  de Mr Martelly du besoin urgent  de toucher  les dividendes  sur les débours consentis  et de leurs sentiments républicains ambitieux  pour Haïti. Je ne prétends pas nier non plus les  inquiétudes justifiées des artisans de la transition avortée de l’INITE qui se voient  voler une pactole et perdre un pouvoir longuement rêvés  après avoir construit frauduleusement  un bouclier politique de protection légale . C’est dans ce sens qu’il faut comprendre le  blocage  de la constitution du nouveau gouvernement au niveau  de la présidence et  du législatif haïtien. Ne soyons  pas le dindon  de la farce que nous a cuisiné l’étranger pour s’en régaler á  nos dépens.

Mais, l’énigme réelle que je n’arrive pas á  déchiffrer  est la  position  partisane  affichée de la presse á travers les medias dominants dans  leurs éditoriaux  ou dans  les commentaires des émissions á  grande écoute .  Dans le cas de radio Caraïbes, on doit assimiler la position de Jean Monard á  une dérive momentanée du   soutien inconditionnel  au candidat de son cœur ayant perdu les élections malheureuses de 2011 dont il n’arrive  pas á  se remettre. Les moments chauds sitôt terminés, notre ami retrouvera bientôt la gestion habituelle de ses mega  émissions  en  surveillant  l’esprit partisan qui commence á  transpirer  de ses prestations. Pour les autres media en dehors de Signal FM qui s’était positionné face á  Radio Caraibe pour les raisons similaires,  le doute reste entier sur la motivation des journalistes talentueux qui peignent á retrouver  la neutralité  dont ils faisaient preuve dans le traitement de l’information.

Premièrement, je ne crois pas un seul instant que ces journalistes  sont mus.  par un intérêt  financier quelconque. Ils ne l’ont pas été hier. Il n’y a aucune raison  pour qu’ils le soient aujourd’hui. C’est ma conviction la plus intime.

Les directeurs d’opinion de ces medias dominants ont entretenu dès la campagne du candidat  Martelly, un sentiment de boycottage sur chacune de ses initiatives .Le clou de cette partisannerie est  enfoncé  dans toute sa cruauté  dans la chair du président dans le rejet des premiers ministres et dans le bilan sinistre  des cent premiers jours de son pouvoir dont  l’échec est aussi celui  du parlement qui y est lié. Il ne saurait avoir de bilan présidentiel sans un bilan parlementaire. L’échec  de l’un est aussi celui de l’autre. Le succès de l’un est aussi  celui de l’autre.. On sent  et on vit l’impartialité des journalistes dans leur animation écrite ou orale des articles qui ont royalement ignoré le  bilan également désastreux du législatif.

Cette semaine  j’ai noté en plus deux cas béants

Le premier est d’accepter que le sénateur Moise Jean Charles traite ,publiquement et á   la face du monde, de maitre d’arme de menteur et de  coquin, Mr Michel Martelly, qui a rang d’excellence en tant que président de la république et  celui des dix millions  haïtiens .Des journalistes avisés se devaient de ne pas accepter un traitement aussi odieux  du président de la république par un membre á  part entière  du pouvoir législatif au bout  de leurs micros. Ceci ne se fait dans  aucun pays du monde, fut il autrefois  une république bananière de l’Amérique centrale. D’ailleurs  même au niveau du grand Corps, le groupe des 16 devrait rappeler  á  l’ordre le  Sénateur  Moise, qui aux Etats Unis serait accusé  d’aller trop loin et le cas échéant forcé  á   donner  sa démission ( cas mineur  député  Anthony Wiener) (un journaliste de MSNBC écarté de la station pour un accroc de langage)  .Les journalistes ne l’ont pas entendu de cette oreille. Pourtant ils l’ont fait quand Mr Martelly avait commis le lapsus lapidaire  d’évoquer l’idée regrettable de la dissolution du parlement. Ils ont défendu du bec et des ongles l’intégrité du parlement  .

L’autre cas est la position confuse  des journalistes  des media dominants dans le choix et la ratification du premier ministre désigné  Gary Conille. J’ai été vraiment attristé de suivre l’insistance de la journaliste vedette de radio vision 2000 dans son animation d’acculer le premier ministre désigné á  confirmer l’animation politique et irrespectueuse  du Sénateur Moise  Jean Charles concernant la  décision  éventuelle de faire ses adieux á la désignation de ce poste  suite  á  la présentation d’une lettre de  démission anticipée á  lui soumise par l’épouse du président et conseillers de ce dernier. Je  pourrais encore citer  les interviews réalisées dans les autres media dominants soit avec le premier ministre désigné, soit avec le sénateur Jean Charles. On  y décèle la même  volonté des journalistes de donner foi aux déclarations  enflammées du sénateur revêtu de son costume d’activiste de béton, qui armé d’un couperet  cherche a asséner au président des meurtrissures qui blessent jusqu’aux os. Les journalistes se sont fait naïvement avoir et pourraient être jugés  de complices de la volonté politique du sénateur  de salir  le prestige du président de la république et de ses conseillers , fut ce pour le plaisir  de créer un spectacle au gout amer pour le public  ?

Le doute devrait être  levé définitivement sur la naïveté  des  célébrités de notre presse á  partir du traitement de l’article 157 vis avis  de Mr Gary Conille  et de leur repositionnement rapide au constat d’un changement du vent en faveur du premier ministre désigné. Le parlement nous a appris en rejetant le choix des deux premiers ministres  que le vote de l’assemblée  est toujours politique. Si le vote est politique et que c’est le vote du parlement qui s’impose á  la nation, pourquoi insister sur la non éligibilité du premier ministre désigné par rapport aux prescrits de l’article 157 et á  la non applicabilité  des conventions de Genève ou des Nations Unies au cas d’espèce ?Ce traitement conjoncturel et biaisé de l’information concernant la ratification du choix du premier ministre désigné á  l’aune d’une constitution sodomisée par l’étranger et par le  combiné exécutif parlement d’INIITE ,  dégage un message  au  gout amer .Celui-ci s’apparente  a un jeu subtile  qui aurait pour unique objectif de retarder la formation du nouveau gouvernement et de précipiter inconsciemment   le chaos politique tel que souhaité  par le GPR.

Nos journalistes d’élite savent que le parlement et la présidence  sont deux institutions de facto qui nous régissent par la volonté des Nations Unies  de redistribuer  les votes électoraux  selon un agenda connu seulement d’elles. Pendant que nous nageons en pleine inconstitutionnalité  nos journalistes font appel á  mme Manigat , un mauvais perdant,  redirait l’OEA, pour évoquer dans des arguments fallacieux la violation de la constitution dans la ratification pressentie du choix du Premier ministre désigné. En toute sincérité, je ne reconnais pas la presse héroïque qui a accompagné le peuple dans la débâcle post séisme et le comportement totalitaire du président Préval aux derniers jours de son pouvoir.

Lorsque la presse a soupçonné   maintenant qu’ á  la suite d’accords politiques internes et externes secrets la tendance au parlement est á  la ratification du premier ministre, elle prend  une nouvelle position de défense du premier ministre ,qu’une semaine plutôt elle présentait comme un candidat inéligible  á  ce poste. La presse devient l’avocat constitué d’office du premier ministre désigné pour le défendre contre une éventuelle manoeuvre politique du président qui aurait pour effet de le dissuader  de renoncer  á  ce poste. La presse a relayé á  grand renfort de  publicité nationale et internationale les interviews du sénateur Moise Jean Charles qui ne jouissait auparavant aucun crédit dans la même presse. Cette démarche controversée  et troublée de la presse  ne contribue plus  á  la formation critique des opinions. Elle influence négativement l’opinion publique. Que tout le monde  sache jusqu'à présent que la presse n’a fait  aucune intention déclarée de faire opposition ouverte   ni n’appuie un éventuel parti politique  d’opposition   existant ou en miniature au président de  la république. Le comportement acide de la presse  reste un élément d’inquiétude et de trouble fête  pour les observateurs  qui se demandent perplexes  ou elle  veut en venir ?

Ce n’est pas dans mon intention d’engager aucune polémique  avec la presse parce qu’il est dans l’intérêt de tous qu’elle  fasse son travail en toute liberté et en toute indépendance. Mais si d’aventure, on constate que par moment elle s’égare, on se demande pourquoi des invités de marque  comme  Maitre Menard, l’ambassadeur  Lalane, l’ancien membre konakom du conseil électoral provisoire et autres figures importantes de l’élite politique haïtienne, ne font pas usage de leur renommée pour adresser élégamment ces accrocs aux journalistes noyés  dans les eaux ténébreuses  d’habiles politiciens. Agissons consciencieusement  et sereinement ensemble pour éviter a Gary Conille le sort funeste d’Oreste et á Martelly de savourer pendant cinq ans la victoire couteuse de Pyrrhus . Nous en pâtirons tous.

michelwilliam1000@hotmail.com

COHA Analysis of WikiLeaks: Blame Others for Haiti’s Problems by Stanley Lucas

It seems there is a renewed effort to cast all of Haiti’s problems as those of the horrible West continuing to practice colonialism.  A fresh batch of WikiLeaks cables have been analyzed by the Council of Hemispheric Affairs, See: http://www.coha.org/wikileaks-cables-show-haiti-as-pawn-in-u-s-foreign-policy/ which concludes that US efforts to interfere in the Venezuela oil deal and keep Haitian wages low are merely an extension of exploitative colonialism.  This is beyond absurd particularly when the charges are leveled at President Obama’s Administration. 

First, the article discusses the Petrocaribe deal in which the US, on behalf of Chevron and ExxonMobil, attempted to scuttle an oil deal with Venezuela that would allow Haitians to buy oil at a much-reduced price.  They attempt to cast the US as the bad guy for advocating interests and not presenting a fair deal.  What would be the problem with Preval negotiating a better deal with the US?  Preval had no interest in that.  Yes, the Petrocaribe deal allowed Haiti to buy oil much more cheaply.  Preval then gave the importation monopoly to an elite business cartel, known as the Groupe de Bourdon, which turned around and sold the oil at the same price.  They did not pass on any of the savings.  They claimed that the additional profit would be invested in social programs.  It never was.  President Preval is suspected to have personally benefitted from this deal to the tune of $463 million in pilfered profits and kickbacks.  How did that benefit the Haitian people? 

Second, the article outlines US efforts to undermine Preval’s efforts to raise the minimum wage in Haiti from 24 cents and hour to 61 cents.  They note that Hanes, Fruit of the Loom and other garment manufacturers threatened to pull manufacturing jobs from the country given the high increase.  This is a clearly a much more difficult issue to manage.  Haiti is in a tough situation given the global context.  As China moves up the manufacturing value chain, there is enormous opportunity for developing countries to compete for that capacity.  Bangladesh and Vietnam have equally low wages.  Haiti’s leverage is low cost labor and proximity to the US.  Clearly wages need to rise in Haiti, but Preval went about this with his usual lack of strategy and delivered another loss to the Haitian people.  There is a tripartite commission in place with representatives of the Haitian government, industry and labor unions.  This mechanism was set up to tackle the wage issues and other labor issues, but was never used, and likely could have been a good tool for building consensus before rushing to legislate.  Further, Haiti could do a lot better in its trade agreements.  Preval should have thought about this problem more comprehensively and should have pursued and aggressive trade agenda to reduce barriers and make Haiti a more attractive destination for foreign companies.  He failed to take any action on a trade agenda. 

Finally, the article provides flawed analysis on the corrupt 2010 elections.  They note that donor countries and international organizations knew the elections were flawed but blessed the results in the interest of moving forward.  The article does not mention that the people revolted, which resulted in OAS being invited in to do a recount.  They mention that Martelly was elected with only 23% of the vote and attribute the low turnout to the exclusion of Aristide’s Fanmi Lavalas.  What about the 1% turnout in the 2000 elections in which Aristide won 83% of the vote?  Seems that turnout was significantly lower despite the “popular” Lavalas party’s participation?  People did not turnout because of threatened violence and because of the complete and utter fraud in the first elections.  Further, the international community only addressed the Presidential elections allowing the fraudulent Parliamentary elections to stand, which has resulted in political deadlock today, see: http://solutionshaiti.blogspot.com/2011/07/inites-deadlock-last-ditch-effort-to.html

Surely the partisan Electoral Council (CEP) excluded Lavalas in an effort to secure victory for Preval’s INITE coalition, but for once, they used a legitimate and legal reason.  Aristide refused to certify paperwork allowing his party to participate.  This was not a paperwork snafu as the article leads us to believe.  Further, they excluded several Lavalas candidates directly linked to drug trafficking, corruption and murder.  This is one case in which the CEP acted legally – albeit partisan.

The article concludes with the absurd assertion that, “Based on these cables, we see a disturbing image where U.S. foreign policy is shaped by the interests of the rich and is geared toward underhanded interference in the affairs of other nations.” 

For one, this is an unbelievably absurd accusation to level against the Obama Administration.  The debates over raising taxes in the US right now directly contradict this assertion.  But more importantly, this analysis portrays Haiti as a victim.  All of Haiti’s problems are the fault of evil Western countries.  In reality, Haiti cannot blame other countries for its problems.  The US – and every other country around the world – acts in its self-interest, and, not surprisingly, advocates the interests of its companies.  It is the job of the Haitian Government to defend its interests globally.  But Preval and his cronies were too busy advancing their own interests to bother with advancing their country’s interests.  Haiti is ranked one of the top four more corrupt countries in the world.  Does that not have something to do with the dire poverty?  Duvalier pilfered $600 million from Haiti’s coffers.  Aristide pilfered $350 million, and Preval pilfered $463 million.  Might that not have something to do with Haiti’s problems?  The Haitian people generally blame a predatory, incompetent and corrupt government for its problems.

    Click on pictures to enlarge

DOSSIER SOUMIS PAR BERNARD GOUSSE AU SENAT D'HAITI POUR SA RATIFICATION COMME PREMIER MINISTRE

    Pour agrandir cliquez sur les pages 

Haitian Companies Still Sidelined from Reconstruction Contracts by Cepr

In December 2010, the AP conducted an analysis, see: http://www.bostonhaitian.com/2011/would-be-haitian-contractors-miss-out-aid of Haitian earthquake contracts given out by the US government, finding that only $1.60 out of every $100 went to Haitian companies. In the story, USAID responded: US AID says it is committed to increasing the amount of contracts going to Haitians.“We already are engaging with Haitian communities to make them aware of how they can partner with us,” said Janice Laurente, a spokeperson for US AID. Yet a new analysis from Haiti: Relief and Reconstruction Watch shows that since December 2010, not a single contract has been awarded to a Haitian firm, according to the Federal Procurement Data System, see: https://www.fpds.gov/fpdsng_cms/  (FPDS).  As of April 14, 2011, 1490 contracts had been awarded, since the January 2010 earthquake, for a total of $194,458,912. Of those 1490 contracts, only 23 have gone to Haitian companies, totaling just $4,841,426, or roughly 2.5 percent of the total. Table 1 shows the breakdown of contracts going to Haitian firms organized by the date the contract was signed. As can be seen, after originally being neglected, Haitian firms fared better from February 2010 through November 2010, receiving 5 percent of the value of all contracts. Since December 2010, however, not a single Haitian company has received a contract despite nearly $20 million being awarded in the last five months. The last contract awarded to a Haitian firm was actually signed on November 9, 2010, according to FPDS records. Although one possible explanation for the lack of participation by Haitian firms early on was the use of no-bid contracts, this does not account for the lack of Haitian participation. The share of no-bid contracts has actually increased in each time period, from 15.5 percent of all contracts in January 2010, to 16.4 percent from February - November, to an astounding 42.5 percent of all contracts in the previous five months. If no-bid contracts were used predominantly because of urgency, one would expect to see the share of no-bid contracts decreasing over time instead of increasing. While Haitian firms have largely been left on the sidelines, Beltway contractors (from DC, Maryland and Virginia) have received 39.4 percent of the nearly $200 million in contracts, as can be seen in Table II. Two of the largest Beltway contractors, DAI and Chemonics, we have written about numerous times before see: http://www.cepr.net/index.php/blogs/relief-and-reconstruction-watch/haitian-companies-bypassed-in-favor-of-dc-area-contractors-with-poor-track-records Despite the statement from USAID atop this post, they have actually been one of the worst US government agencies in terms of contracting to local businesses. USAID has awarded contracts totaling $33.5 million yet not a single contract has been awarded to a Haitian company. In addition, an astounding 92 percent of contracts awarded by USAID have gone to Beltway contractors. Which Haitian Firms Are Getting Contracts? Even this, however, overstates the benefits that have gone to Haitian firms. The 23 contracts that have gone to Haitian firms have gone to just six different companies, many large corporations with ties to the international community. Table III shows the six Haitian companies that have received contracts, and what the values of those contracts are. Sanco Enterprises received nine contracts between February 2010 and October 2010 for “life services”, predominantly waste removal, water delivery and supplying porta-potties. Sanco, however, has not received a contract since October when the cholera epidemic began to spread throughout Haiti. A leading theory as to the cause of the cholera outbreak was improper waste removal at a Nepalese UN Peacekeeping base. The company that had the UN contract for waste removal at the base was Sanco Enterprises http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/40280944/ns/health/ Terminal Varreux is the main port near the capital and is owned and operated by the WIN group, which is one of the largest conglomerates in Haiti and is run by the Mevs family. Tracy Wilkinson, writing for the Los Angeles Times, see: http://articles.latimes.com/2010/jan/21/world/la-fg-haiti-elites21-2010jan21 shortly after the earthquake, described one of the partners at the WIN group, Gregory Mevs: He has the prime minister's ear. He hobnobs with people like Bill Clinton, George Soros and the chief executives of the world's largest corporations. He is one of Haiti's storied elite, a member of one of the six families that control the Haitian economy and have essentially called the shots here for generations. Distributeurs Nationaux, a fuel distribution company, is part of another one of the largest Haitian conglomerates, the GB group, see: http://www.gbgroup.net/energy.php run by Gilbert Bigio. In 2009, Distributeurs Nationaux, with the help of an $18 million loan from the Inter-American Development Bank, see: http://www.iic.int/newsrelease/view.asp?id=666, acquired the assets and operations of Chevron Haiti. The GB group, together with Ashbritt (an American contractor we have written about previously) formed the Haiti Recovery Group (HRG). HRG was recently the subject of a lawsuit by the former USAID reconstruction coordinator Lewis Lucke, see: http://www.cepr.net/index.php/blogs/relief-and-reconstruction-watch/lucke-guy-former-usaid-official-continues-lobbying-for-contractors-in-haiti Lucke contends that he is owed $500,000 for helping HRG secure reconstruction contracts. GDG Beton & Construction S.A. is the largest cement company in Haiti and the current tourism minister, Patrick Delatour, is a 5 percent owner.USA Today reported in March 2010: http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2010-02-23-delatour_N.htm Haiti's top reconstruction planning official owns part of the country's largest concrete company, which stands to reap major gains from the coming wave of international rebuilding aid. Patrick Delatour, Haiti's tourism minister, leads a commission that has been crafting plans to rebuild Port-au-Prince and other earthquake-devastated areas. He acknowledged he is 5% owner of GDG Concrete and Construction, which he started in 2000 with his cousin. The company, which calls itself Haiti's only supplier of ready-mixed concrete, helped construct the U.S. Embassy and several other major buildings in Port-au-Prince, it says on its website. Sol Haiti is another fuel distribution company, with operations throughout the Caribbean. Sol took over Shell’s assets in much of the Caribbean in 2005 and took over Exxon-Mobil’s assets when the former divested from Guyana, Suriname and Haiti in 2007.

HAITI ELECTIONS, RETOUR DUVALIER ET LE CONSEIL DE SECURITE DES NATIONS UNIES: VIDEO DECLARATIONS DE L'AMBASSADEUR SUSAN RICE

DUVALIER, PREVAL ET ARISTIDE: POUR SORTIR DE LA DICTATURE ET ETABLIR UN ETAT DE DROIT EN HAITI ? PAR STANLEY LUCAS

Avec le retour de Jean Claude Duvalier et les excitations d'Aristide pour imiter Duvalier, Haiti doit commencer par reflechir sur les moyens de trouver des solutions institutionnelles a ses problemes. Nous ne pouvons pas continuer dans cette spirale de defense des interets indefendables de moun panou. On ne va pas recommencer avec des slogans desuets "Mache pran yo Duvalier mache pran yo" ou bien "Pa merite bayo say o merite!" ou du "Naje pou'n soti". Il faudra finalement etablir des regles que tout le monde devra respecter, duvalieristes ou non, lavalassiens ou pas, Lespwa ou INITE, riches ou pauvres, chefs ou gouvernes. Cela passe par l'etablissement du regime de la loi. Ce sera penible mais il faudra le faire pour donner une chance a Haiti et a ses enfants. 

 

Apres le debarquement a l'aeoport le dimanche 16 Janvier 2011 le debat national se tourne autour de l'ancien president a vie Jean Claude Duvalier, des successeurs a la presidence et leurs modes de gouvernance , tous faconnes dans le papadocquisme, sans oublier le dossier du coup d'etat electoral du 28 Novembre.

Selon les victimes et les rapports disponibles les anciens presidents Duvalier et Aristide ont cause de grands torts au pays. Le Rapport de Leslie Delatour sur les detournements de 600 millions des Duvalier (30 ans de regne) est un classique autant que le rapport de Paul Denis sur le detournement de 350 millions d'Aristide en 9 ans et le Rapport sur le detournement de 400 millions par Rene Preval dans le dossier Petro Caribe. Pou lideu say o leta se chwal papa ...

Je n'ai ni fabrique les victimes, ni les rapports administratifs du gouvernement Haitien. Cette conversation doit etre franche. En tant que peuple nous devons garder notre calme, sans passion, avec sang froid determiner comment allons nous aborder les accusations sur les violations de droits humains et les de detournements de trois presidents de la republique: Jean Claude Duvalier (1971-86). Jean Bertrand Aristide (1991-95 - 2001-04), Rene Preval (1996-2000 - 2006-11). Comment allons-nous garantir que chacun d'eux recoit un traitement equitable devant la justice tout en envoyant un message clair aux futurs presidents? Quel modele suivre? Celui du Perou avec la mise en accusation et l'emprisonnement de l'ancien President Alberto Fujimori? Celui des Phillippines avec la mise en accusation et le renvoi du president Joseph Estrada par le parlement Phillippin? De la France ou le juge d'instruction a entame une procedure contre l'ancien President Jacques Chirac? Ou celui de la republique Dominicaine avec Joaquim Balaguer?

Pour le president Duvalier il y a le rapport de l'ancien ministre Leslie Delatour l'accusant de corruption notamment le detournement de US$600 millions  et une liste des victimes de cette ere 1957-86 a ete publiee sur l'internet, cliquez ici: http://www.fordi9.com/Pages/Victlist/ListA.htm   

Pour le president Aristide le rapport de l'etat Haitien sur sa corruption a montre qu'il a vole US$350 millions en neuf ans, cliquez ici: http://www.haitipolicy.org/content/3284.htm et il y a deux listes de victimes d'Aristide et de Lavalas sur l'internet (1995-2000) en plus d'une troisieme en preparation (2000-2010). La premiere liste des victimes d'Aristide a ete rendu publique par une lettre du senateur de la republique Irvelt Chery, cliquez ici: http://www.forumhaiti.com/t678-liste-partielle-des-victimes-et-magouilles-du-lavalas  et la seconde: http://www.prevalhaiti.com/messages.php/24180  

Le president sortant le 7 Fevrier 2011, Rene Preval peut aussi faire face a des poursuites judicaires, pour la corruption des fonds du petrocaribe, voir: http://www.lenouvelliste.com/article.php?PubID=&ArticleID=83102 et l'assassinat de Robert Marcelo, le President de la Commission des Marches, cliquez ici: http://www.lenouvelliste.com/articleforprint.php?PubID=1&ArticleID=82527   

En abordant le dossier de ces anciens president nous ne devons pas oublier la partie invisible de l'iceberg dont la presence aux abords du pouvoir a ete permanente autour de ces trois presidences. Dans l'ombre le cartel economique des hommes du groupe de bourdon ont tire les avantages et "assister" les trois presidents. Ils sont les gagnants permanents du systeme et la partie de l'iceberg que nous n'arrivons jamais a mettre la main dessus. Le groupe de bourdon est le gardien de ce systeme, courir apres Duvalier, Aristide, Preval, Lavalas, Lespwa, INITE sans poser la problematique et le role du groupe de bourdon dans le soutien de ces politiques se lave main siye ate. Ces seigneurs feodaux du groupe de bourdon ne peuvent pas etre au dessus de la loi.

Tout accuse est innocent jusqu'a ce qu'il soit reconnu coupable. La justice Haitienne doit faire son travail et c'est la seule facon que notre pays peut commencer a construire un etat democratique.

Je suis sur que chacun de ces presidents maintient une base prete a crier Duvalier ou la mort, Preval ou la mort, Aristide ou la mort. Mais cela ne doit pas nous faire peur. Cela fait  partie du combat pour l'etablissement du regime de la loi, du combat contre les corrompus et les jusqu'auxboutistes qui empechent la democratie haitienne de fleurir et nos institutions de repondre aux besoins de notre peuple en lieu et place d'un petit groupe. Pour le groupe de bourdon la philosophie est differente: le roi est mort vive le roi! Comme les musiciens de palais une fois le chef dechouke, ils s'empressent toujours de faciliter l'entree d'un nouveau chef, un de leurs consultants, qui defendra leurs interets. Et ce jeu macabre qui fait des victimes et detruit Haiti est un eternel recommencement. La question centrale pouvons-nous detruire ce systeme feodal qui ensevelit notre pays au niveau economique et politique? Pouvons-nous trouver le leadership capable d'affronter ce systeme?

Ce debat a aussi un aspect politique et ideologique qu'il faudra debattre: le populisme, moun anwo, moun amba, neg nwa, milat, la classe, elatrye... Je cede la place aux membres du secteur academique. Cette conversation honnete a la fois legale et politique si elle se tient permettra a Haiti de sortir du petrin. En attendant il nous faut sortir de ce feodalisme, de ce systeme qui produit des leaders qui ont les memes reflexes et les memes attitudes, incapables d’apporter des solutions aix problemes de notre societe. Il faut donc une nouvelle alternative politique et une nouvelle generation, question de sortir de la dictature pour entrer en democratie...

Duvalier Returns to Haiti; Merely a Pawn in the Political Chaos by Stanley Lucas

Three former strongmen of Haiti have been living in exile since being forced to leave the country:  Jean Claude Duvalier, better remembered as “Baby Doc”, exiled in France; General Henri Namphy in the Dominican Republic; and Jean Bertrand Aristide in South Africa.  Duvalier’s return opens the door to the return of other former corrupt leaders the Haitian people ousted and sends a message to current leaders that there are no consequences to corruption.  It is important at this time to look back at these three leaders to better frame what Duvalier’s return actually means for the Haitian people.

After a popular uprising against his regime, Jean Claude Duvalier, self-appointed President for Life, left Haiti on February 7, 1986 after 14 years in power.  Henri Namphy, General President, who headed the transition after Duvalier’s departure left the country on June 20, 1988 after a military coup.  And, Jean Bertrand Aristide left on February 29, 2004 after a popular uprising and an armed rebellion led by his former allies.

Aristide and Duvalier’s Ouster

Aristide and Duvalier have extensive human rights violations and track records of corruption.  They brutalized the Haitian people and enriched themselves.  Duvalier persecuted and killed many political opponents, see: http://www.fordi9.com/Pages/Victlist/ListA.htm .  During his regime thousands of political opponents had to flee the country.  Freedom of expression and civil liberties were non-existent under his rule.  Journalists were persecuted as well and political parties were outlawed under Haiti’s one party system.  After his departure an administrative commission, led by former Minister of Finance Leslie Delatour, concluded Duvalier had stolen more than US$600 million from Haiti’s coffers.

Jean Bertrand Aristide was democratically elected in December 1990.  The people of Haiti were hopeful that this humble, poor priest meant a new era for Haiti.  But Aristide ruled as a strongman – not as a man of God. Aristide lost credibility among the Haitian democrats when he recruited some of the FRAPH killers, a paramilitary group responsible for the killing hundreds of Haitians after the 1991 coup d’etat.  Aristide used those killers to assassinate a popular catholic priest that stood up against his corruption and violence, Father Ti Jean.  When the Secretary General of Haiti Human Rights Platform, Chenet Jean Baptiste, denounced the killing, he had to flee the country to save his life.  Aristide recuperated several Duvalierists that were members of the military and the now defunct Tonton Macoutes, a paramilitary group under Duvalier, during his second term in office.  The most well known was Sainvoyis Pascal, who Aristide made Speaker of the House in 2001 as the head of the Lavalas caucus in the House of Deputies. Aristide persecuted and killed his political opponents.  Journalists, women and youth activists, political parties and human rights activists, peasants and others that opposed his views were beaten, illegally jailed or killed, see: http://www.forumhaiti.com/t678-liste-partielle-des-victimes-et-magouilles-du-lavalas  and http://www.prevalhaiti.com/messages.php/24180 . After Aristide resigned in 2004, Haiti’s General Accounting Office and an administrative commission led by the current Minister of Justice Paul Denis found that he had stolen more than US$350 million from Haiti’s coffers over nine years, see: http://www.haitipolicy.org/content/3284.htm 

Both Aristide and Duvaliers have maintained with the stolen funds a base of support in-country while residing in exile.  But Aristide went a step further and has maintained a network of contacts in the U.S. comprised of his former lobbyists see: http://www.haitipolicy.org/Lobbying7.htm and people who made money with him during his rule via telecommunications and other business dealings.  He also has a network of academics and ideologues like Robert Maguire at the US Institute of Peace, Dr. Paul Farmer, a prominent AIDS expert and Deputy UN Special Envoy to Haiti, who actively promoted Aristide’s return under the false premise that he was  “kidnapped” by the US Government in 2004 rather than having resigned in disgrace and requested evacuation.  Aristide’s own Prime Minister has denied the kidnapping claim and stated officially and publicly that the kidnapping charge was fabricated for political purposes.

Duvalier and Aristide’s Relationship with the Preval Government

Rene Preval and Jean Bertrand Aristide were political twins when they were seeking power in the 1990s.  When Aristide became President in 1991 he ditched the coalition (FNCD) that allowed him to win the presidency and a parliamentary majority.  He handpicked Rene Preval as his Prime Minister in February 1991, in violation of the Haitian constitution, which requires that the Prime Minister be selected from the party that has the majority in both chamber of parliament.

On August 13, 1991, the FNCD caucus in parliament sought to fire Preval as Prime Minister on the grounds of incompetency.  Both men, Aristide and Preval, sent a group of thugs to burn some of the members with a common tactic of  their regime “necklacing” burning tires around their necks.  Without police intervention many members of the House of Deputies could have died that day, among them the current Haiti’s ambassador at the OAS Dully Brutus, former Speaker of the House of Deputies.  This act led to a political crisis and later an illegal military coup in September 1991.  Both Aristide and Preval went into exile.  

After Aristide requested a US military intervention for his return in 1994 and attempt to illegally stay in power after his term was over, he was forced to relinquish power and Preval became his successor.  Aristide wanted Preval to be his puppet during Preval’s first term in office as president.  When Preval started to become more independent, Aristide -- as a warning -- sent some of his thugs to kill the dogs Preval’s sister, who was serving as his Executive Assistance.  Despite the warning Preval, continued to move away from Aristide.  As a second warning, Preval’s sister was shot and wounded by Aristide’s gunmen.  Preval backed down and ceded to Aristide’s pressure following his instruction to the letter.  

At the end of his first term under Aristide’s control, Preval rigged both the legislative and presidential elections in May and November 2000.  The President of the Provisional Electoral Council (CEP) Leon Manus resisted and in a public letter denounced the fraud threatened by Aristide and Preval and had to flee the country for political exile in the United States.  Despite a letter written to the OAS by Manus detailing the situation, the OAS did nothing.  Aristide forced his majority in parliament and stole the presidency.  The people of Haiti stood up and said “no”, and contested the legitimacy of both parliament and Aristide as president.  On February 7, 2001, two presidents were sworn in:  Aristide who stole the elections, and Gerard Gourgue a provisional president representing the opposition.  Preval went quietly back to his hometown Marmelade. The following three years Aristide in power tried to frame and eliminate Preval. One of the key players protecting Preval against Aristide a that time was Jude Celestin who got a stock of heavy weapons from Preval before the end of his first term. From 2001 to 2004, Aristide used violence and corruption to suppress dissent among the population -- students, women, political parties, peasants,  press, humans right activists, and civil society.  His brutality failed.  The Haitian people would not stand for it.  In February 2004, a popular uprising was highjacked at the last minute by a group of gunmen, who used to serve as Aristide henchmen and allies, provoked his resignation.  He fled into exile with the assistance of the US military at his request.  Aristide’s Prime Minister Yvon Neptune invoked Article 149 of the constitution and allowed a member of the Haitian Supreme Court to become provisional president.

The provisional government organized general elections in 2006 allowing every political party to run, but they prevented any members of the provisional government to run for office unless they resigned six months prior to the elections. Preval became president and Aristide’s Lavalas party won six of the 99 seats in the Chamber of Deputies and three of the 30 seats in the Senate.  It was clear that the Lavalas party had no political support among the people.  Preval distanced himself from Aristide and captured most of his supporters and gave them government positions in his office, the cabinet and the civil service.  Preval closed all the loopholes that allowed Aristide to siphon money from the State.  Since then, Aristide has been maneuvering with his former lobbyists and allies to use Haiti’s telecommunications company to weaken Preval and promote their fabricated line that he was kidnapped all in an effort to return him to Haiti.  Aristide promised to make everyone rich – or richer as several of them have already enriched themselves with Aristide

Preval’s relationship with Duvalier began in the 1980’s through Michele Pierre Louis, Haiti’s former Prime Minister.  At that time, Pierre Louis was Deputy Director General of the airport.  They negotiated Preval’s return to Haiti (he had fled into exile in the 1960s) and gave him a job as a civil servant.  Preval knew key players at the Minister level since he grew up with several of them, attended the same schools and lived in the same neighborhood.  When as a young man he had to flee Haiti into exile in Belgium, two of Preval’s friends under the Duvalier regime went to the Dominican Embassy where Preval was seeking asylum to give him a packet of cigarettes and US$100.  One of them, a Duvalierist, is living in Long Island today and is Preval’s top political advisor and most trusted political ally.

This the context in which Jean Claude Duvalier returned to Haiti.  His return is inextricably linked with Aristide and Preval’s agendas, and most observers believe he is merely a pawn in or distraction from a larger political dynamic underway.

Duvalier’s “Inexplicable” and “Surprise” Return

Duvalier landed in Haiti on January 17, 2011 after 24 years in political exile in France.  His return is being labeled a “surprise” in press reports, but it could not have happened without international diplomatic support and Preval’s approval.  He could not have boarded a plane in France to Haiti without the approval of the French and Haitian governments.  Further, his supporters did not seem to be surprised by his return as they turned out to great him at the airport. 

News coverage of Duvalier’s return has also called his return “inexplicable”, but many Haitians are speculating about three likely scenarios:

1.     Preval is using Duvalier’s return to create political confusion and a distraction for the international community.  Preval received the OAS’s report of recommendations on how to resolve the fraudulent elections last Thursday.  On Monday, the OAS Secretary General will visit Haiti to get Preval’s official response to the report findings. 

The report recommends a run off elections between the top two candidates:  Martelly and Manigat.  International officials have stated that the report “makes sense” and the methodology is “flawless” and the credentials of the report team are “impeccable”.  Haitians are questioning what methodology would actually account for the thousands of ballots littering the streets, uncounted after the elections.  Apparently the recount process was carried out by using a small percentage of the tally sheets from the voting precincts.  It was widely reported and observed that tally sheets were manipulated before they even arrived at the tabulation center. 

In this scenario, Duvalier’s return creates an enormous distraction, serious confusion and has the added benefit of rallying his base against Duvalier.  Essentially, Duvalier is a pawn in Preval’s transparent and desperate attempts to maintain power.

2.     People believe that Dr. Paul Farmer, head of Partners in Health and Mr. Clinton’s deputy UN special envoy to Haiti, is has orchestrated Duvalier’s return behind the scenes.  Farmer is an ardent Aristide supporter and Duvalier’s return opens a window for Aristide’s return.  If Duvalier can return, why not Aristide?  Aristide has an equally despotic track record in Haiti stealing elections, trafficking drugs and overseeing political persecution, violence and murder.  His return would be disastrous for Haitians.  Ever since the earthquake, however, there has been speculation about Aristide’s return.  He has tested the waters as have his political supporters, so people believe this is their political play to get him back in country. 

3.     Duvalier’s return creates a level of political chaos that will be impossible to resolve without foreign political occupation – and someone, somewhere benefits from that with billions of aid money on the line.  The Haitian people will resolutely reject foreign occupation, however. 

Whoever is pulling the strings (Preval or Farmer/Aristide backers), it is clear that they do not want to see a run-off between Martelly and Manigat and the annulment of the legislative elections.  Duvalier is a pawn and a distraction.  And, no matter who is using Duvalier as a pawn, knows there are the only two scenarios facing Duvalier:  jail or execution. 

One thing is certain:  whoever is behind this move wants to ensure and maintain the status quo of corruption in Haiti.  Ultimately whether or not the underlying motive is billions of dollars in reconstruction contracts that are in play or newly discovered resources (it is widely speculated that the earthquake revealed an oil deposit off the coast of Haiti) that some are trying to put their hands on, Haitian reformers in Haiti and the Diaspora need to come together via an emergency political summit to put an end to this madness. The Haitian democrats in country and in the Diaspora that are trying to change the culture of corruption are caught in a nexus of power that inhibits or completely thwarts their efforts.  On the one side is the corrupt politics of Duvalier, Aristide and Preval and the Groupe de Bourdon, Haiti’s business cartel controlling more than 90% of the economy and paying only 4% of the taxes, which is basically the status quo.  And on the other side is the network of supporters in Washington, DC and other big capitals of the world.  This group is comprised of lawyer searching for large retainers, ideological academics and foreign profiteers.  In their fight for democracy and the modernization of Haiti’s economic system, they never find a support base, and worse, those members of the wealthy sector use their resource to publicly assassinate their characters and isolate them. For all Haitians, a foreign occupation will never be an option and the political instability must end.  We need to focus on rebuilding the country.  Now.

HAITIAN DIASPORA FORUM: CONTRIBUTING TO A STRATEGIC PLAN FOR RECONSTRUCTION by Stanley Lucas, Architect and Co-organizer

HAITIAN DIASPORA FORUM:

CONTRIBUTING TO A STRATEGIC PLAN FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT IN HAITI

Stanley Lucas Architect and Co-organizer

Chairman of The Haitian Coalition

Co-Chairman of the Greater Washington Haiti Relief Committee

March 21-23, 2010

CONSOLIDATED RECOMMENDATIONS ANDREPORTS OF WORKSHOPS

The Haitian Diaspora wishes to thank the Organization of American States (OAS) for convening some 400 representatives from the Haitian Diaspora in its headquarters in Washington, DC, from March 21-23, 2010, to submit recommendations to the Government of Haiti and donors ahead of the discussion to be held on March 31^st, 2010 at the United Nations in New York, as part of its contribution into the elaboration of a strategic plan for the reconstruction and development of its homeland. Following are the recommendations that emanated from the two-day discussions:

URGENT HUMANITARIAN NEEDS AND EFFECTIVE DEPLOYMENT OF FOREIGN AID

 The Diaspora acknowledges and supports efforts by the Government of Haiti (GOH) and the private sector to address the post-earthquake urgencies. It welcomes their insistence to the international community that, in purchasing food aid, preference be given to local producers and national suppliers in order to avoid the contraction of domestic production. It also welcomes efforts initiated with the help of the international community to assess the structural integrity of existing homes, and to implement cash for work programs.

The Diaspora would like to urge the GOH to:

R1.        Collaborate with the international community to ensure that food distribution systems and shelter arrangements take into account social and cultural factors and respect the dignity of people (e.g. establish distribution schedules and community kitchens; keep lines short at distribution points; target vulnerable beneficiaries for special distribution channels including home delivery; uphold regional equity by extending distribution to areas that have welcomed the displaced population; etc.).

R2.        Transform the idle time at the camps into educational opportunities and provide various trainings, including civic education for children, young adolescents and adults. At the same time, strengthen the educational infrastructure outside of Port-au-Prince including at higher educational levels.

R3.        Seek the coordination of distribution efforts with all stakeholders, including local governments, international aid agencies, hometown associations and community groups in Haiti and abroad. Additionally, increase transparency and accountability by requiring aid agencies to publicize a detailed accounting of funds expended in Haiti.

R4.        Given the fast-approaching rainy and hurricane season, seek the collaboration of aid agencies and local Haitian organizations to identify and prepare areas outside of Port-au-Prince that are less susceptible to natural disasters. Build seismic and cyclonic resistant temporary housing, such as modular housing and prefabricated homes. In the design of long-term housing and shelter plans, adopt and enforce seismic and cyclonic resistant building codes.

R5.        Increase the effectiveness of humanitarian aid by empowering aid recipients through the extension of work for food and cash for work programs within the camps and throughout the critical areas, with a focus on the youth and women. Collaborate with aid agencies to assess periodically the humanitarian needs and the effectiveness of aid distribution within and outside of Port-au-Prince, including through feedback from beneficiaries.

ENSURING A DYNAMIC AND TRANSPARENT RECONSTRUCTION PROCESS

R6.         Increase accountability through greater transparency and oversight of all reconstruction funds (public or private) with the creation of an Inspector General Office. Such Office shall be required to conduct audits and investigations to prevent fraud, waste and abuse, and shall report its findings publicly.

R7.        Make best efforts to ensure that firms that are contracted in Haiti hire Haitian workers and contractors as a priority, including from the Diaspora, as a means to alleviate poverty, enable job training and creation, reverse the brain drain by expanding human capital that will, in turn, attract foreign investment.

R8.        Recognize the importance of the Diaspora in the Haitian economy and, referencing the Plan d’Action pour le Relèvement et le Développement National (March 2010), yield to the Diaspora’s strong request for a full voting seat in la Commission Intérimaire pour la Reconstruction d’Haïti.

R9.        Create a Civil Service Corps with the participation of Haitian nationals and the Diaspora, particularly women, to assist in the building process. Donors are encouraged to review their personnel’s legal framework with the view of facilitating the transfer or detail of Creole speaking employees to work on loan in Haiti.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

 The Diaspora stands ready to play its part in the development of private capital vehicles for investing in Haiti such as social venture capital funds, and to bring to bear its multifaceted expertise in capital markets, technology, engineering, green energy, etc. The proposals of the Diaspora for a sustainable development are articulated around two themes: (i) greater involvement of the Diaspora and (ii) sector specific recommendations.

The Diaspora urges the GOH to:

R10.     Set an ambitious but concrete and quantifiable goal for the short and medium run, particularly in terms of GDP growth (6% per year or more) and reduction of poverty.

R11.     Work with donors to formally engage the Diaspora in the implementation and follow up of measures and recommendations for recovery and reconstruction. As such, create a platform for exchanging information and ensuring that (i) the Diaspora is updated on business opportunities as well as other developments and (ii) at the same time that the GOH is aware of resources available in the Diaspora (financial and human).

R12.     Publicize eligibility and selection criteria for donor-funded projects and ensure greater participation of Haitian small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and Diaspora investors. Moreover, create streamlined/expedited processes for business formation and license applications including a single point of entry for business proposals where investors can get responses from relevant authorities on firm timetables.

R13.     Recognize dual nationality. Although the Diaspora understands that there are no legal impediments to investments, dual nationality will create greater inclusion and incentive.

R14.     Increase accountability and transparency, and oversight of all funds with detailed reporting through a public information system and a reformed/strengthened judicial system.

R15.     Have an updated and publicly available inventory of all NGOs operating on the national territory and a mapping of their activities and the sources of their funding.

R16.     Promote green (solar, wind, ocean thermal and geothermal) and/or locally produced energy to achieve energy independence and security. Reduce electricity theft through wireless usage meter.

R17.     Prioritize projects based on their contribution to decentralization, deconcentration, and the participation of women.

R18.     Strengthen the role of the Investment Facilitation Center (Centre de Facilitation des Investments -CFI) and institute self-contained, automated regional branches to facilitate the establishment of corporations and investments directly outside the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area. Also, amplify the database within CFI of potential partners by sector.

R19.     Create a mechanism to promote Haiti as a tourism destination even in the short term and to address all aspects of tourism security.

R20.     Have a subaccount for the apparel industry within the framework of the Guarantee Fund which is currently being created. Moreover, create a mechanism to make credit readily available for the productive activities, particularly in the agricultural sector.

R21.     Increase productivity by strengthening vocational training and targeting skills demanded by the market, while promoting the employment of women. This would include an assessment of available skills and needs by sector.

R22.     Encourage innovation through the strengthening of intellectual property rights.

R23.     Transform the rural landscape by promoting local farming to better compete with agricultural imports, by aggressively pursuing food security and promoting agro-exports and agro-industry (including vertical integration). Specifically, promote rural units of integrated production including aquaculture, livestock, light manufacturing, services, etc.

R24.     Identify each region’s comparative advantage and invest accordingly. Provide for appropriate financing of development activities, particularly through the widening of the tax base.

STRENGTHENING GOVERNANCE

 The Diaspora views institutional rebuilding and democratic governance consolidation as imperative. It believes that social justice, the rule of law, the respect of civil liberties and the protection of private property are key to creating an environment conducive to economic growth and development. Thus, it encourages the GOH to:

R25.     Combat impunity and review immunity provisions in order to prosecute to the full extent of the law officials who have been perceived to abuse their privileges.

R26.     Implement provisions of the Constitution with regards to decentralization.

R27.     Adopt a realistic decision on the scheduling of the elections taking into consideration the special circumstances as a result of the earthquake.  Collaborate with international partners and Diaspora organizations to put in place a mechanism to encourage greater participation of the Diaspora as electoral observers in all upcoming elections.

R28.     Pursue the transfer of knowledge and expertise to help strengthen capacity through effective mechanisms such as (i) twinning/exchange programs with Diaspora professionals and through online communities and (ii) partnerships with academic centers for the training of civil servants.

SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, NATURAL DISASTER PREPAREDNESS AND MITIGATION

The Diaspora believes that natural disaster management should be a long-term priority of the state. If Haiti cannot control the likelihood of natural disasters, it must manage the ensuing vulnerability and risks. Hence, the GOH should:

R29.     Strengthen the capacity of the country to react to catastrophes and manage natural disasters through the implementation of a national emergency action plan. Particularly, implement strict building codes.

R30.     Reinforce La Direction de la Protection Civile through formal training of public servants at all levels in disaster-related fields. At the same time, implement programs for disaster preparedness and simulation exercises. For example, implement a web-enabled crisis information management system to provide real-time information sharing to improve the response to disasters.

SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

Child Welfare

The Diaspora believes that laws and regulations that govern child abandonment, foster care, kinship care, domestic and inter-country adoption need to be modernized. Diaspora professional social workers and specialists in child welfare models as well as legal experts stand ready to consult and partner with the Ministry of Social Affairs, particularly l’Institut du Bien-Être Social et de Recherche (Institute for Social Welfare and Research), to provide training and technical support. NGOs working with children should be required to register with the Ministry prior to having access to children, and then be monitored by a set of guidelines.

The Diaspora makes the following recommendations for short-term improvements and long-term sustainability:

R31.     Adopt the Hague Convention on the Protection of Children and Cooperation in Respect of Inter-country Adoption (Hague Adoption Convention), which aims to prevent the abduction, sale or traffic of children, and prioritize the adoption of children by Haitian families in Haiti and the Diaspora. Further, work with identified partners to develop culturally congruent education and training for those wishing to care for Haitian children in order to minimize additional trauma and maximize adaptive outcomes consistent with Haitian culture and values.

R32.     Support family preservation to prevent child abandonment, by offering support services to families and/or extended families to care for their own children. Moreover, phase out the orphanage system through the re-integration of children into family/extended family like settings (i.e. foster care models).

R33.     Create a central database of all children in out-of-family placement, where progress and services are recorded and tracked ---modeled after best practices.

Education

Members of the Diaspora who are in academia wish to collaborate with the government and the private sector to offer their services in implementing the following recommendations:

R34.     Implement quality Universal Education For All (EFA) that assure equitable access to all children, including over-aged students and students with disabilities, that make no difference between rural and urban schools, that offer health and sports program, and civic education, that supply second-chance education (drop-outs and youths) as well as youth mentoring and adult literacy programs, and that provide free meals (breakfast and lunch), free transportation, potable water, uniforms, and school supplies. Such education will have to be provided in schools built on the basis of safe building codes and fitted with all modern sanitation and hygiene facilities.

R35.     Strengthen the certification process of teachers and administrators, and implement (i) appropriate training structures to ensure their ongoing professional development and (ii) a mentoring and exchange program between Haiti and Diaspora teachers. Similarly, implement a program of adoption of Haiti schools and students by Diaspora schools and students. Such partnership should occur also at the higher learning level, and extended through collaboration with foreign universities. Moreover, provide incentives to teachers and administrators through decent wages and reasonable benefit packages.

R36.     Design school programs that utilize result-based criteria and reflect national standards. Such programs should be culturally relevant (use of Creole), promote differentiated curricula (by age and ability level), foster STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics) program, uphold technologically friendly tools and conduits (distance learning, media, internet, etc.), and support post-secondary internships for workforce readiness, as well as school readiness programming through a community approach that leads to higher education and vocational training.

R37.     Address the needs of all vulnerable groups (special education, orphans/unaccompanied minors, restavek/children in domesticity, exploited children, disabled youths, etc.). Further, implement psycho social support services.

Health Development

The need for medical attention and care has nearly tripled as a result of the seism; and the doubling of medical infrastructure and services is indispensable to avoid a major health care crisis. As a result, the Haitian government needs to:

R38.     Increase Haiti’s medical and health care capacities to meet the actual and future needs of the population through a medical assistance program with the Haitian Diaspora where Haitians from abroad will provide their services for two weeks at time on a year round basis.

R39.     Foster a partnership between Diaspora and local health care professionals to provide intense and modern technology training. Particularly, offer clinical mentorship programs to build technical and practical capacity for the numerous medical students who are no longer in school.

R40.     Partner with universities as well as public and private hospitals to achieve uninterrupted medical service through clinical education. Further, maintain a medical residency and fellowship, focusing on diseases that are endemic to Haiti and the Caribbean (use of current technologies where continued training and support of Haitian doctors and nurses can be done through teleconferencing).

R41.     Create a “mini-fellowship” fund in infectious diseases for local doctors and nurses.

R42.     Strengthen family planning, women’s reproductive health and child health organizations, health centers in conjunction with the GOH. Special attention must be given to pregnant women living in precarious conditions in temporary shelters.

R43.     Create mental health clinics to address the various post-earthquake traumas to provide therapy, especially to children and other vulnerable groups. Social workers from the Diaspora can be key in addressing this issue while understanding how culturally sensitive this is.

R44.     Create therapy centers for the rehabilitation of thousands of amputees and for their reintegration in society.

R45.     Urge donor countries to create a program to sponsor a certain number of students (a number to be agreed upon) per accredited medical schools per year during the period of reconstruction.

HAITIAN DIASPORA FORUM:

CONTRIBUTING TO A STRATEGIC PLAN FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT IN HAITI

March 21-23, 2010

WORKSHOP RECOMMENDATIONS

The following recommendations were generated through dialogue among the Haitian Diaspora representatives within the framework of six workshops held as part of the Haitian Diaspora Forum: Contributing to a Strategic Plan for Reconstruction and Development in Haiti, which took place from March 21-23, 2010 at OAS Headquarters in Washington, D.C.

WORKSHOP 1: URGENT HUMANITARIAN NEEDS, EFFECTIVE DEPLOYMENT OF FOREIGN AID, AND EXPERIENCES FROM AROUND THE WORLD IN RECOVERING FROM AN EARTHQUAKE & CURRENT HUMANITARIAN CHALLENGES, DEPLOYMENT OF AID, AND RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE DIASPORA ON HOW TO IMPROVE THE PROCESS

1.     Food distribution

a.     Distribute uncooked food in kits easily portable

b.     Establish standard operating procedures (SOP) for food distribution that protects the dignity of the population and includes the most vulnerable, people with disabilities, for example

c.     Food has to be distributed based on a schedule known to the beneficiaries

d.      Establish relationships with Mayors and other Local Authorities and Organizations, particularly women’s groups, to support distribution

e.     Identify criterion such as efficiency and transparency in the choice of local partners in Haiti;

f.      Promote local agriculture by distributing locally produced food

g.     Include aid distribution in areas beyond Port-au-Prince, which have welcomed displaced people

h.     Encourage the use of community kitchens in camps 

2.     Working with the International Community

a.     Cooperation must be multilateral

b.     International cooperation and OAS inter-American disaster mitigation: Early warning system, risk management and post standard for construction. Sustainability of progress

c.     Principles to keep into account: Deepen democracy, peace, security, and the strengthening of institutions

d.     All actors, from public and private sectors, must be involved in the reconstruction process: local, national and international

3.     Shelter

a.     Immediate relocation of displaced Haitians because of the rainy season

b.     Solicit the assistance of the US Corps of engineer to rapidly relocate populations

c.     Cannot move people from one disaster area into another. Evacuate people from Port of Prince as soon as possible, before the raining season (to higher areas in Haiti).  However, the houses and the areas must be ready for the people to move before they do.

d.     Haïti doit reconstruire plus petit mais plus solide

e.     Have shelters like the ones build for Katrina victims in New Orleans (Dormatories)

f.      Consider more resistant shelters – other than just the short-term tents

g.     Registration form to identify camp population

h.     Look for transitional/temporary housing

i.      Improve security environment in camps

4.     In relation to the use of the money

a.     Transparency is necessary to avoid frustration and doubt;

b.     Be sure that money goes to organizations able to provide credible reports;

5.     In relation with coordination and capacity of interventions

a.     Promote preparedness so as to facilitate quick and efficient response;

b.     Promote Coordination between competent Agencies through the use of Emergency Management Sofwares (web EOC).

c.     Coordination should be before coming to Haiti. We have had two mistakes, one the lack of resources, and then, we are receiving resources we don’t need. In this sense, coordination should be done in advance.

d.     Make assessments about what is needed before requesting and receiving (example: clothes for adults and kids receive in an improper manner making it hard to distribute).

e.     Ensure that the beneficiaries’ voice is taken into account to get regular feedback on the effectiveness of aid distribution; include a voice in cluster meetings.

f.      Strengthen Haitian NGOs on the ground.

g.     Foster employment: Putting Haitians back to work in close coordination with the civil society, the Haitian Government, and the International Community.

h.     Encourage legislators and cooperation agencies to keep aid organizations and other aid providers accountable by requiring that a feedback loop be created to verify the effectiveness of aid programs with beneficiaries.

6.     Need to reunify families – community organization

a.     Reunite families and re-start building communities. To build communities, families need to receive the proper conditions (transportation, literacy, health, food distribution, civil and community education, water systems, recreation areas, waste management, among other basic needs), in order to transit to a new society and to a new way of life for Haitians.

b.     Empowering people and victims become workers, community facilitation.

c.     Employment: cash for work program to clean the drainage to avoid disaster during the rainy season

d.     Put Haitian back to work – regain dignity

7.     In relation with the intervention capacity

a.     The civil protection needs to have its own capacity.

8.     In relation with the diaspora

a.     La diaspora a un avantage: la connaissance du pays. Celle-ci doit etre exploitee

b.     Database for people able to help for the reconstruction of the country

c.     Make in place a corps of volunteer including the diaspora

d.     The diaspora must be involved (communications) 

9.     Coordination de la diaspora

a.     Voter positivement pour la fédération de la diaspora

b.     Regroupement – actions par commune

c.     Promote network

10.  Other recommendations:

a.     Absolutely take into account the long-term implications of aid distribution so that population eventually becomes self-sufficient (i.e. consider agricultural industry) and not wholly dependent on economic aid.

b.     Give them an incentive to do activities (job creation), especially building homes and also inside the camps (for example, people to work within the camps)

c.     Haitians are willing to find ways to work efficiently and strive for our country’s development. We welcome international help but we don’t have to put any blame or claim in support of organizations if they don’t come on time or in an appropriate way. Haitians to develop our country in respect to our motto: “L’union fait la force”

d.     Recommendations put together by the Montreal Diaspora can be found at www.grahn.net   

e.     Promote tourism.

f.      Little plans and projects are ok, but massive action is needed.

g.     Establishing of a central national agency to coordinate investment and manage reconstruction efforts. Channeling reconstruction funds and efforts directly to communities.

h.     Make simulation exercises with the population for preparedeness of disasters.  

i.      Youth have to be involved in this process that will serve as therapy in terms of providing literacy and civic education, organizing food and/or goods distribution.

j.      Need to create the environment so that investors perceive liberty to invest in the country.

11.  Les mots d’ordre à retenir (Rep. From the Ministry):

a.     Préparer la saison cyclonique et la saison de pluies 2010 (identifier les zones à risqué, sécuriser les populations affectées par le tremblement de terre, renforcer les systems d’alerte précoces et d’évacuation, reconstruir les infrastructures du secteur et augmenter les capacities du niveau national, des equipes départamentales, communales et locales).

b.     Systematiquement incluir les aspects environmentaux dans toutes les décisions en rapport avec le relèvement et le développement.

c.     Incluire la gestión des risques et des désastres dans les mesures de tous les secteurs (code de construction, assurance, consolidation et budget de fonctionnement, plans de contingences et continuités des activitités).

d.     Le défi que le pays doit aujourd’hui relever est de parvenir à reduire les pertes de PIB en changeant de paradigme par la promotion et l’adoption de mesaures eficaces telles que: intégration de la gestión des risques dans les programmes de développement, integration de la gestión des risques dans le cursus scolaire et universitaire, intégration de la gestión des risques dans l’aménagement du territoire.

WORKSHOP 2: ENSURING A DYNAMIC AND TRANSPARENT RECONSTRUCTION PROCESS

Participants of the workshop consisted of architects, engineers, project managers, curators and human rights activists from the United States, Canada, Haiti, France and elsewhere. Sustainable development efforts that include green building, harnessing solar energy, use of indigenous building materials and the incorporation of Haitian esthetic sensibilities and other design issues are imbedded in the pragmatic and philosophic viewpoints of this particular workshop.

By taking serious ownership of the process, participants quickly acknowledged the urgency on the ground – namely the need to provide immediate and significant temporary shelter solutions to internally displaced persons as long terms answers are sought.

Workshop participants elected to focus on five keys recommendations to ensure a more organic and transparent reconstruction process in Haiti. They include but are not limited to the following matters that emphasize transparency, accountability, compliance, inclusion and the mitigation of corruption:

1.     The need for an Inspector General to oversee the procurement process for contracts relative to the built environment, NGO funding, and other transactional relations is strongly prioritized and recommended for issues such as:

a.     How the biding process is organized;

b.     Bid selections and notifications;

c.     How contract generation is facilitated and managed;

d.     Control of building and infrastructure compliance and regulations including safe zones [or earthquake free areas;]

e.     Ensuring accountability, transparency, responsibility and compliance from top to bottom through the duration of building processes;

f.      Accountability of NGO’s in Haiti.

2.     The Inspector General (IG) whose post is potentially accounted for via the Executive Directors post in the Interim Haitian Recovery Commission (the pre-cursor of the Haitian Development Authority) would have the following duties and responsibilities:

a.     Provide for the independent and objective execution and supervision of audits and investigations;

b.     Provide objective leadership and coordination of and recommendations on policies designed to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in management of Haiti’s reconstruction programs and operations, prevent and detect fraud, waste, and abuse;

c.     Review existing and proposed legislation and regulations and make appropriate recommendations;

d.     Maintain effective working relationships with other government agencies and non-government organizations regarding oversight in Haiti;

e.     Report irregularities to appropriate stakeholders;

f.      Submit reports in a consistent and timely fashion to relevant stakeholders in the Haitian redevelopment process.

 

3.     Mechanism to develop strategic partnerships with Haitian nationals and Haitians of the Diaspora for meaningful, sustainable, mutually beneficial and inclusive procurement and bidding processes is urged of the donor community. A goal of 40% (25% minimum) must be “set aside” or accounted for to make sure that when non-Haitian firms are hired, they have Haitian nationals and her Diaspora at the table if not as primary, then as secondary or sub-contractors to rebuilding efforts. This is especially important as capital is sought and joint ventures within the Haitian community-at-large are created to further enable participation in larger procurement contracts. This methodology aims to alleviate poverty in the country, enables job training and creation; reverses the brain drain by expanding human capital exponentially and attracting foreign investment.

4.     Emboldened by the OAS Haitian Diaspora Forum, the Diaspora recognizes the magnitude of its remittances to the Haitian Republic and how those contributions totaling $2 billion dollars annually allots for 30% of the GNP of Haiti. With the creation of the Interim Haitian Recovery Commission that seeks to spend hundreds of millions of dollars over the next 18 months in rebuilding efforts, we in the Diaspora recognize that we are the single largest donor to Haiti, as such, we strongly urge our current seat as a formal “observer” to the Commission’s work be up-graded to a full voting seat in the interest of equity, parity and accountability.

5.     Relative to the Interim Haitian Recovery Commission is the Multi-donor Trust Fund with some 18 members that may have the World Bank pooling donor dollars towards reconstruction. There are no members of the Haitian Diaspora on the Commission. We formally request two (2) voting seats for the Haitian Diaspora on the Multi-donor Trust Fund (MDTF). This is strongly recommended.

6.     An architectural term applied to this exercise is the “scaling up” of skills in terms of capacity building, technical assistance, professional development and apprenticeship programs that expand and sustain the building process. This notion speaks to enabling a design and build process in Haiti that necessitates serious vocational preparation or training; further refinement of existing skill sets; advanced management; technology and other tools for a rebuilding process that will meaningfully include Haitian nationals and members of the Diaspora.  Expansion of skill sets also encourages putting exacting systems in place to manage the overall process. To that end, built environment professionals propose creation of a Civil Service and Professional Support unit that consists of Haitians, Haitians descendents, and members of the Diaspora.

7.     In conclusion, Haitian nationals and the Haitian Diaspora possess the intellectual and creative capital to rebuild the country towards prosperity. Resources in the form of training, financial capital, re-enfranchisement of its citizenship, repatriation, technical assistance, investment in schools, education, health, cultural patrimony and the environment must be made by the Haitian government to buoy the unprecedented talent, efforts at resource mobilization, political will, vision and courage at its disposal. The Haitian government must facilitate the enrichment of Haitians first: practically, spiritually, morally, economically and intellectually before it enables this for others. Inclusionary processes, implementation of best practices, transparency and good governance enable our collective move towards progressive and sustainable change.

WORKSHOP 3: STRENGTHENING GOVERNANCE

The Haitian Diaspora is cognizant of the fact that numerous studies have been conducted and many solutions have been proposed over the years to strengthen governance and the justice system in Haiti.  The Diaspora proposes a fresh approach, seizing on the opportunity presented by the disaster of January 12 to build a better and stronger Haiti. Members of the Diaspora strongly urges that that any Justice Sector/Governance initiatives in Haiti be organically conceived and implemented, and encompass working with all levels of the Haitian government, beginning with the smallest township authorities to highest level officials in the three branches of government, but not neglecting other domestic actors, including school age children and post-secondary students, on their role in having a justice and governmental system that works for all.  These efforts must be long term, as past experiences have shown that short term efforts generally only yield short term results.  

We urge all stakeholders involved in the reconstruction of Haiti to make full use of the Diaspora: the Diaspora is poised to play a significant role, offering its professional skills, cultural awareness and language capabilities, to work both in Haiti, within Haitian governmental institutions and the foreign and local NGO communities; as well as in the donor countries with governmental, nongovernmental and private entities involved in the reconstruction process. The use of Haitian professionals of the Diaspora shall be in the same manner and with similar remuneration as transfers, details, or employment of non Diaspora members.

The goal is not to duplicate nor supplant the much needed long term changes to the GOH Civil Service career track, and the need for a larger programmatic objective of reversing the brain drain in Haiti; instead it is designed to address the immediate and short-term human resource needs that currently exist in Haiti.

1.     Institutional rebuilding and democratic governance consolidation

a.     Constitutional Reform: while constitutional reform is important, the immediate and basic needs of the Haitians on the ground must be the primary focus of the reconstruction strategy.    However, we urge the GOH to continue the process of reforming the Constitution, recognizing that the new provisions will not take effect immediately.  In addition, the aspiration is that as the new Constitution is contemplated, the drafters consider eliminating the constitutional provision granting what amounts to absolute immunity from prosecution to parliamentary and high government officials; officials involved in wrongdoing must be held accountable like every other citizen, they should not be shielded by immunity.

b.     Decentralization: We urge the GOH to give full force and effect to constitutional provisions regarding decentralization, and this must occur with all deliberate speed.  The decentralization process must include providing the necessary competencies (legal authority to get things done) and resources (funds) needed to effectuate it.

c.     Elections: Political stability is the cornerstone of any prosperous nation, and Haiti must provide political stability to its citizens, local and foreign investors, partners in the reconstruction effort and geographic neighbors.  We urge the government of Haiti to find a solution to the potential destabilizing political climate that is forthcoming as the term of the lower Chamber of Parliament and some members of the Senate expires in May 2010, and that of President Preval and his cabinet in February 2011.  In that light, Members of the Diaspora have called for free and fair elections to be held as soon as possible, possibly at the end this calendar year, but certainly before February 7, 2011, to ensure an effective transfer of power to a legitimate constitutional government. Others in the Diaspora recognize that these are extraordinary time and election s may not be possible, in that case, an alternative form of government is urged (such as an Assemblée Constituante) that would govern the country until free and fair elections can be organized.  In any event, a survey of the population should be conducted to assess whether the Haitians living on the ground believe it is best to hold elections between now and February, or schedule them for later.

d.     We urge the domestic entities organizing the elections as well as the international donors supporting them to make full use of the Diaspora as Election Observers in all upcoming elections.

2.     Increasing the State’s capacity in governance matters

Any reconstruction strategy must prioritize strengthening State institutions so they become able to provide basic services to the citizens of Haiti as soon as possible.  The Diaspora can serve as a bridge between the donor and NGO communities abroad, and the Government and people of Haiti on the ground, to effectuate that goal, through the following initiatives:

a.     Train the trainers initiatives, using the skills of Kreyòl speaking Diaspora members whenever possible

b.     Partnerships between the GOH, the Diaspora, and donor communities through, for example:

·       Twinning programs/exchange programs between Diaspora professionals and the national and local governments in Haiti;

·       Creation of online communities of practice;

·       Use of an open source database of Diaspora expertise (not owned by any one organization)

c.     Partnerships with academic centers, such as Haitian and foreign universities, for practical training programs for government officials

d.     Help increase the capacity of the GOH through programs that promote accountability, transparency, combat impunity, establish watchdog organizations both in Haiti and in the Diaspora, but also provide strong incentives for good governance. 

e.     As relief efforts continue and reconstruction efforts take shape, we urge the GOH and donor countries to institute a rigorus evaluation and monitoring mechanism for all program activities in order to ensure that implementing entities are accountable for the results desired.

f.      Establishment of a Civil Servant career track

g.     Support of a strong and sound educational system in Haiti that will strengthen the capacity of all in Haiti

h.     Establishment of a Civic Engagement Board to facilitate input from all segments of society, including the Diaspora

i.      Integration of a structure of the Diaspora within the Ministry of Haitians Living Abroad

3. Rule of Law and Public Security

Prior to the earthquake, the weaknesses of Haiti’s criminal justice institutions were well known to all, domestic and international actors alike.  Haiti’s laws are antiquated, the system is slow and burdensome, the detention facilities and prisons are overcrowded, justice sector personnel  are not well trained, equipped, or supported, the experience gaps in middle management is pronounced, and corruption plague the system.  These weaknesses have been exacerbated by the collapse of the Ministry of Justice building, the destruction of courthouses, police stations, and detention and correctional facilities in the earthquake zone.  In the aftermath of the quake, the escape of more than 4,000 detainees and prisoners from the National Penitentiary and detainees now pose a domestic security threat for an already weak justice sector.   While a lot progress in reducing crime was made by the Haitian National Police, with the support of MINUSTAH, in previous year, more needs to be done to professionalize the police in order to address emerging threats.

The Haitian Diaspora, at its March 2010 conference in Washington, DC, renewed its commitment to assist Haiti in the reconstruction effort by drawing on the thousands of professionals within it ranks.  To that end, we offer the following specific recommendation:

a.     The Government of Haiti should implement without delay the three laws enacted in 2007 establishing an independent judiciary.

b.     The Government of Haiti should accelerate the reform of Haiti’s criminal laws and criminal procedure, and donors should increase their financial assistance in support of the same.

c.     The Government of Haiti should, with donor support, take immediate steps to reform its civil code (e.g., contract, labor, and property, environmental) in order to facilitate economic growth, create jobs, pull citizens out of poverty, and foster a safe and secure environment for all Haitians to prosper.

d.     The Government of Haiti should increase the number of judges, prosecutors, police, and corrections officers, and other court personnel, and with donor support, train them to meet post-earthquake law enforcement and economic development requirements.

e.     The Government of Haiti, as it reforms the country’s justice system, should strengthen the capacity of its Ministries, including the Ministry of Justice and Public Security, to support national government institutions operating in local communities, and to develop and train a core of middle managers to assume leadership roles within their organizations.

f.      The Government of Haiti should, with the support of the international community, develop a correctional system that consistently meets international standards.

g.     The Government of Haiti should establish a robust anticorruption regime, staffed by properly vetted personnel charged with enforcing laws with severe penalties, including the suspension or revocation of the visa of public officials formally charged with corruption.

h.     Donors should resolve and make it a high priority to utilize, in the first instance, police, attorneys, corrections and other justice sector (rule of law) professionals within the Haitian Diaspora in implementing all the above mentioned reform initiatives.

WORKSHOP 4: SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND NATURAL DISASTER PREPAREDNESS AND MITIGATION

Les recommandations de cet atelier reposent sur le constat que la plupart des Haïtiens de l’intérieur, pour des raisons diverses, rêvent de quitter le pays,  tandis que la majorité de la diaspora rêvent de rentrer de rentrer, sinon définitivement, du moins  le plus souvent possible, au pays. La question se posait alors de savoir quelle était la logique de notre rapport au territoire, où était nous voulions vivre.  A bien observer les pratiques communes et évaluer la mobilité des biens et des personnes, on s’avise que notre rapport au pays dépasse le cadre étroit du territoire national. La crise ouverte par le séisme a fait de la question haïtienne une cause internationale où se trouve engagée la responsabilité de toute une génération, au-delà des frontières de la République d’Haïti. Cela concerne aussi bien les Haïtiens qui ont quitté le pays (et qui représentent une population de plus de trois millions d’habitants en 2010), leurs descendants que les Haïtiens de l’âme, amis étrangers qui voient dans l’avenir de ce peuple prophétique une cause universelle digne de leur solennel engagement.

Aussi avons-nous guidé nos travaux sur l’idée que nous voulions participer à la tâche commune la posture de citoyens concernés, non pour donner des ordres ni dessiner à la place des Haïtiens  le schéma de leur vie, mais pour aider à la réalisation d’une œuvre commune, fondée sur un plan concerté et rationnel afin de répondre à l’urgence de la crise ouverte par le séisme dans un premier temps, puis de jeter les bases d’un développement durable à plus long terme.

Nos propositions se résument en quatre points qui insistent sur:

·       La gestion de l’urgence liée à l’aléa

·       La gestion du risque lié à la vulnérabilité de la population

·       La nécessité d’un schéma directeur d’aménagement et de développement durable du territoire

1.     La gestion de crise

a.     Après les experiences passées qui ont révélé la gravite de la situation, il faut veiller à la production de l’information pertinente pour anticiper la catastrophe. La premiere chose a faire : mettre en place une culture du risque au sein de l’administration, sans attendre, c’est dans l’urgence que se fait l’apprentissage nécessaire à l’amélioration des techniques de secours.

b.     Dire aux gens quelles sont les attitudes à adopter  dans l’urgence de la situation, sur le plan sanitaire, sur le plan relationnel, sur l’encadrement des personnes traumatisées, l’accompagnement et la prise en charge des personnes mutilées, des enfants en particulier, etc.

c.      La radio doit être utilisée de facon systématique car c ‘est le média le plus accessible en Haiti.

d.     Haïti est un pays de plans et de projets dans lendemain, cela ne suffit plus, il faut passer à l’action rationnelle, urgence oblige. Il faut établir un climat de confiance entre la population et les autorités par la divulgation du Plan national d’intervention d’urgence et de gestion des risques. Un tel document doit être consultable par chacun. C’est la condition de la diffusion de la culture du risque et de sa prise en compte réelle dans l’aménagement concerté du territoire. Cela implique que tous les partenaires et acteurs sociaux ont accès à la même qualité de l’information nécessaire aux prises de décisions importantes.

e.     Il faut développer un système de recrutement et de formation d’un corps actif de volontaires bénévoles mobilisables sans délai. Cela pourrait se faire dans le cadre d’un service civil post-baccalauréat pour les jeunes gens et jeunes filles en fin d’études secondaires ou universitaires de façon à valoriser toutes les compétences.

f.      Il faut former les secouristes haïtiens selon les standards internationaux de façon à faciliter l’articulation avec les volontaires internationaux et éventuellement participer eux-mêmes à des opérations de secours dans des pays étrangers, là où l’urgence se présente, ce sera une façon pour Haïti d’exprimer sa gratitude envers l’empathie universelle manifestée à l’occasion du séisme du 12 janvier 2010.

g.     Il faut une plateforme qui permette la diffusion de l’information. Des plans d’urgence doivent être imaginés sous la forme de scénarios possibles en de catastrophe.

h.     Définir une échelle dans les niveaux d’alerte et à chaque situation avoir un scénario crédible et clair, accessible à la population.

i.      Il faut mettre en place un système de surveillance par GPS, comme moyen de prévention des seismes. 75 000 dollars ont été récoltés ici a Washington dc en 2001 pour acheter des équipement et les acheminer dans le pays. Il faut mobiliser les élèves et

j.      Mettre en place un système sinon d’adduction mais d’acheminement d’eau et d’assainissement d’urgence. L’eau doit être un objet central de nos préoccupations à court et long terme. Multiplier les Citernes et fontaines publiques, mettre en place un plan de soins adaptés à la réalité des camps de réfugiés qui ne doivent pas devenir de fait de nouveaux bidonvilles au cœur de la cité. Le Champs de Mars n’a pas vocation à devenir un bidonville.

k.     Il faut éduquer également les enfants,  leur montrer comment créer des abris, comment y accéder le plus rapidement.

l.      Il faut avoir tout de suite un plan d’occupation des sols, nécessaire à la mise  en défens de certaines zones : les versants les plus pentus, les zones de mangrove.

m.   Un parc marin pour protéger le golfe de Port-au-Prince et protéger l’avifaune de la mangrove durement éprouvée par l’envasement de la baie.

n.     Il faut renforcer la capacité d’intervention des professionnels, des ingénieurs et des architectes en particuliers par une responsabilisation accrue, ce qui implique l’existence de normes admises et sanctions pénales en cas de non-conformité des permis de construire.

En bref.

L’information en cas de désastre/un plan est necessaire /la communication entre les segments de la population/le savoir doit être mieux approprié/la mise en place d’un systeme de défense civile fondée sur le volontariat et le bénévolat/lq cartographie des endommagements/la rénovation urbaine est une nécessité/

2.     Gestion de la vulnerabilite

a.     La vulnérabilite est a la fois  physique et sociale. Il faut une carte de représentation du risque. La vulnérabilite est liée à la fois aux cyclones et aux séismes. Les facteurs de vulnérabilité sont aussi parfois des atouts: comme l’eau.

b.     Il faut réaliser un plan national de réduction du risque, un plan de gestion durable, qui dépasse la temporalité d’un gouvernement quel qu’il soit. Une politique nationale doit être adossée à une legislation adaptee en vue d’un plam de gestion durable. Ainsi, de proche en proche, on peut prendre en compte les préoccupations sectorielles et locales.

c.     Il faut définir un Schéma Directeur d’Aménagement du Territoire, articulé en trois échelles : une échelle régionale, une échelle municipale et une échelle locale. Il faut contrebalancer la macrocéphalie de portoprincienne par le renforcement de trois ou quatre métropoles d’équilibre vers lesquels orienter les investissements par une politique d’incitation fiscale. Il faut reconstruire les villes dont les rues et les voies ne sont pas formalisées.  Les secours n’ont pas pu être acheminés à temps parce que les venelles sont difficiles d’accès aux camions de secours. Il faut cesser de construire la ville à l’inverse de l’ordre rationnel : les maisons s’entassent d’abord sans ordre et sans services, après on se rend compte qu’elles sont inaccessibles et dépourvues de services de base. Il faut garantir la fourniture de services de base aux communautés rurales qui représentent plus de 60% de la population du pays.

d.     Il faut imposer des normes de construction. Il faut des plu locaux qui soient interactifs et capable de représenter un pal d’intervention d’urgence.

e.     Le Chili est un exemple de diffusion d’une culture du risque efficiente qu’il faut avoir comme modèle.

f.      Il faut penser aussi à l’aspect culturel de la vulnérabilite. Il faut penser à la culture de ceux qui  sont appelés à appliquer les principes de la culture du risque. Il faut expliquer au peuple le pourquoi des mesures adoptées dans l’intérêt commun, c’est le seul moyen d’obtenir des résultats dans le changement des attitudes communes.

g.     Il est important d’associer aux décisions la base, celle des associations populaires qui comme à Fondwa , Pandiassou, Fonkoze, des expérieneces pionnières comme le Lèt a gogo, etc. ont mis en place des stratégies de développement local dont les résultats sont encourageants et aidé à insuffler un regain de rersponsabilité dans le monde rural haïtien.

h.     Il faut renforcer les capacités des collectivités locales.

i.      DINEPA direction nationale plan d’assainissement et d’eau potable est un élément central du développement depuis 2009. Elle a fait les preuves de sa capacite de coordination dans la crise. Depuis deux ans et demi, la DINEPA a fait montre d’une meilleure organisation publique. La diaspora peut participer à son renforcement par la mise à disposition d’experts et de finances appropriées à une gestion à long terme.

En bref.

Il faut la mise en défens de certaines zones/les normes de constructions doivent être appliquées/les imageries satellitales doivent être utilisées dans les politiques de prévention/la population doit être actrice engagée dans le développement/les institutions doivent être renforcées et l’application des lois encouragées/ il faut mettre en place un système d’alerte efficace/ il faut une chaîne de responsabilité et des sanctions pour que les cadres se sentent tenus par leur engagement dans le service public/ les défaillances humaines doivent être punies et les sanctions exemplaires, à la mesure des enjeux humains et matériels.

3.     Rôle de la diaspora

a.     La diaspora doit aider à ameliorer la situation intérieure par le transfert des compétences.

b.     Il faut faciliter les missions des Haitiens de la diaspora pour partager les compétences. Il faut encourager le volontariat et valoriser l’engagement en faveur d’Haïti. Il faut un programme et un plan d’intervention d’urgence articulé à celui du pays natal.

c.     Il faut une traçabilite des fonds envoyés par la diaspora en Haiti. Un rapport précis et circonstancié de l’argent dépensé doit être accessible.

d.     La diaspora peut aider à la formation des opérateurs de secours. L’expérience du carnaval 2009 est un succès : seulement un mort par accident, grâce a l’apprentissage de 200 volontaires de premiers soins l’année précédente dans le cadre d’une mission de formateurs volontaires issus de la diaspora.

e.     L’assistance financière est acquise, plus de 1,3 millions de dollars par an, ce qu’il faut désormais, c’est l’assistance technique et sociale. La construction doit être un secteur clé du développement des relations entre la diaspora et le pays natal. Elle peut aider à la mise en place d’un centre de formation et de renforcement des capacités des métiers du bâtiment ou associés au génie civil en général.

f.      La diaspora propose de créer un fonds en faveur d’un memorial en souvenir des victimes du séisme. Il faut inscrire dans la mémoire la catastrophe. « Bay kou bliye pote mak sonje » dit un proverbe créole.

g.     Les universités étrangères (les universités francophones de l’Agence Universitaire de la Francophonier, pour des raisons de communauté linguistique évidentes, celles  des Etats-Unis, du Canada et de la République dominicaine, pour des raisons géographiques de proximité) sont déjà très engagées aux côtés des universités haïtiennes, publiques et privées. La diaspora peut mobiliser des ressources en faveur de ces collaborations multiples qui sont des passerelles de connaissances et de compétences et de savoir-faire.

h.     L’OEA en 2004 avait aidé au retour de 90 à 200 membres de la diaspora pour aider le pays: un tel programme pourrait etre systematisé.

i.      Il  faut travailler ensemble, en synergie avec le pays du dedans.  La diaspora a devoir d’humilité, mais aussi un droit de regard sur les décisions qui engagent l’avenir de leurs familles restées au pays.

j.      Comment envisager le retour des émigrés les plus formés?

k.     Il faut un pont entre la diaspora et le ministère en charge de la gestion des risques en Haiti. Il faut un plan de disponibilité des médecins et professionnels haitiens, il faut utiliser les réseaux sociaux pour faire circuler l’information pertinente en temps utile.

l.      il faut instaurer sans délai le droit à la double nationalité de tous les Haïtiens, ceux qui sont nés Haïtiens et ceux qui le deviennent par choix ou filiation directe.

En bref

La diaspora doit etre organisée de facon organique/le transfert des competences et des connaissances doit etre encourage/les transferts financiers sont importants, mais ils pourraient etre egalement techniques et scientifiques/il faut construire un memorial des disparus de la catastrophe, c’est la condition de la diffusion d’une authentique culture du risque/il faut une participation de la diaspora a la vie politique du pays natal/ des passerelles doivent etre etablies avec les ministeres pour faire face aux problems/ il faut ameliorer l’integration entre le pays interieur et la diaspora de facon a travailler de conserve et non pas de facon concurrentielle.

4.     Plan de developpement durable

a.     Il faut distinguer entre les aléas physiques et les enjeux économiques et sociaux : les aléas sont connus et peuvent être analyses indépendamment de la société, mais les enjeux sont directement corrélés aux préoccupations sociales. Les pauvres tiennent autant a leurs bicoques de fortune que les riches a leurs palaces, une politique publique de developpement durable doit prendre en compte les interêts des personnes d’abord, leur vouloir vivre ensemble. Il faut reloger autant que possible les gens selon des règles de solidarité vicinale de façon à maintenir les liens anciens. Les même communauté de vie peuvent être regroupés dans des logements salubres ailleurs que sur le site d’origine. Ce souci de regroupement est propice à l’équilibre psychologique à long terme de la population.

b.     Les politiques publiques haitiennes ont ete le plus souvent des politiques d’urgence, il faut imaginer des politiques de developpement sur le long terme.

c.     Il faut une banque de developpement et de reconstruction. Il y a un manque crucial au niveau du pays : une banque de la diaspora serait la bienvenue. Cela donnerait un plus grand accès au crédit en vue de la réalisation d’investissements productifs.

d.     Il faut une politique d’amélioration des infrastructures : des autoroutes reliant les capitales régionales et les grandes villes de province. Des routes pour désenclaver les campagnes.

e.     Il faut valoriser les secteurs ou le pays dispose d’avantages comparatives : par exemple, les exportations de produits d’élevage (cabrits et de pintades vivants en Republique dominicaine), la musique, la peinture, la sculpture et tout l’artisanat d’art, etc. Il faut diffuser l’information économique aux entrepreneurs et aux petits producteurs.

f.      Il faut empêcher que les gens recommenecnt à construire de la même façon qu’avant. Des mesures drastiques doivent être prises.

g.     Il faut distinguer entre les plans d’urgence et les plans de gestion durable. Les priorités, ce sont la production alimentaire, puis le relogement des personnes déplacées, il faut encourager le micro crédit.

h.     La terre manque aux paysans entrepreneurs pour développer une production agricole durable. Les paysans sont traditionnellement considérés comme des pauvres a la périphérie de l’économie réelle. Il faut renverser la tendance et renforcer la tenure fonciere et les compétences des agriculteurs.

i.      Il faut recourrir aux energies nouvelles comme secteur prioritaire : il faut encourager le recours aux energies renouvelables . Il faut des incitations et des subventions publiques pour encourager le recours à des ressources nouvelles (solaire, eolienne, biocarburant, etc.).

j.      Il faut une politique de decentralisation et de developpement industriel sous la forme de technopoles ou les TIC occupent une place centrale. C’est le moyen de trouver la meilleure articulation entre la formation, l’enseignement supérieur et la production : des universities de pointe au service d’entreprises tournées vers la production de produits à haute valeur ajoutee destinées a l’exportation.

k.     Une technopole metropolitaine dans la region de Port-au-Prince, adossée à un Campus Universitaire International (CUI) et des technopoles regionales, des pôles universitaires régionaux, de moindre envergure mais capables de drainer dans les principales villes de provinces, érigées en métropoles d’équilibre, les forces vives necessaries au rééquilibrage du tissu economique national.

En bref.

Il faut organiser le systeme educatif en vue d’une politique de développement/il faut encourager les technologies de l’information et de la communication/il faut lutter contre la pauvreté par la facilitation des mécanismes d’acces au credit et à la connaissance/il faut renforcer les infrastructures de communications et de télécommunication/il faut renforcer l’agriculture vivrière/ il faut un mécanisme public d’intervention pour la mise en place de plan d’intervention d’urgence/ il faut la mise en place d’un systeme d’alerte en cas de désastre.

WORKSHOP 5: ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

The Workshop on Economic Development (and Job Creation) is considered by the Diaspora as a consultancy forum and the recommendations formulated by participants can be regrouped under three themes.

1.     To have a greater involvement of the Diaspora in the definition, implementation and monitoring of economic policy and development initiatives through the following points:

a.     Create a Peace Corps model  in every country  where Haitians and people of Haitian origins can offer their services free of charge to Haitians and Haiti (foreign governments);

b.     Increase the level of participation of the Diaspora in the Sister City Initiative in order to strengthen economic development and institutional capacity;

c.     Fix an ambitious but concrete quantifiable goal for the short and medium term for example in terms of GDP growth (6% per year or more) and reduction of poverty;

d.     Officially have donors and the government of Haiti (GOH) agree to formally engage the Diaspora in the implementation and follow up of measures and recommendations for recovery and reconstruction;

e.     Create a platform for exchanging information and ensuring that (i) the Diaspora is updated on business opportunities as well as other developments and (ii) at the same time that the GOH is aware of resources available in the Diaspora (financial and human).

2.     To instill confidence and leverage greater Diaspora involvement in the recovery and reconstruction, through the following  points:

a.     Recognize dual nationality: although the Diaspora understands that there are no legal impediments to investments , dual nationality will create greater inclusion and incentive;

b.     Increase accountability through greater transparency and oversight of all funds through the strengthening of the judicial system, the appropriate and detailed reporting  of through a public information system;

c.     Create a Diaspora fund with the possibility of matching contributions from donors and others;

d.     Create a social venture fund  which could be in the form of a Haiti Bond or private equity fund;

e.     Have an updated and publicly available inventory of all NGOs operating on the National territory and a mapping of their activities and the sources of their funding;

f.      Publicize eligibility and selection criteria for donor funded projects and ensure greater participation of Haitian SMEs and Diaspora investors;

g.     Home countries provide Tax relief incentives for investing in Haiti.

3.     Specific sector recommendations and proposals[1] are key to fostering job creation and a sustainable economy. They can be regrouped under the following topics:

a.     Mechanisms and tools to promote and attract investments in priority sectors such as agriculture, apparel industry and tourism particularly in newly defined economic hubs:

·       Prioritize projects based on their contribution to decentralization, deconcentration, and the participation of women in economic activity;

·       Strengthen the role of the Centre de Facilitation des Investments (CFI) and institute regional representation to facilitate outside the metropolitan area;

·       Create a mechanism to promote Haiti as a tourism destination even in the short term and to address all aspects of tourism security;

·       Have a subaccount for the apparel industry within the framework  of  the Guarantee Fund which is currently being created;

·       Create a mechanism to make credit readily available for the productive sector particularly the agricultural sector;

·        Increase productivity by strengthen vocational training and targeting skills demanded by the market. This would include an assessment of available skills and needs by sector;

·       Strengthen the database within CFI of potential partners by sector;

·       Encourage innovation through the strengthening of intellectual property rights;

·       Transform the rural landscape by protecting local farming against agricultural imports, aggressively pursuing food security, and promoting agro exports and agro industry (including vertical integration);

·        Promote rural units of integrated production including aquaculture, livestock, rudimentary manufacturing, services, etc;

·       Identify each region’s comparative advantage and invest  accordingly;

·       Provide for appropriate financing of development activities, particularly through widening of the tax base.

b.     Under the Infrastructure development particularly outside the capital city, the  following suggestions were made:

·       Energy

o   Allow the private sector to distribute electricity; at the same time reinforce the power of the state to reduce non technical losses.

o   Promote green energy by pursuing solar energy production and developing inexpensive storage systems (electro-chemical, kinetic, etc.) that can stock energy.

o   Provide alternative energy solutions for reaching remote areas not serviced by national grid.

·       Housing

o   Create mortgage banking.

o   Provide tax incentives for investments in social housing.

·       Others

o   Encourage investments in talent and promote culture sectors.

o   Fiscal incentives to encourage investments outside Port-au-Prince.

o   Ensure transfer of technology.

o   Advocate green construction and use disaster resistant structure.

WORKSHOP 6: SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

Child Welfare

A central flaw of the child welfare system in Haiti prior to the earthquake was that it was mostly private and suffered from the absence of appropriate government regulation. To address this, technical assistance should be provided to the Government of Haiti to develop laws that govern child abandonment, foster care, kinship care domestic and intercountry adoption. Many members of the Haitian Diaspora are master degreed social workers who have become specialist in Child welfare models. This Diaspora can consult and partner with the “Ministère des affaires sociales” in particular “l’Institut du bien Etre social et de Recherche” to implement, provide training and technical support in order to strengthen the infrastructure of the child welfare system. NGO’s working with children should be required to register with the Government prior to have access to the children then be monitored by a set of guidelines.

The Diaspora make the following recommendations in which they believe that the Government should be able to implement in the short term, and create infrastructure for  long term sustainability; 

1.     Adopt the Hague Convention for international adoption; that aims to prevent the abduction, sale of or traffic in children that works to ensure that intercountry adoption is in the best interest of the children.

2.     Support family preservation to prevent child abandonment, by offering support services to the family and/or extended family to care for their own children. 

3.     Prioritize the adoption of children by: Haitian families in Haïti and the Haitian Diaspora and work with identified partners to assist in developing culturally congruent education and training for those wishing to care for Haitian children in order to minimize additional trauma and maximize adaptive outcomes consistent with Haitian culture and Values.

4.     Phase out the orphanage system through the re-integration of children into family/extended family like settings (i.e. foster care models).

5.     Create a central database of all children in out of family placement, where progress and services are recorded and tracked. (modeled from the District of Columbia’s child welfare system)

Education

The members of the Diapora who are in academia wish to collaborate with the government and offer their services in implementing the following recommendations:

1.     Wholistic view of education;

2.     The government should attempt to provide schools with safe building codes including provisions with access for students with disabilities.

a.     Provide to free meals, transportation, uniforms, schools supplies, and have a strategy for the implementation of technology in all classrooms. 

3.     National free Education System to reflect quality schools with no difference between rural and urban schools (Equitable access)

4.     Certification process through professional institute for teachers and administrators

b.     Ongoing professional development of educators and administrators

c.     Higher wages for teachers and administrators

d.     Diaspora Teacher Mentoring Exchange Program

e.     Diaspora Adoption of School/Students Program

5.     Start school readiness programming through a community approach that leads to higher education and vocational training

a.     Develop second chance education ( Les suragés)  and adult literacy programs

b.     Support post-secondary internships with partners in the world for workforce readiness.

c.     Build capacity of University of Haiti through partnerships with Universities abroad.

d.     Support of Cultural Art Centers that could also serve as mental health therapeutic medium.

6.     Develop curriculum with national standards with result-based evaluation criteria. Integrate the following considerations:

a.     Create and implement culturally relevant curriculum

b.     Create and implement differentiated curriculums (age and ability level)

c.     Create and implement STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics) program

d.     Use mechanisms such as distance learning, media tools, etc.

e.     Create and implement health and sports program

7.     Continue to promote early education in Creole in the provinces with emphasis of French as a second language in primary school to help address high illiteracy rate (Research-Based)

8.     Promote civic education program for all students which includes sensitivity education and training awareness regarding student with disabilities

a.                                                                             Youth Mentoring Programs

9.     Implement psycho social support services in the schools, to address the Post-traumatic effects of the earthquake.

The Role of Women in the Reconstruction

1.     Gender mainstreaming

a.     Take into consideration gender in its conception, elaboration, et the establishment of structures, projects and programs.

b.     Positive reinforcement of the status of women

2.     PDNA focused on women: needs assessment and best practices

3.     Empowerment through education

a.     Skills building

b.     Literacy

c.     Higher education

4.     Empowerment though agriculture infrastructure

a.     Equipment

b.     Access to funding

5.     Strengthening the response to violence against women

a.     Zero tolerance policy

b.     Implementing a victim and abuser profile registry

c.     Support grassroots organization in their efforts to reinforce education

d.     Reinforce security on camps by women

                  i.     Increase the presence of women in security personnel including local sand foreign troops.

6.     Ensure that the Diaspora is effectively represented (with at least one of the two representatives being a woman) in the body responsible for allocation of funds from the international community.

Health Development

It has been conservatively estimated that the approximately two million earthquake survivors who are either injured, displaced or both, will need at least three times the medical and health care services as the remaining eight million or who survived unharmed.  This effectively means that Haiti’s pre-earthquake capacity has to double.  In an effort to avoid excess deaths and debilitations, the urgency to double this capacity is now.

It has also been estimated that the environmental refugee population will continue to be uprooted, poorly-housed and under terrific stress for months if not years.  Subsequently the refugee population will be several times more vulnerable to secondary health problems, infections, accidents and mental illnesses than overall Haitians who were not displaced.

The moderator, rapporteurs and technical experts of the Health Development group developed an outline of the nearly 40 recommendations that were suggested by the collective Social Development group. The targeted population in need is as follows:

1.     Victims displaced by the earthquake: The earthquake has caused a development of new population of people, “internally displaced persons”. One out of every five Haitians is in this population. Their needs are specific and immediate.  Hence targeted health interventions are necessary.

2.     Women: Women make up a majority of the Haitian population. Life expectancy is estimated at 53 years of age for women¹. Women in Haiti suffer high rates of maternal and infant mortality, which is a key indicator of a country’s overall health.  Action is needed to improve women’s health outcomes.

3.     Children: Pediatric care in Haiti is in dire need of strengthening. Due to inadequate sanitation, clean water and poor living conditions, the children of Haiti are developing diarrheal illnesses and infectious diseases that could otherwise be prevented. The children of Haiti are struggling to survive as their mortality increases.

4.     Elderly: The earthquake’s burden weighs heavy on the elderly. As repositories of Haiti’s history and culture, the elderly have specific chronic care needs, such as diabetes and hypertension that must not go unnoticed. Most elderly are taken care of by family members or neighbors and are at high risk of dying with lack of proper health care.

5.     Laborers: In a land of manual labor, there are physical and emotional changes that will affect the workforce of Haiti. Many amputees (within all of the listed population in need categories) will not be functional without proper rehabilitation and follow up health care. Health workers who take care of the sick and injured also need appropriate follow up and medical care and often times forego the medical care they need as they take on the needs of others.

6.     Students: Medical, nursing, paramedical persons are in need of sustained support and continuous training. They should be integrated in the health strategies that are developed so that they are leading the effort for optimal health care in Haiti.

The following recommendations by the workshop are categorized according to the type of professional groupings that will be involved:

Preventive Medicine

1.     Promoting health education using the specific framework of social determinants of health

2.     Supporting education campaigns within the camps focusing on infectious diseases such as TB, HIV, malaria, STDs,  and water sanitation hygiene (WASH)- using media forum ie. radio, oral animation, theatre

3.     Increase a health focus in the penitentiary system, ensuring access for health of prisoners

4.     Promotion of healthy lifestyles for our youth through sports

5.     Implementing a follow up care system, specifically post amputation, funding existing rehab centers and supporting them by well-established organizations from the Diaspora.

6.     Investing in sustainable health by focusing on the environmental effects pre/post earthquake on healthcare in Haiti, (ie. measuring effectively the amount of toxins in the air and addressing this issue in an effective way, resources toward environmental standards for Haiti’s air, promoting clean air, replanting the trees to prevent continued deforestation of Haiti land mass).

7.     Continue to increase the current capacity in Haiti through support of a developed  health systems management strategy working with and through the MINISTRY OF HEALTH .

Human Resources

1.     Promoting a partnership between Diaspora health care professionals and health care professionals in Haiti to provide intense and modern technology training

2.     Support the existing development of small community health centers outside of the capital.

3.     Investing in work force development, community workers and other mid level providers to build the infrastructure; these persons could be trained to be a mid level resource for the community.

4.     Create incentives for specialists to work in the provinces thereby decentralizing special care services (an estimated 95% of specialists are living and practicing within Port-au-Prince and the ratio is 25/100,000).

5.     Investing in indigenous Haitian organizations that promote health and provide health care and contracting them directly to continue these services.

6.     Supporting a Haitian version of the US Comfort relief ship to be docked at the Haitian seaport, supplied with Haitian doctors, specialists, social workers, nurses, and an extended cadre of health care providers for a period of 5 years, while the current health system is being restructured.

7.     Investing in a civil service humanitarian act for Haitians to return to Haiti for two weeks to provide services and for their jobs in the States remain secured.

8.     While their schools are being rebuilt, using and working alongside the medical students to provide basic primary health care and public health promotion within the camps

Emergency Preparedness

1.     Investing in an adequate emergency system, ICU, CCU system and promoting partnerships between American University Hospitals, and the Ministry of Health (MSPP) to provide sustainable outcomes.

Partnership in Advanced Clinical Education

1.     Funding towards building medical schools of excellence in partnership with the private/public hospitals through:

a.     Rebuilding hospitals (public/private)

b.     Supporting clinical mentorship programs to build technical and practical capacity for the many medical students who are no longer in school

c.     Partnering with the Ministry of Health (MSPP), Notre Dame, Quisqueya, L’hopital General, and other public/private hospitals to build medical continuum through clinical education.

d.     Maintenance of a medical residency and fellowship focusing on diseases that are endemic to Haiti and the Caribbean ( ie, Telemedicine where doctors can communicate with international community via internet and web for continued training and support of Haitian doctors in Haiti)

e.     Supporting Continuing Medical Education by visiting professors already established with the Faculty of Medicine and the General Hospital.

f.      Supporting the training program already started by reputable medical associations, locally and from the Diaspora.

2.     Fund a “mini-fellowship” in infectious diseases for local doctors. This activity will build capacity of the in-country physicians, and strengthen the skills of other members of the multi-disciplinary team, including the counselors and treatment support staff, and the technical staff (ie, pharmacists, lab technicians). This training will provide an opportunity for continued clinical technical assistance that will be sustainable over time by Haitians.

Women’s Health

1.     Invest in family planning, women’s reproductive health and child health organizations, health centers in conjunction with the Ministry of Health that will promote the expansion of services for women’s health

2.     Improving maternal health through increasing skilled midwifery and health providers and strengthening the referral systems to effectively manage complicated births

Performance Based Evaluations

1.     Create a performance based evaluation system through the Ministry of Health for indigenous based organizations, hospitals and international aid working in Haiti.

Mental Health

1.     Investing in mental health specifically since the earthquake, looking at different mediums of therapy especially for children.

Creating a culturally sensitive model for mental health care.

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[1] These are listed in no particular order